Ricardo Aguilar

Illustrations and examples have always been deemed rare in the otherwise abundant materials Kant sent to be printed. In this sense, tradition has made out of the Königsbergs philosopher a rather arid writer. He himself advocated for the perks of a proper scholastic method in presenting arguments. It is thus a common place among scholars that Herr Professor valued discursive clarity over any whimsical rhetorical garments the popular thinker could have been tempted to wield in defense of his surely more than dubious reasons. But even with that in mind, in Kants writings there is this persistent and everlasting metaphor regarding the activity of navigation. A metaphor going all through the Kantian philosophical enterprise: either in the form of sailing the thin air and pretending to avoid -- or surf -- any resistance, like the figure of the dove in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781); or better with the picture of the wandering unconcerned under the celestial and immeasurable vault only to discover we were lost in search for the North in What Does It Mean To Orient Oneself In Thinking?(1786), Kants critical philosophy insisted in the depiction of the task of thinking not only as a concrete one depending on facts and experience gathered -- pinpoint locations -- but also as a matter of orientation depending on the necessity of categories -- criteria, cardinal points -- of thought. If fanciful aspirations of ideas happen to take off from the objective ground irresponsibly as if empirical experience and facts had no substance at all -- it is with good reason that due operations of counterbalance should be taking place with help of the sound weight of articulated reasonable concepts based on formal and material reality. Kants theory of mind presupposes a responsibility of a subject in relation to several types of objects. The two of these epistemic extremes are intertwined and in need of each other. When it comes to orientation, leaning on some sort of inner compass, each of us would have both in regard to sensitivity, knowledge, and moral thinking which serves like a guide to the trip within all three domains, and even comes in handy to map them out. This collective volume is precisely devoted to the task of revisiting some landscapes of the Kantian thought-itinerary along the brave seas and deep into the thick forests of justified knowledge, principles of morals and judgement in aesthetics: through its pages this work has put together renowned scholars from very different traditions eager to circumnavigate again the issues and concerns of 18th Century Philosophy and the particular Kantian solution of a new branded type of metaphysical inquiry, one inquiry subject to intellectual global duties as well.

Illustrations and examples have always been deemed rare in the otherwise abundant materials Kant sent to be printed. In this sense, tradition has made out of the Königsbergs philosopher a rather arid writer. He himself advocated for the perks of a proper scholastic method in presenting arguments. It is thus a common place among scholars that Herr Professor valued discursive clarity over any whimsical rhetorical garments the popular thinker could have been tempted to wield in defense of his surely more than dubious reasons. But even with that in mind, in Kants writings there is this persistent and everlasting metaphor regarding the activity of navigation. A metaphor going all through the Kantian philosophical enterprise: either in the form of sailing the thin air and pretending to avoid -- or surf -- any resistance, like the figure of the dove in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781); or better with the picture of the wandering unconcerned under the celestial and immeasurable vault only to discover we were lost in search for the North in What Does It Mean To Orient Oneself In Thinking?(1786), Kants critical philosophy insisted in the depiction of the task of thinking not only as a concrete one depending on facts and experience gathered -- pinpoint locations -- but also as a matter of orientation depending on the necessity of categories -- criteria, cardinal points -- of thought. If fanciful aspirations of ideas happen to take off from the objective ground irresponsibly as if empirical experience and facts had no substance at all -- it is with good reason that due operations of counterbalance should be taking place with help of the sound weight of articulated reasonable concepts based on formal and material reality. Kants theory of mind presupposes a responsibility of a subject in relation to several types of objects. The two of these epistemic extremes are intertwined and in need of each other. When it comes to orientation, leaning on some sort of inner compass, each of us would have both in regard to sensitivity, knowledge, and moral thinking which serves like a guide to the trip within all three domains, and even comes in handy to map them out. This collective volume is precisely devoted to the task of revisiting some landscapes of the Kantian thought-itinerary along the brave seas and deep into the thick forests of justified knowledge, principles of morals and judgement in aesthetics: through its pages this work has put together renowned scholars from very different traditions eager to circumnavigate again the issues and concerns of 18th Century Philosophy and the particular Kantian solution of a new branded type of metaphysical inquiry, one inquiry subject to intellectual global duties as well.

La nueva era de exploración espacial ha sopesado una y otra vez las posibilidades que tiene nuestro planeta de ser el lugar cósmico en el que las únicas formas de vida inteligentes del universo se hayan desarrollado. La astrofísica y la astrobiología lo ha hecho con números. Esta inquietud existencial se ha plasmado en una serie de escalas científicas que miden la importancia relativa del posible impacto sobre nuestra civilización de un encuentro con vida extraterrestre inteligente. Lamentablemente las consecuencias medidas se han limitado a factores científicos y un hipotético control de daños, y a la credibilidad para con estos por parte de la opinión pública. Han olvidado sin embargo su trascendencia antropológica, moral y filosófica para nuestra especie.

