Ricardo Batista

Several authors attribute the beginnings of the philosophy of language to Plato. In the Cratylus, Plato introduced the problem of the “correctness of names,” discussing whether words should imitate the essences of the objects they represent or if they are merely cultural conventions. This dialogue inaugurated a perennial question: is there a natural connection between words and the things they represent? This debate deepened over the centuries and gained new momentum with the emergence of analytic philosophy. This philosophical tradition result from a movement known as the “linguistic turn,” in which language was regarded as the privileged medium for resolving philosophical problems. This turning point was largely due to the work of Gottlob Frege, who, through his studies in mathematical logic, introduced novel ideas into the philosophy of language. Among these was the “context principle,” which asserts that words only have meaning within the context of a complete sentence. In other words, words by themselves (isolated) do not encompass their entire meaning; it is only within sentences that meanings are fully assigned to terms. This principle would profoundly influence the nascent analytic philosophy.

For much of the 20th century, philosophy sought to eliminate once and for all the question of God. The “death of God,” proclaimed in the parable of the madman with the lantern in Nietzsche’s famous aphorism 125 of The Gay Science, was not merely a literary gesture or a metaphor for modern nihilism. It became, rather, the epochal sign of a world aspiring to emancipate itself from all transcendence. Enlightened reason, confidence in scientific progress, and the consolidation of secular institutions shaped a cultural framework in which religion appeared as a residue of the past—an archaic echo destined to dissolve in the light of positive knowledge. The sociological theory of secularization, in its various forms, accompanied this process by affirming that modernity would inevitably bring about the disappearance of religion as a meaningful phenomenon in both public life and the self-understanding of the modern subject. Yet this prediction did not come to pass. At the threshold of the 21st century, philosophical discourse has had to acknowledge the insufficiency of that secularization narrative. Far from dissolving, the religious has re-emerged with renewed vigor in new, diffuse, and hybrid forms: postsecular spirituality, political theology, the philosophies of alterity and of the gift, the return to metaphysics and theodicy in a critical key. The supposed “death of God” has not eradicated the question of God—it has transformed it. If anything characterizes our age, it is precisely the survival of God: His resistance to being dissolved into modern immanentism and His capacity to reconfigure Himself within thought, culture, and human experience. The present special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, entitled The Survival of God: Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century, seeks to situate itself at the heart of this question. Its purpose is not simply to reopen a familiar debate, but to interrogate the ways in which the question of God has shifted, been rearticulated, and transformed within contemporary thought. The aim is not merely to assert the “relevance” of the problem of God, but to understand why, after its apparent eclipse, the divine continues to emerge as a site of thought—an irreducible remainder resisting any rationalist or historicist closure.

This paper critiques the contemporary reliance on linguistic analysis in metaphysics, arguing that it leads to the representational fallacy – a tendency to derive ontological conclusions from linguistic properties rather than from reality. We trace the historical roots of this issue to the Kantian and linguistic turns, which shifted metaphysical focus from ontology to semantics, situating language at the center of the philosophical inquiry. We examine how this fallacy manifests in the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists of time. Both camps rely on Structural Linguistic Representationalism – the assumption that language directly mirrors reality –, presupposing a necessary correspondence between linguistic structures and ontological facts. We argue that this dependence is misguided, as language alone cannot adequately capture the fundamental nature of reality. In addressing this issue, we analyze two approaches within the B-theory of time: the truth-conditions approach and the truthmaker approach. We contend that the truth-conditions approach reiterates the representational fallacy by deriving ontological conclusions from linguistic structures. In contrast, the truthmaker approach presents a more promising framework by shifting focus from language to ontology, grounding metaphysical explanations in the structure of reality in itself. We conclude that the pursuit of an absolute linguistic model to reveal the ultimate nature of reality is unjustified and hinders metaphysical investigation. Instead, we advocate grounding ontological inquiries in reality, using language as a tool rather than a source of metaphysical truth.

Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology. Analytic metaphysics, as a contemporary branch of philosophical research, originated from the analytic tradition. This movement emerged in the early 20th century, driven by a desire for greater clarity and rigor in philosophical inquiry. Philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein were pioneers of this movement, advocating a methodology based on precise linguistic argumentation and rigorous logical analysis. Despite the advancements promoted by analytic philosophy, this period was also marked by a profound crisis for metaphysics. Influenced by the rigidity and the spectrum of the new logical positivism, the philosophical community began to view metaphysics with increasing skepticism, often considering it speculative and devoid of any meaningful or empirical content. This view became dominant, dismissing traditional metaphysical questions as pseudo-questions, i.e., devoid of empirical content and therefore devoid of real meaning. However, this trend began to shift under the influence of figures such as W. Quine, who played a key role in revitalizing metaphysics within the analytic tradition, and is often considered the founder of the new “analytic metaphysics.” Notably, his challenge to the then analytic-synthetic distinction in his famous paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” had profound implications for logical positivism and the verification principle. Quine argued that there was no clear boundary between purely analytic propositions (known through understanding alone) and synthetic propositions (known through experience), thus breaking the dogmatic boundaries between conceptual analysis and empirical representation. This perspective opened the possibility of reappreciating ontological questions that had until then been marginalized.

Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology.

In Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1960 declaration that Marxism was the “unsurpassable philosophy of our time,” he acknowledged the relationship between the Marxist interpretation of history and an existentialist philosophy focused on the individual’s subjective experience. However, in the decades since Sartre’s assertion, the philosophical landscape has undergone significant transformations. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to mark the final triumph of liberal capitalism over socialist alternatives. At the same time, the rise of postmodernism in philosophy casted doubts on the grand universal narratives that supported Marxism. Postmodern theorists argued that these overarching meta-narratives were intrinsically totalizing and oppressive, thereby suppressing diversity and plurality. Despite these challenges, Marx’s influence persists, often in complex and mediated ways. Paul Ricœur sees Marx as the first “master of suspicion,” who continues to be relevant (alongside Nietzsche and Freud). These thinkers have taught us to question superficial appearances and unearth the hidden forces and motivations shaping our social and psychic lives. Marx’s analysis of the operations of capitalism, his critique of ideology, and his view of class struggle as the engine of history continue to resonate, even as the details of his theory are disputed. Indeed, as Jacques Derrida argues, Marx remains present even in our attempts to surpass him. The language and concepts of Marxism have infiltrated modern discourse so deeply that we cannot simply dismiss them. Instead, we are haunted by the specters of Marx, which continue to haunt us and demand our attention. Even those who reject Marxism often engage with it, defining their positions in opposition to it.

Resumo Na actual metafísica, no âmbito da Filosofia Analítica, mantém-se intenso o debate acerca do Problema da Persistência. Actualmente, o Endurantismo sendo alvo de várias críticas, é acusado de ser insustentável, pelo que prevalece a teoria Perdurantista. O autor do artigo irá percorrer o actual debate, mostrando que este decorre implicitamente numa perspectiva monista e unívoca do ser e que, sob este enquadramento, o Perdurantismo encontra-se melhor posicionado para responder à questão da Persistência do que o Endurantismo. Contudo, surgem dois problemas associados a este enquadramento: o problema da real diferença ontológica entre Identidade Numérica e Qualitativa; e, subsequentemente, o problema da igualdade ôntica na predicação existencial. Por conseguinte, o autor irá mostrar que uma concepção analógica da realidade consegue, melhor do que a univocidade, postular a unidade e diferenças reais, superando os dois problemas. Conclui que com recurso à analogia do ser estaria também solucionado o problema dos intrínsecos e intrínsecos temporários, permitindo a mediação e qualificação de propriedades. Desta forma, conseguir-se-ia assegurar as vantagens próprias do Endurantismo, nomeadamente a consideração dos objectos na sua totalidade e a explicação da sua persistência face à mudança, de forma concordante com as mais básicas intuições do senso-comum sobre o fenómeno. Palavras-chave : Analogia do Ser, Endurantismo, Metafísica, Perdurantismo, PersistênciaIn contemporary metaphysics, on the context of Analytic Philosophy, remains an intense debate about the Problem of Persistence. Currently, Endurantism has been the target of criticism and accused of being unsustainable, so the Perdurantism theory prevails. The author of the article will go through the current debate showing that this is taking place implicitly under the framework of monism and of the univocity of being. Under this framework, the Perdurantism is best positioned to answer the Problem of Persistence than Endurantism. However, associated with this framework two problems arise: the problem of real ontological difference between Numerical Identity and Qualitative Identity; and the problem of ontic equality in existential predication. Consequently the author will show that an analogue conception of reality can better than univocity postulate real unity and difference, overcoming the two previous problems. The author concludes that with the use of the analogy of being it’s also solved the problem of intrinsics and temporary intrinsics, allowing mediation and qualification of properties. So, it would ensure the advantages of Endurantism, namely the consideration of the objects in their totality and the explanation of its persistence through change, according with the most basic common-sense intuitions about Change and Persistence. Keywords : Analogy of Being, Endurantism, Metaphysics, Perdurantism, Persistence.

