Riccardo Luccio

In recent years, the term experimental phenomenology has come to refer to the work of various researchers, mainly Italian, of whom Gaetano Kanizsa and Paolo Bozzi are the most representative. Their work is well presented in this article by Bianchi and Burro (2022). My objection is to what I consider to be the misnomer and misleading name “experimental phenomenology,” which gives the impression that we are dealing with a homogeneous group following a unified approach. However, this is not the case. The phenomenological view is not the same for everyone, ranging from borrowings from Gestalt theory, as in Kanizsa, to Gibsonian ecologism, as in Bozzi. And, most importantly, the research designs of these researchers are only sometimes experimental, sometimes quasi-experimental, but more often non-experimental.

In 1940, Wolfgang Metzger began a profound reflection on the meaning of the phenomenological approach to Gestalt psychology, which had its starting point in the rejection of what he called the “Eleatic” or “Eleatic–Rationalistic Postulate,” that is, the notion that, in his opinion, had dominated Western scientific and philosophical thought of the past centuries, according to which any assertion about the state of things that could lead to self-contradictory conclusions had to be considered unfounded. On the basis of this rejection and with exclusive reference to access to experiential data, Metzger proposed to distinguish five meanings of reality: (1) the physical or experiential world; (2) the intuitive or experienced world; (3) the experienced world (met, Angetroffen) in contrast to the represented world; (4) the something or fullness in contrast to emptiness or nothingness; (5) the real in contrast to the apparent. For Metzger (1950), this concept, although primarily related to perception, has far-reaching implications for our conception of others and of society. We question here the validity of Metzger’s concept, its explanatory significance, and its relation to other phenomenological concepts, such as that of Merleau-Ponty.

Summary In recent years, the concept of simplicity in perception has acquired a leading role, above all thanks to scholars linked to Bayesian modeling and to theories like structural information theory derived from information theory. Unfortunately, two misleading ideas made their way into the discussion: that in perception, simplicity is equivalent to Prägnanz and that Occam’s razor plays a role in the simplicity of percepts. Here it is shown that in Gestalt theory, simplicity is only one of the factors of Prägnanz and that the use of Occam’s razor is improper, because it applies only to the theories that generate, in this case, a percept, and not to the product of the theory.

This paper is devoted to stress the importance of the contribution of Gaetano Kanizsato contemporary psychology. His theoretical ideas have in many respects been truly seminal. In particular, are emphasized his distinction between the primary and secondary process, his criticism of the concept ofPrägnanz, and his focus on self-organisation in a dynamic approach. To continue his work, the main task is to identify the rules and constraints that enable us to see the world as it appears. In the last years of his scientific work, his insight was that the non-linear dynamic approach may be the best way to achieve this goal, giving a more sound sense to the intuitions of Gestalt psychologie.Unfortunately, he died before he could reap the fruits of this insight. Here are reviewed the first results that some among his direct and indirect pupils have obtained in this direction.