En este artículo se trata de presentar una panorámica general del problema del conocimiento cuando es aplicado a la temática del yo. Cuando su objeto goza de las características presupuestas que se le suelen adjudicar al ego personal, el material de que disponemos para juzgar los resultados que se obtienen con el modelo usual cognoscitivo, uno perceptivo, se vuelve obsoleto y se precisa del recurso a un nuevo modelo. Un lenguaje límite para la Ciencia que implica el concepto de certeza y el lenguaje de sensaciones.The aim of this article is to present a general perspective on knowledge’s problem when applied to the self’s issue. As the object called self enjoys the alleged features that are ascribed to the personal Ego, the grounds we have to judge conclusions obtained with the usual perceptual model, a perceptive one, turn obsolete and another is required. A bound-language for Science which implies the concept of certainty and language of sensation.

El presente artículo pretende apurar algunas consideraciones kantianas en torno al uso de ejemplos en su filosofía, sea en el empleo especulativo o bien en el práctico en que la razón se implica. El argumento se dispone de modo que a la concepción general que de los ejemplos y las ilustraciones se suele adjudicar a Kant –una concepción que los tacha de irrelevantes– se le contesta con una corrección a dicha acusación sacada de su utilidad aparente en la Doctrina del método de la KpV, desde la Doctrina trascendental del método de la primera Crítica. Se tratará con ello de hacer plausible la tesis según la cual los exempla cumplirían un papel análogo a las intuiciones empíricas, pero en el uso práctico de la razón.

Boredom is tout court a matter of sense incorporated in meaning. Indeed, it is a matter of being able to give sense, of producing meaning. Self-referential narratives are crucial in referring to the Pragmatic mechanisms in play within this special operation of “giving sense.” Identity and meaning are correlated terms. In fact, this kind of minimal auto-biographical oriented descriptions can be conceptually depicted as the general rule. Success in the process of narration seems to be dependant on the construction of an ongoing meaning that stitches together the otherwise scattered events. And, they need of course a designated protagonist above everything. One view in classical narratology lists all its strategies to cope with this requirement basically in a twofold manner, one objective and one subjective: “sense” appears as soon as a causal rationale or an analogous of it is utilized to order the relative configuration of events, so each one can be told to lead to the other ; a second complementary approach makes out of a performative strategy based in self-identification—katharsis, Narrativecommitment—and Expectations the needed elements. Meaning, sense, depends on the ascription of past, present, and future events to oneself. Of being part of the Story told while working it through as its inside author. This fundamental reference to every story account is explained in a theory of the authoring mind either as an essential indexical, a permanent center of gravity for the narrative’s dramatic direction—possibility of reidentification and relocation, of contextual completeness…—or as some constitutive rule—a performative cognitive act—which entails sense in the shape of the involvement of the narrator in the naming/pointing out of the elements to be included. Both some use of indexical. Particularly, they comprehend actions related to the employment of proper names—and especially, ones proper name should be an index in a prominent sense. Pronouns, names, are analogous to that related identification present in the natural kinds—the essential nomination for non-artificial common terms such as “gold” or “water”—both sets of nouns being a necessary condition for any personal narrative meaning intended… safe for the fact that we can only be addressed back from Weariness by the former ones. Total or gradual oblivion of this ability of self-implication—as in seniors—is apparently a first step in disentangling personal master narratives and the type of identities attached to them. The occasion for that goes hand in hand with the inviting of narrative weariness and boredom.

RESUMENEl presente artículo trata de mostrar la evolución de una concepción del poder concreta que lleva de Hegel a Stirner a través del papel desempeñado por el individuo. De esta forma, el individualismo aparece entre dos líneas enfrentadas de la metafísica y la teoría de la acción.PALABRAS CLAVEHEGEL, STIRNER, ACCIÓN, POLÍTICAABSTRACTThis article tries to show the evolution of one specific conception of power that leads from Hegel to Stirner through the role played by the individual. Thus, individualism appears between two conflicting lines of metaphysics and action theory.KEYWORDSHEGEL, STIRNER, ACTION, POLITICS

What should be called (at least according to the views supported by modern moral philosophy schools) the ‘modern moral world’ can be depicted nowadays as an environment in which we consider relations to the community to be morally significant, even when the individuals within the reach of these duties are in fact unknown. So we can blame or we can praise, even in the notorious absence of any identifiable subject of ‘moral obligation’. The fundamental difference is in perceived obligations, not in entitlements: duties versus rights. At first glance, moral entitlement is nothing but an abstract right seeking recognition. Not so the obligation, as the ‘right-bearer’ is waiting for the commitment to be honored. The work of Onora O’Neill, Charles Fried and Thomas M. Scanlon rounds out the argumentation of the normative frame that operates in today’s strongly supererogatory moral world.

El presente artículo busca explorar las implicaciones que los nuevos modos de comunicación digitales y de masas tienen sobre la constitución cognitiva, social y política de sus usuarios. El nuevo modo de comunicación privilegiado apunta por medio de un uso muy concreto de sus protocolos –el que reduce los textos e interfaces al trabajo de signos algorítmicos– a un usuario que va reduciendo la extensión de sus textos y los contenidos de sus experiencias hasta su expresión comunicativa mínima, con el ideal de la literalidad esperando allá en su extremo, el signo que no necesita traducción por parte del algoritmo. El conocimiento va quedando reducido a su vez a flujo y intercambio de informaciones, el comercio de estas, meramente, y el usuario en cada uno de los extremos de dicho intercambio, reducido a mero consumidor y propietario de datos.