Truth is one of the main concepts of Philosophy, some even consider it the most important of all (W. Künne). This concept is also a foundation for other philosophical concepts. Some of them even depend intrinsically on it, such as the concepts of belief (to believe in something is to believe this something is true), knowledge (if you know something then that something is true), fact (facts are what make our statements true), existence (true reality is the external world that exists) and modality (there are propositions that can be true in all possible worlds), among many others. Truth is also a crucial concept for other domains. Science is said to be the search for the truth of the Natural World and the good life is said to be the pursuit of the good (Aristotle). If one considers that the good and the just are objects of knowledge (R. Campbell), then, there could be no good or justice without truth, insofar as knowledge needs truth. Also, our confidence in the robustness of western political and social institutions has always rested on truth. Unfortunately, this basis, which is the foundation of trust and, therefore, of the robustness of our institutions, is being eroded by external forces, deniers and nihilists, by undermining the concept of Truth, endangering in that way the democratic model (H. Frankfurt). The troubled events we have recently experienced – the raise of populisms, conspiracy theories, pandemic skepticism, the conflict in Ukraine not only in the battleground but also in the info space – could, to some extent, make us question whether, in fact, there is still any theoretical interest in “truth”. As several authors have noted, it seems that today we live in a society of “post-truth” (A. Szakolczai) or “veritophobia” (A. Goldman), where lies are tolerated and facts ignored. Also, for this reason, understanding what truth is by reflecting on its nature and function, from the most sophisticated conceptual schemes to its most everyday uses, seems to be a philosophical task of the utmost importance. This is why the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia has decided to dedicate this special issue to the subject of truth.

In the broadest sense of the term, “Thomism” refers to a set of ideas and principles, both in philosophy and theology that can be considered as derivations or representations of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. However, Thomism should not be considered as a mere conceptual body. It also represents a certain view and way of doing philosophy and theology. Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, argues that the Thomistic approach provides a coherent and skillful point of view for dealing creatively and critically with opposing views, contrasting this approach with the encyclopedic and the genealogical approaches. The former imposes a single worldview, enclosing knowledge and “truth” in a monolithic structure of “progress,” while the latter, following Nietzsche, devalues and relativizes knowledge, reducing it to a multiplicity of perspectives, each with its own claims to truth, leading to incommensurability and the consequent subjugation of “truth” to the law of the strongest. On the other hand, Thomists have adopted, from the end of the thirteenth century to the present day, different styles and ways of thinking while maintaining dialogue with their “predecessors” and at the same time with their contemporaries, that is, Thomists are capable of what MacIntyre called the “rationality of tradition”.

The response to the profound crisis posed by SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has demanded the best commitment from the various agents of society and called upon researchers from the various fields of knowledge to seek solutions to the challenges we face and to reflect on the impact of the pandemic on the various dimensions of human life. In this context, the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia intends to contribute to the philosophical reflection on the challenges posed by the pandemic, publishing original essays that address, from different philosophical perspectives, problematics associated with the crisis we are facing. The disease caused by the Covid-19 is much more than a mere biological phenomenon, it is a phenomenon that is experienced by concrete human beings in its psychological, social, existential, and spiritual dimensions. Because of the complex nature of this phenomenon, social distance measures that have been adopted to battle the pandemic have had a disruptive impact on the core of the human experience, characterized by embodied social interactions. In this scenario, new urgent questions regarding the spiritual dimension of the human person, the meaning of life and death, and the human connection with an ultimate source of meaning have been emerging. Philosophy can make an important contribution to the understanding and interpretation of these complex experiences. Among the many problems associated with the pandemic, ethical issues have occupied a prominent place. For example, what are the ethical criteria that should guide health professionals when faced with the need to decide who has access to basic life support? How to manage the tension between the imperative to protect the most vulnerable members of society and the need to guarantee the economic and financial sustainability of countries, organizations, and families? Important questions also arise in the field of bioethics. At the political level, the response to the pandemic has led to the suspension, albeit temporary, of many of the practices that govern the life of democratic societies, with the limitation of human rights and freedoms. The adoption of this type of measures, demands an in-depth reflection on the role of the State and the difficulty to balance the protection of the health of citizens and the respect for individual rights and liberties. Reflection on this issue is particularly urgent in face of new threats posed by the emerging populisms and nationalisms. The social consequences of the pandemic are particularly profound. The situation we are experiencing has already had a visible impact on the way we work, the way we relate to one another, the way we communicate, teach, and learn. The digitalization of the society has been significantly enhanced in this period and privacy issues are even more pressing. During the confinement, many citizens begun working remotely, and classrooms were moved to virtual rooms. All these experiences raise psychological, social, and anthropological issues that can and should also be addressed by philosophers. In the current pandemic context, science has assumed a major role. Despite the efforts of teams of researchers around the world to find a treatment and to develop vaccines for Covid-19, which at the beginning exceeded the general expectations, in the course of time public opinion has been confronted with a certain feeling of the inefficiency of science to solve the health problem in a definitive way, which could result in a new perception of the limits and possibilities of science. The uncertainty associated with many of the predictions regarding the evolution of the pandemic poses questions about the limitations of quantitative models in health sciences and about the epistemological limits of multivariable analysis. The problem of discerning between causality and correlation also takes on a new relevance.

