Rhytham Das

This paper suggests for a framework termed methodological functionalism to ad- dress the infinite regress problem inherent in metaphysical justification. Whenever one attempts to justify a metaphysical claim, each justification calls for a further one, yielding an endless regress. This connects to the level-connector role played by grounding things. At the most fundamental level, traditional responses either posit self-evident axioms or accept infinite chains of reasoning. The present account offers a prag- matic synthesis: philosophers halt their inquiry when doing so becomes function- ally adequate: a decision formalised through what I call the z principle (‘if it works, it works’). This halting point differentiates from what might be an ultimate metaphysical ground against a provisional terminus guided by epistemic humility. Central to this framework is the concept of recalcitrant facts, adapted from Quine’s notion of ‘recalcitrant experience’. These emergent facts, arising from a reality in flux, resist estab- lished metaphysical systems and compel their revision or abandonment. When a metaphysical position encounters such facts, it loses its functional adequacy, prompting reevaluation. This renders methodological functionalism both descrip- tive—depicting how philosophers implicitly operate—and prescriptive—providing criteria for when metaphysical inquiry should stop. The paper situates this model within a lineage extending from Russell’s ‘primitive propositions’ and Chalmers’s ‘constructing the world’ to Nietzsche’s will to power, showing that metaphysical reasoning has a cease-point that is at least functional (existential purposes are fulfilled). Rather than seeking the final metaphysical truth, this framework clarifies how metaphysical systems evolve, collapse, or endure under the pressure of reality’s resistance. It proposes that philosophy’s strength lies not in attaining certainty but in its capacity for self-correction through humility before the transcendent.