Ricardo Batista

Truth is one of the main concepts of Philosophy, some even consider it the most important of all (W. Künne). This concept is also a foundation for other philosophical concepts. Some of them even depend intrinsically on it, such as the concepts of belief (to believe in something is to believe this something is true), knowledge (if you know something then that something is true), fact (facts are what make our statements true), existence (true reality is the external world that exists) and modality (there are propositions that can be true in all possible worlds), among many others. Truth is also a crucial concept for other domains. Science is said to be the search for the truth of the Natural World and the good life is said to be the pursuit of the good (Aristotle). If one considers that the good and the just are objects of knowledge (R. Campbell), then, there could be no good or justice without truth, insofar as knowledge needs truth. Also, our confidence in the robustness of western political and social institutions has always rested on truth. Unfortunately, this basis, which is the foundation of trust and, therefore, of the robustness of our institutions, is being eroded by external forces, deniers and nihilists, by undermining the concept of Truth, endangering in that way the democratic model (H. Frankfurt). The troubled events we have recently experienced – the raise of populisms, conspiracy theories, pandemic skepticism, the conflict in Ukraine not only in the battleground but also in the info space – could, to some extent, make us question whether, in fact, there is still any theoretical interest in “truth”. As several authors have noted, it seems that today we live in a society of “post-truth” (A. Szakolczai) or “veritophobia” (A. Goldman), where lies are tolerated and facts ignored. Also, for this reason, understanding what truth is by reflecting on its nature and function, from the most sophisticated conceptual schemes to its most everyday uses, seems to be a philosophical task of the utmost importance. This is why the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia has decided to dedicate this special issue to the subject of truth.

In the broadest sense of the term, “Thomism” refers to a set of ideas and principles, both in philosophy and theology that can be considered as derivations or representations of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. However, Thomism should not be considered as a mere conceptual body. It also represents a certain view and way of doing philosophy and theology. Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, argues that the Thomistic approach provides a coherent and skillful point of view for dealing creatively and critically with opposing views, contrasting this approach with the encyclopedic and the genealogical approaches. The former imposes a single worldview, enclosing knowledge and “truth” in a monolithic structure of “progress,” while the latter, following Nietzsche, devalues and relativizes knowledge, reducing it to a multiplicity of perspectives, each with its own claims to truth, leading to incommensurability and the consequent subjugation of “truth” to the law of the strongest. On the other hand, Thomists have adopted, from the end of the thirteenth century to the present day, different styles and ways of thinking while maintaining dialogue with their “predecessors” and at the same time with their contemporaries, that is, Thomists are capable of what MacIntyre called the “rationality of tradition”.

The response to the profound crisis posed by SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has demanded the best commitment from the various agents of society and called upon researchers from the various fields of knowledge to seek solutions to the challenges we face and to reflect on the impact of the pandemic on the various dimensions of human life. In this context, the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia intends to contribute to the philosophical reflection on the challenges posed by the pandemic, publishing original essays that address, from different philosophical perspectives, problematics associated with the crisis we are facing. The disease caused by the Covid-19 is much more than a mere biological phenomenon, it is a phenomenon that is experienced by concrete human beings in its psychological, social, existential, and spiritual dimensions. Because of the complex nature of this phenomenon, social distance measures that have been adopted to battle the pandemic have had a disruptive impact on the core of the human experience, characterized by embodied social interactions. In this scenario, new urgent questions regarding the spiritual dimension of the human person, the meaning of life and death, and the human connection with an ultimate source of meaning have been emerging. Philosophy can make an important contribution to the understanding and interpretation of these complex experiences. Among the many problems associated with the pandemic, ethical issues have occupied a prominent place. For example, what are the ethical criteria that should guide health professionals when faced with the need to decide who has access to basic life support? How to manage the tension between the imperative to protect the most vulnerable members of society and the need to guarantee the economic and financial sustainability of countries, organizations, and families? Important questions also arise in the field of bioethics. At the political level, the response to the pandemic has led to the suspension, albeit temporary, of many of the practices that govern the life of democratic societies, with the limitation of human rights and freedoms. The adoption of this type of measures, demands an in-depth reflection on the role of the State and the difficulty to balance the protection of the health of citizens and the respect for individual rights and liberties. Reflection on this issue is particularly urgent in face of new threats posed by the emerging populisms and nationalisms. The social consequences of the pandemic are particularly profound. The situation we are experiencing has already had a visible impact on the way we work, the way we relate to one another, the way we communicate, teach, and learn. The digitalization of the society has been significantly enhanced in this period and privacy issues are even more pressing. During the confinement, many citizens begun working remotely, and classrooms were moved to virtual rooms. All these experiences raise psychological, social, and anthropological issues that can and should also be addressed by philosophers. In the current pandemic context, science has assumed a major role. Despite the efforts of teams of researchers around the world to find a treatment and to develop vaccines for Covid-19, which at the beginning exceeded the general expectations, in the course of time public opinion has been confronted with a certain feeling of the inefficiency of science to solve the health problem in a definitive way, which could result in a new perception of the limits and possibilities of science. The uncertainty associated with many of the predictions regarding the evolution of the pandemic poses questions about the limitations of quantitative models in health sciences and about the epistemological limits of multivariable analysis. The problem of discerning between causality and correlation also takes on a new relevance.

