Resa-Philip Lunau

This article discusses the potential of a trans standpoint epistemology. The author begins by addressing a general concern that may discourage trans philosophers from engaging with standpoint epistemology, by responding to Emily Tilton, who formulates this concern as the strong epistemic disadvantage thesis (SEDT). The author argues that the SEDT rests on an individualistic misreading of standpoint epistemologies. To counter such misinterpretations, the article proposes a reformulation of the core theses of standpoint epistemology: situated knowledge, inversion, and achievement. Additionally, the author outlines three claims that characterize standpoint as a framework and uses them to show how Veronica Ivy's proposal for a trans standpoint epistemology falls short. However, her account offers valuable insights for a (meta)epistemological trans standpoint critique. The author concludes that trans standpoint epistemology can make important contributions not only to trans philosophy but also to broader philosophical and interdisciplinary research.

This paper is part of a conversation in the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC) about my paper “Epistemic Domination and ‘Gender Identity Fraud’ Prosecutions.” It replies to Talia Mae Bettcher’s “A Letter to Resa-Philip Lunau: Epistemic Domination, ‘Gender Identity Fraud,’ and Reality Enforcement.” In this response, I address the questions Bettcher raises about my arguments, including my decision not to propose that the sex/gender presentation of trans people be treated as evidence. I also develop a more nuanced engagement with Miranda Fricker’s and Katharine Jenkins’s work in “Epistemic Injustice, Ignorance, and Trans Experiences” to reinforce my claim that hermeneutical injustice did not play a role in “gender identity fraud” prosecutions. In doing so, I question Fricker’s strong linkage between experience, understanding, and the possession of concepts, and I extend my account of epistemic domination as a more accurate framework for understanding these cases.

By analyzing the so-called ‘gender identity fraud’ cases of recent years in Great Britain, I will show that these cases fall outside Miranda Fricker’s theoretical framework of epistemic injustice. In building on Talia Bettcher’s work on the deceiver and pretender stereotypes of trans people, I will provide an analysis of the convictions and argue that these cases are examples of epistemic domination. First, I will argue that testimonial injustice as a concept is inapt to explain why the consent given in these cases was considered vitiated in the trials. Second, I will show how hermeneutical injustice falls short in elucidating the power structures at play and obscures our understanding of the possibilities and responsibilities of the respective epistemic agents. Moreover, I argue that these cases are morally and politically wrong because these convictions create a legal double-bind for trans people. At the end of my discussion, I develop the concept of relational epistemic domination, which is suffered by partners of trans people and which might affect the complainants in these cases. I will conclude that states must refrain from prosecuting gender identity fraud, and to theorize similar cases adequately, we must do so as cases of epistemic domination.