Remy Debes

The ideal that all humans deserve respect is almost universally accepted today. But how well do we live up to this ideal? Even in Western nations, where this moral ideal has become sacrosanct, we suffer daily reminders of our failures to live up to it. Sexism, racism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, islamophobia, antisemitism: as soon as we declare progress in overcoming such attitudes, they regenerate with renewed vigor. What explains this moral inertia? Drawing from a wide range of historically underrepresented voices, and real-life reflections, Remy Debes argues that we are missing something important when it comes to respect- and that our existing ideas are part of the problem. We are introduced to the concept of respect in childhood and quickly learn that respecting persons requires us to focus on the undifferentiated aspects of people. Each of us, we are told, is a rational agent, with autonomy and rights, and it is in this sense of personhood that we all deserve respect. The problem with this mindset, Debes argues, is that sometimes respecting persons - in the basic moral sense - requires deemphasizing what all persons have in common, in favor of what is different and unique about them. Sometimes, we are not calling out to be respected as a person in general, but as the specific person we are. The Possibility of Respect addresses the what and how of practicing respect on an individual basis, compares it to other kinds of demonstrations of respect, and explains how practicing this alternative, individual-focused way of thinking about respect might improve the outcomes of the multiple moral challenges facing us today.

Remy Debes provides a historical background for the prominent role that respect plays in current moral discussion. But, true to the spirit of this volume as philosophical rather than encyclopedic, Debes does not just describe texts and list dates. Instead, he raises doubts about the standard story about the rising influence of the idea of respect for persons, that it comes mainly and directly from Immanuel Kant. Debes offers evidence that by the time Kant’s writings gained influence in the English-speaking world, the movement toward the importance of respect for all persons already was well underway, albeit often using terminology other than “respect.” This movement grew partly among moral and political philosophers, and political activists, but also in underappreciated literary writing, often written by women and men of color.

Since its introduction into English in 1909, as a translation of the German concept _Einfühlung_ (feeling into), “empathy” has had a convoluted relationship to the concept of sympathy. This chapter explains some of this complicated conceptual history, with a focus on the primary subjects of their earliest overlap: late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century phenomenology and psychology. Out of this analysis emerges a surprising discovery. Within turn-of-the-century phenomenological conceptions of _Einfühlung_ and empathy, on the one hand, and early American social psychological conceptions of sympathy, on the other, is a common concern to connect both concepts (respectively) to a claim about the _recognition_ of other persons. Specifically, there is an attempt to use these concepts to explain our ability to experience other persons as just that—as “other.” Accordingly, the philosophical import and conceptual ramifications of this discovery are explored.

Trending work in social epistemology suggests that those with power actively and passively hinder those without power from interpreting and communicating their experiences of suffering and persecution, thus obstructing their role in the production of knowledge about these experiences. This kind of “epistemic oppression” raises a puzzle about the nature and possibilities of interpersonal understanding, which this chapter calls the problem of power. Put simply, if what counts as “knowledge” is regulated by those with power, then can empowered people ever genuinely understand oppressed people? This essay attempts to answer this question, which in turn leads to a new theory of what it means to understand other persons.

It seems that talk of dignity is everywhere. In my first formal study of dignity in 2009, I noted a marked uptick in interest in the subject during the latter half of the twentieth century. Since then, the enlargement of appeals to dignity is even more striking. The idea is now constantly referenced in everyday Western moral and political debate and news coverage. It is featured in all kinds of institutional policies, codes of conduct, and handbooks, especially in the areas of health care. And the number of scholarly articles and books published on the subject over the past decade is impressive, to say the least.Whether all this increased talk has been productive is far less obvious. I argued in 2009 that scholarly...

In this entry to David Hume scholarship, Jacqueline Taylor brings together a line of interpretation she has been developing over several years, connecting Hume's theory of the passions to what she calls Hume's "social theory." Through a concise, well-organized argument, the book offers insights into how one of the Enlightenment's most famous and gifted thinkers conceptualized social roles and institutions, the ways we navigate these roles and institutions, and how all this connects to the kind of creature we are. It is a rewarding read for anyone interested in Hume's moral project.The book begins with a lively, historicized defense of Hume's "experimental" method against readers who have thought his approach fails...

In everything from philosophical ethics to legal argument to public activism, it has become commonplace to appeal to the idea of human dignity. In such contexts, the concept of dignity typically signifies something like the fundamental moral status belonging to all humans. Remarkably, however, it is only in the last century that this meaning of the term has become standardized. Before this, dignity was instead a concept associated with social status. Unfortunately, this transformation remains something of a mystery in existing scholarship. Exactly when and why did "dignity" change its meaning? And before this change, was it truly the case that we lacked a conception of human worth akin to the one that "dignity" now represents? In this volume, leading scholars across a range of disciplines attempt to answer such questions by clarifying the presently murky history of "dignity," from classical Greek thought through the Middle Ages and Enlightenment to the present day.

Given a steady increase of interest in 18th Scottish philosophy it isn't surprising that Mandeville is also enjoying a new wave of interest. On the one hand, Mandeville had an especially obvious influence on Scottish Enlightenment thought. As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, the Scots took Mandeville very seriously, more so than any other collective audience at the time. In The Fable, the Scots saw fundamental challenges, not mere rabble-rousing social commentary. On the other hand, an essential aspect of Mandeville’s work is a competing moral psychology as well as a similarly tightly conjoined and competing social-political theory–one with much more radical implications than most Scots were prepared to endorse.

