Renee J. Smith

Distance Learning (DL) courses have become ubiquitous, especially since the pandemic. Having had some experience with DL in high school, first-year students might be inclined to enroll in DL courses. Other students take DL because of completing demands on their time, such as work, family, or athletics participation, and some students just like the flexibility afforded by DL courses. However, many college students are unprepared for the self-regulative practices, including time management and assistance-seeking behaviors, required for success in a DL course.

It's nearly 10:00 AM on a Thursday morning and the courtroom is filled with more than 100 members of the jury pool. Court officials, state police officers, and defendants line the halls waiting to be called for pre-trial conferences and for jury selection to begin, then the fire alarm sounds. There is no obvious evidence of fire, no smoke, no shouts, and no other warnings. At the same time, no one announces that there is a fire drill in progress, that the alarm is merely being tested, or that the alarm was pulled by accident. Sitting in the court room, what would you do? And, more importantly, why would you do it? What goes through your head when you hear the alarm?

Given the right sorts of reading assignments, students can learn to read philosophy by reading philosophy. This paper identifies a number of obstacles to students’ reading philosophy and recommends re-envisioning student-learning outcomes in light of the revised Bloom’s taxonomy of learning objectives and using directed reading assignments that help students achieve them. It describes seven reading assignments in philosophy that emphasize active learning to facilitate students’ learning to read philosophy as they read philosophy.

Sydney Shoemaker has gone to great lengths to defend a repre-sentationalist view of phenomenal character, and yet he describes this view as breaking with standard representationalism in two ways. First, he thinks his representationalist position is consis- tent with the possibility of spectrum inversion, and second, he thinks there are qualia. Thus, we can think of his position in the qualia debate as moderate representationalism by taking up some middle ground be- tween these two major camps. This \moderate" view faces several problems. Here I will very briey explain Shoemaker's represen- tationalist account of spectrum inversion in which he appeals to the existence of a certain sort of subjective property of objects, namely, what he calls appearance properties. I will argue that an alternative ver- sion of representationalism provides a more plausible explanation of both inversion-type scenarios and Shoemaker's color constancy case, which he uses to motivate the existence of these subjective properties, without positing appearance properties at all.

Given the right sorts of reading assignments, students can learn to read philosophy by reading philosophy. This paper identifies a number ofobstacles to students’ reading philosophy and recommends re-envisioning student-learning outcomes in light of the revised Bloom’s taxonomy of learning objectives and using directed reading assignments that help students achieve them. It describes seven reading assignments in philosophy that emphasize active learning to facilitate students’ learning to read philosophy as they read philosophy.

Given the inexperience, misconceptions and misgivings students often bring to a first course in philosophy, we present an activity that acquaints students with the main areas of philosophical inquiry and the tools philosophers use. Students engage in philosophical thinking by reflecting on and answering questions, defending and discussing their answers, and modifying or rejecting views in light of this discussion. The activity introduces students to conceptual analysis, argument, thought-experiment, and the use of counterexampleswhile simultaneously emphasizing and illuminating students’ natural tendency to think philosophically.

Qualia realists hold that experience’s phenomenal character is a non-representational property of experience, what they call qualia. Representationalists hold that phenomenal character is a representational property of experience—there are no qualia (in this particular sense of the word). The transparency of qualia to introspection would seem to count as reason for rejecting qualia realism and favoring representationalism. Sydney Shoemaker defends a middle ground, call it moderate qualia realism, which seems to provide a response to the problem of transparency that in consistent with qualia realism. According to this view, while phenomenal character is a representational property of experience, it is determined by certain non-representational properties of experience, namely qualia. Shoemaker explains the apparent transparency of qualia by claiming that, while qualia are not directly introspectable, they are indirectly introspectable. I argue that neither Shoemaker’s moderate qualia realism nor his account of indirect introspection provide the qualia realist with a plausible solution to the problem of transparency.

This study examined academic and psychological correlates of exam performance in an introductory logic course. The participants were 39 students who completed Logic and Critical Thinking at a southeastern liberal arts university. Students were assigned 20 online homework sets, met for two 75-minute class sessions each week for a 15-week term, and took three exams. A general self-efficacy scale and a frustration scale were administered during the last class meeting. A significant positive correlation was found between exam scores and each of the following variables: homework scores, attendance, and self-efficacy scores. A significant negative correlation was found between students’ frustration scores and their exam scores. Hierarchical regression analysis indicated that homework, attendance, and frustration scores made significant contributions to the prediction of exam scores. The implications of these findings for improving course design and enhancing student learning were discussed. (139 words)

The most notable contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind have been written by philosophers of mind for philosophers of mind. Without a good understanding of the historical framework, the technical terminology, the philosophical methodology, and the nature of the philosophical problems themselves, not only do undergraduate students face a difficult challenge when taking a first course in philosophy of mind, but instructors lacking specialized knowledge in this field might be put off from teaching the course. This paper is intended to provide a framework for instructors with little background in this area of philosophy to develop a course in philosophy of mind. This course, aimed at the advanced undergraduate student, provides students with the tools necessary for understanding some of the key readings in contemporary philosophy of mind and offers unique benefits to both majors and non-majors. The course described here focuses on just two of the main problems in philosophy of mind—the mind-body problem and the problem of phenomenal consciousness—and briefly touches on other issues one might address. Finally, several solutions to common challenges that arise in an advanced philosophy course are discussed.