From the dawn of philosophy, with pre-Socratic thinkers, to the present day, the concept of causality continues to captivate and divide philosophers in all areas. On the one hand, as it is a fundamental concept for understanding the World and its dynamism, the notion of causality remains attractive. On the other hand, it is a source of discord, since it can be understood and thought of in different ways, which leads to contradictory visions about reality. In face of these two stances, the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of causality is fragmented into a large number of positions, each of which implies a different worldview. In this context, this issue of Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia intends to contribute to the philosophical reflection on the challenges posed by the different perspectives on causality and corresponding problematics.

The imperative to practice hospitality constitutes a mark of Western civilization. Already in Homer’s Odyssey, the hero Ulysses punishes Polyphemus for not having respected the obligation of hospitality towards him and his companions. In fact, hospitality has been a constitutive element of the West, marked by linguistic, cultural, and religious differences, in a world whose borders are supposed to be well defined. In his discussion of hospitality, Derrida shows how Socrates, in Plato’s dialogue The Apology of Socrates, places himself in the position of a foreigner. In fact, Socrates presents himself as foreigner, that is, someone who is alien to the language and procedures of the court that is judging him. According to Derrida, he shows, in this way, the extent to which the foreigner is forced to ask for hospitality in a language he does not know. The court reduces Socrates to the other, the different. Moreover, the court forces him to deny his difference, his own identity, asking him to adapt himself to a system that he does not control. The paradox arises when Socrates, who regrets being regarded as a foreigner, asks the court to treat him at least as a foreigner. He feels so outraged that he asks to be granted at least the rights of a non-national. In doing so, Socrates shows how recognizing the rights of the foreigner generates hospitality but, at the same time, also limits it. Whenever a human being is recognized as human being, he or she will necessarily be seen as another, as someone different. This person will have to adapt him or herself to a system, culture or world that will define him or her as a foreigner. In short, in the phenomena that we tend to see as hospitality there is always a certain hostility. In a world of ongoing migratory crises, and in the context of a return to nationalisms of exclusion combined with populisms of prejudice and aversion to those who are different, it becomes imperative to rethink the ethics and politics of hospitality. In this context, Derrida’s distinction between conditioned and unconditioned hospitality can be useful.

Resumo O presente artigo brota da verificação de que a metafísica mantém uma relação complicada com a ciência. Para compreender a natureza deste problemática o autor percorre a história da relação entre estas duas áreas de estudo, focando-se no ponto decisivo dessa história que foi o surgimento do neopositivismo. O autor argumenta que durante o processo de reabilitação e ascensão da metafísica, logo após a queda do neopositivismo, os metafísicos em vez de procurarem diminuir o hiato com a ciência, acabaram por adoptar uma abordagem ainda mais autónoma desta. O autor procura mostrar que esta viragem tem origem no cerne da própria metafísica analítica, pelo que neste artigo se revisita o processo de reabilitação da metafísica com Quine, passando para a ascensão da modalidade a posteriori com Kripke. Evidencia-se que é nesta última fase que reside subtilmente a parte da mesma filosofia que causou a queda da metafísica. O autor argumenta que os principais factores que motivaram um afastamento das comunidades metafísica e científica, e a consequente posição de autonomia daquela, resultaram do facto da metafísica analítica contemporânea manter implicitamente uma forma de teoria deflacionista da verdade e de não-factualismo, que conduziu a uma posição anti-realista com todas as suas consequências. Por último, o autor propõe um reposicionamento da metafísica, a partir do conceito de união em complementaridade suportado por um realismo e compromisso ôntico com a Verdade. Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Ciência, Metafísica, Metafísica Analítica Contemporânea, Modalidade, Papel da Metafísica na Ciência, Teoria da Verdade

A comunidade de filósofos da Metafísica Analítica Contemporânea não consegue entender-se com respeito ao estatuto ontológico das “Propriedades”. Uma parte defende que as propriedades existem, mas, têm grandes dificuldades em explicar a sua existência. Outra parte acredita que as propriedades não existem, mas, não conseguem justificar o problema ontológico da sua predicação. Esta divisão é o tema central deste livro que vos apresentamos, intitulado, “Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic” da autoria de Robert Trueman e publicado pela Cambridge University Press.