The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading, and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this paper assesses mirrored understanding in cases of emotion and its import for theories of empathy and especially empathy in ethical contexts. In particular, this paper argues that the mirrored understanding claim is ambiguous and ultimately misleading when applied to emotion, partly because mirroring proponents fail to appreciate the way in which empathy might serve a distinct normative function in our judgments of what other people feel. The paper thus concludes with a call to revise the mirrored understanding claim, whether in neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy.

Where exactly should we place Adam Smith in the cannon of classical liberalism? Smith's advocacy of free market economics and defence of religious liberty in The Wealth of Nations suffice for including him somewhere in that tradition.1 The nature and extent of Smith's liberalism, however, remain up for debate. One recent trend has been to characterise Smith as a proponent of social liberalism. This includes those like Stephen Darwall, Samuel Fleischacker and Charles Griswold, who have drawn attention to a kind of descriptive moral egalitarianism in Smith.2 Humans, Smith seems to hold, are naturally disposed to valuing one another under a conception of equality. But that is not all these scholars suggest. They have also hinted at something more contentious? the idea that, according to Smith, we value one another in a way resonant with contemporary notions of human dignity, conceived as the inherent value of persons grounding certain rights to, or restrictions on, treatment by others.3 In saying so, these scholars have hit upon something remarkable. However, I also think their arguments in this respect are both indirect and incomplete. Consequently, the full import of Smith's view remains obscure. This essay aims to bring some clarity. 1I intend this historically. I grant there are good reasons to be sceptical about the ultimate fate of liberty in capitalist society (e.g. Marxist reasons and reasons based on various postmodern critiques of enlightenment ideology). Also, the designation?free market? should be understood loosely, as most scholars now agree it is a mistake to identify Smith with thoroughgoing laissez-faire economics. 2Darwall, S.,?Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith?, Philosophy Fleischacker, S., A Third Concept of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Griswold, C., Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Other major commentators holding some version of this view might include Raphael, D. D. The Impartial Spectator (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994). 3See e.g. Fleischacker (2004), 205; Darwall at 142, 156 and Griswold at 235?239. However, one must read Fleischacker carefully, for he also uses the adjectival?dignified? to express Smith's concern with what is?honourable? or?respectable? about persons, which use does not obviously match up with the notion of inherent value (see e.g. p. 207). Darwall's argument includes by far the most explicit discussion of?dignity? as I've defined it. But as Darwall's article is ostensibly a book review (albeit a substantive one that addresses three books at once, including Griswold's), it cannot be called a direct inquiry. Griswold never explicitly puts his interpretation in terms of?dignity?, but that is clearly what he is after. Thus Darwall also reads him that way.

In recent years there has been a tremendous resurgence of interest in ethical sentimentalism, a moral theory first articulated during the Scottish Enlightenment. Ethical Sentimentalism promises a conception of morality that is grounded in a realistic account of human psychology, which, correspondingly, acknowledges the central place of emotion in our moral lives. However, this promise has encountered its share of philosophical difficulties. Chief among them is the question of how to square the limited scope of human motivation and psychological mechanism - so easily influenced by personal, social, and cultural circumstance - with the seeming universal scope and objective nature of moral judgment. The essays in this volume provide a comprehensive evaluation of the sentimentalist project with a particular eye to this difficulty. Each essay offers critical clarification, innovative answers to central challenges, and new directions for ethical sentimentalism in general.

Many prominent scholars of Hume's philosophy have suggested that Hume eventually abandoned his associationist account of sympathy, which he made so much of in the Treatise, by the time he came to write the second Enquiry. In this paper I reconsider the seeming disappearance of the associationist account of sympathy, but with the ultimate aim of defending a no-change hypothesis. That is, I’ll argue that careful analysis reveals that Hume not only retained the associationist theory of sympathy in his later work, he made no substantive changes to this theory, including in particular, in EPM.

By founding morality on the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith implied that the nature of moral judgment was far more intuitive and accessible than their rationalist predecessors and contemporaries would, or at least easily could, allow. And yet, these ‘Sentimentalists’ faced the longstanding belief that the human affective psyche is a veritable labyrinth – an obstacle to practical morality if not something literally brutish in us. The Scottish Sentimentalists thus implicitly tasked themselves with distinguishing and locating the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation in the human psyche. In this paper, I argue that this task led Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith to adopt a remarkable thesis when it came to the nature of the moral sentiments, namely, that the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation are peculiar – somehow radically unlike other sentiments.

The philosophy of “ human dignity” remains a young, piecemeal endeavor with only a small, dedicated literature. And what dedicated literature exists makes for a rather slapdash mix of substantive and formal metatheory. Worse, ironically we seem compelled to treat this existing theory both charitably and casually. For how can we definitively assess any of it? Existing suggestions about the general features of dignity are necessarily contentious in virtue of being more or less blissfully uncritical of themselves. Because none of the suggested features are conscientiously situated in their own right, their justification is taken to rest solely on whether each is borne out by some substantive account. But absent the sort of second-order considerations that would make for a proper metatheory, what can we do with their substantive suggestions? Of course, the concept of dignity has other forums. It figures prominently into insular analyses of either Kantian or Biblical ethics, and, to various degrees, an array of subsidiary fields of practical philosophy including human rights, bioethics, law, theories of respect, race theory, Judaic studies, feminism, care ethics, war, technology, and political philosophy. Each of these areas has an established literature. Each contributes interesting observations to the nature of dignity. But, again, ultimately, without a proper metatheory, it is unclear what to do with any of them. My goal is to remedy this, or at least reverse the trend. In doing so I will have in view one particular subfield, namely, the ever-pressing subject of human rights.

The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that this new account, despite tacit acceptance by all major theories of emotion, in fact rules out some of the most fundamental and controversial claims of one side of the nature-of-emotion debate, emotional cognitivism.