From the dawn of philosophy, with pre-Socratic thinkers, to the present day, the concept of causality continues to captivate and divide philosophers in all areas. On the one hand, as it is a fundamental concept for understanding the World and its dynamism, the notion of causality remains attractive. On the other hand, it is a source of discord, since it can be understood and thought of in different ways, which leads to contradictory visions about reality. In face of these two stances, the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of causality is fragmented into a large number of positions, each of which implies a different worldview. In this context, this issue of Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia intends to contribute to the philosophical reflection on the challenges posed by the different perspectives on causality and corresponding problematics.

The imperative to practice hospitality constitutes a mark of Western civilization. Already in Homer’s Odyssey, the hero Ulysses punishes Polyphemus for not having respected the obligation of hospitality towards him and his companions. In fact, hospitality has been a constitutive element of the West, marked by linguistic, cultural, and religious differences, in a world whose borders are supposed to be well defined. In his discussion of hospitality, Derrida shows how Socrates, in Plato’s dialogue The Apology of Socrates, places himself in the position of a foreigner. In fact, Socrates presents himself as foreigner, that is, someone who is alien to the language and procedures of the court that is judging him. According to Derrida, he shows, in this way, the extent to which the foreigner is forced to ask for hospitality in a language he does not know. The court reduces Socrates to the other, the different. Moreover, the court forces him to deny his difference, his own identity, asking him to adapt himself to a system that he does not control. The paradox arises when Socrates, who regrets being regarded as a foreigner, asks the court to treat him at least as a foreigner. He feels so outraged that he asks to be granted at least the rights of a non-national. In doing so, Socrates shows how recognizing the rights of the foreigner generates hospitality but, at the same time, also limits it. Whenever a human being is recognized as human being, he or she will necessarily be seen as another, as someone different. This person will have to adapt him or herself to a system, culture or world that will define him or her as a foreigner. In short, in the phenomena that we tend to see as hospitality there is always a certain hostility. In a world of ongoing migratory crises, and in the context of a return to nationalisms of exclusion combined with populisms of prejudice and aversion to those who are different, it becomes imperative to rethink the ethics and politics of hospitality. In this context, Derrida’s distinction between conditioned and unconditioned hospitality can be useful.

Resumo O presente artigo brota da verificação de que a metafísica mantém uma relação complicada com a ciência. Para compreender a natureza deste problemática o autor percorre a história da relação entre estas duas áreas de estudo, focando-se no ponto decisivo dessa história que foi o surgimento do neopositivismo. O autor argumenta que durante o processo de reabilitação e ascensão da metafísica, logo após a queda do neopositivismo, os metafísicos em vez de procurarem diminuir o hiato com a ciência, acabaram por adoptar uma abordagem ainda mais autónoma desta. O autor procura mostrar que esta viragem tem origem no cerne da própria metafísica analítica, pelo que neste artigo se revisita o processo de reabilitação da metafísica com Quine, passando para a ascensão da modalidade a posteriori com Kripke. Evidencia-se que é nesta última fase que reside subtilmente a parte da mesma filosofia que causou a queda da metafísica. O autor argumenta que os principais factores que motivaram um afastamento das comunidades metafísica e científica, e a consequente posição de autonomia daquela, resultaram do facto da metafísica analítica contemporânea manter implicitamente uma forma de teoria deflacionista da verdade e de não-factualismo, que conduziu a uma posição anti-realista com todas as suas consequências. Por último, o autor propõe um reposicionamento da metafísica, a partir do conceito de união em complementaridade suportado por um realismo e compromisso ôntico com a Verdade. Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Ciência, Metafísica, Metafísica Analítica Contemporânea, Modalidade, Papel da Metafísica na Ciência, Teoria da Verdade.