The transparency of qualia to introspection has been given as reason for favoring a representationalist view of phenomenal character. Qualia realists, notably Block (1996, 2000), A.D. Smith (2008), and Kind (2003, 2008), have denied that qualia are transparent. What is clear is that the phenomenology of introspection alone cannot decide the case, but a theory of introspection could. If the qualia realist could show that our introspective access to mental properties is akin to the perceptual access we have to perceived properties, then she has grounds for denying the transparency claim. On the other hand, if introspection does not provide access to intrinsic mental properties, then the representationalist has a basis for defending the transparency claim. Armstrong’s theory of introspection has been taken to be typical of perceptual theories; however, this paper will give reasons for thinking not only that his theory does not in fact constitute a perceptual theory but that such theories of introspection do not afford qualia realists with the means of denying the transparency of qualia to introspection.

Sydney Shoemaker has gone to great lengths to defend a repre-sentationalist view of phenomenal character, and yet he describes this view as breaking with standard representationalism in two ways. First, he thinks his representationalist position is consis- tent with the possibility of spectrum inversion, and second, he thinks there are qualia. Thus, we can think of his position in the qualia debate as moderate representationalism (or, equally, moderate qualia realism) by taking up some middle ground be- tween these two major camps. This \moderate" view faces several problems. Here I will very briey explain Shoemaker's represen- tationalist account of spectrum inversion in which he appeals to the existence of a certain sort of subjective property of objects, namely, what he calls appearance properties (formerly he called these phenomenal properties). I will argue that an alternative ver- sion of representationalism provides a more plausible explanation of both inversion-type scenarios and Shoemaker's color constancy case, which he uses to motivate the existence of these subjective properties, without positing appearance properties at all.

Philosophers typically distinguish between a priori and a posteriori beliefs, knowledge, justification, and propositions. A belief is a priori if it is derived from reason, and it is a posteriori if it is derived from sense experience. Similarly, we would say that we know a priori that ‘a closed, n-sided figure has n interior angles’ because our knowledge is derived from reason in that we understand the concept of a closed, n-sided figure and thus know the statement is true. On the other hand, we know a posteriori that ‘Americans drive on the right’ because in justifying this belief, we appeal to sense experience; perhaps we have seen for ourselves that Americans drive on the right or we've read about it in a book or seen it in a movie.

The idea that the phenomenal character of experience is determined by non-intentional properties of experience, what philosophers commonly call qualia, seems to conflict with the phenomenology of introspection. Qualia seem to be transparent, or unavailable, to introspection. This has led intentionalists to deny that the phenomenal character of experience is a non-intentional property of experience—to deny there are qualia. It has led qualia realists to deny the transparency of qualia or to question the reliability of introspection. In this paper, I present what I call the problem of transparency and show that it is what lies at the core of this recent debate over the nature of phenomenal experience. The main positions in the qualia debate can be seen as providing solutions to this problem; however, none of these positions recognizes the central role introspection plays in uncovering the nature of experience

James Van Cleve provides an analysis of Kant’s view of secondary qualities in response to Hilary Putnam’s claim that Kant holds that “all qualities are secondary qualities.” Van Cleve proposes that we modify the thesis Putnam attributes to Kant in order to arrive at an explanation of both primary and secondary qualities that Kant would endorse. I argue that there is a serious flaw in Van Cleve’s characterization of Putnam’s thesis, namely that there is no significant difference between Putnam’s reading of Kant and Van Cleve’s, and I attribute the problem to equivocal senses of ‘primary qualities’, ‘secondary qualities’ and ‘mind dependent’.

: A perceptual theory of introspection is one that treats introspection as a species of perception or as a special case of perception. Additionally, a perceptual theory of introspection is one for which introspection shares at least some of the essential features of perception. However, I will show that there are certain essential features of perception that introspection lacks. Moreover, those features common to perception and introspection are insufficient to distinguish perception from belief. Thus, there is good reason to deny that introspection fits a perceptual model of introspection

This paper describes an undergraduate course in metaphilosophy for philosophy majors and argues that there are four potential benefits to students; namely that doing metaphilosophy (1) allows students to draw their own conclusions about what philosophy is, (2) develops students’ metacognitive skills to promote learning, (3) establishes students as members of the philosophical community, and (4) disposes students to live lives that reflect their philosophical education. It describes issues of transparency of course design and the particulars of the course, including course content, and provides excerpts of student work to demonstrate student learning outcomes. Finally, it will suggest that even if it is not possible to offer a stand-alone course in metaphilosophy, instructors should provide opportunities to reflect on metaphilosophical issues in their other philosophy courses.