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7Consciousness and object: a mind-object identity physicalist theoryJohn Benjamins. 2017.What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked “What is a man?” and replied that a man is “a certain sort of material object”. This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical but not neural. This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported …Read more
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4A Process-oriented Framework for Goals and Motivations in Biological and Artificial AgentsIn Roberto Poli (ed.), Causality and Motivation, De Gruyter. pp. 105-134. 2010.
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1A Radical Externalist Approach to Consciousness: The Enlarged MindIn Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.), Mind and its place in the world: non-reductionist approaches to the ontology of consciousness, Ontos. pp. 197-224. 2006.
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6The Spread Mind: Phenomenal Process-Oriented Vehicle ExternalismIn Michael Blamauer (ed.), The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on Panpsychism, Ontos Verlag. pp. 79-98. 2011.
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6An Externalist Approach to Existential Feelings: Different Feelings or Different objects?In Jörg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive, De Gruyter. pp. 79-100. 2012.
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1665Hallucination and Its ObjectsPhilosophical Review 131 (3): 327-359. 2022.When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each have problems. This paper defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts.
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22The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fitRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (3): 225-241. 2021.: In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity and compare it with other identity theories of mind. Keywords: Extended Mind; Spread Mind; Enac…Read more
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6Teorie descrittive e revisioniste degli eventiNóema 11 19-31. 2020.All’inizio del secolo XX, tre filosofi di Cambridge, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, e Charlie Dunbar Broad, sostennero un’ontologia basata sugli eventi che si riteneva fosse compatibile con la recente teoria della relatività . Gli eventi, perciò, rimpiazzavano le sostanze aristoteliche in veste di componenti primari dell’universo – essi erano concepiti come unità di spazio-tempo che si estendevano spazio-temporalmente e che si sovrapponevano al campo elettromagnetico. Via via che la f…Read more
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45Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and EnactivismPhilosophies 4 (3): 39. 2019.Over the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools (or versions) of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered AI a way out of traditional computationalism—an approach (or an understanding) loosely referred to as embodied AI. This view has split into various branches ranging from a weak form on the brink of functionalism (loosely represented by Clarks’ parity principle) to a strong form (often corresponding to auto…Read more
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18Must Robots be Zombies?In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), Ai and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches, Aaai Press, Merlo Park, Ca. 2007.
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121The New Mind: thinking beyond the head (review)AI and Society 28 (2): 157-166. 2013.Throughout much of the modern period, the human mind has been regarded as a property of the brain and therefore something confined to the inside of the head—a view commonly known as ‘internalism’. But recent works in cognitive science, philosophy, and anthropology, as well as certain trends in the development of technology, suggest an emerging view of the mind as a process not confined to the brain but spread through the body and world—an outlook covered by a family of views labelled ‘externalis…Read more
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42Is consciousness just conscious behavior?International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02): 353-360. 2011.
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41An externalist approach to creativity: discovery versus recombinationMind and Society 12 (1): 61-72. 2013.What is the goal of creativity? Is it just a symbolic reshuffling or a moment of semantic extension? Similar to the contrast between syntax and semantics, creativity has an internal and an external aspect. Contrary to the widespread view that emphasises the problem-solving role of creativity, here we consider whether creativity represents an authentic moment of ontological discovery and semantic openness like Schopenhauer and Picasso suggested. To address the semantic aspect of creativity, we ta…Read more
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Memoria: Fra Neurobiologia Identità EticaMimesis. 2010.Within a general approach that implies the closely related survey of neurosciences and philosophical thought, the essays collected in the volume develop two main lines of research. The first one, thanks to the contributions of scientists and psychologists , psychoanalysists and bioengineers , allows to fix the attention on the neurobiological, psychological, psychoanalytical and physical remembering. The second one, more specifically philosophical, is declined in three different approaches. the …Read more
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33The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming “mindscience.” Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative “mindscience.” The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the natu…Read more
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62Experiences are Objects. Towards a Mind-object Identity TheoryRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1): 16-36. 2016.: Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness. I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rath…Read more
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199 A Process-oriented View of QualiaIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 175. 2008.
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134Artificial ConsciousnessImprint Academic. 2007.And why is there a subjective component to experience?). It is easy to see that the separation between Weak and Strong Artificial Consciousness mirrors the separation between the easy problems and the hard problems of consciousness.
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131The spread mind. Is consciousness situated?"Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 55-78. 2011.If phenomenal experience is a physical phenomenon, it must occur at some spatial and temporal location. Can consciousness be situated in such a strong sense? Although the importance of embodiment and situatedness is often mentioned, most neuroscientists and philosophers alike consider phenomenal experience as an outcome of neural activity. In this paper, the question I would raise is whether the physical underpinnings of conscious experience may be identical with processes temporally an…Read more
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23Is neuroscience adequate as the forthcoming “mindscience”?Behavior and Philosophy 38 1-29. 2010.
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32Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 993-994. 2001.Sensory motor contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not explain why and how objective functional relations produce phenomenal experience. O'Regan & Noë (O&N) as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.
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28A New Mind for a New AestheticsRevista Portuguesa de Filosofia 67 (3). 2011.Embora a extensão da dependência entre teorias da estética e modelos da mente seja urna questão de aceso debate, é justo afirmar que as abordagens actuáis da consciência sugerem novas perspectivas sobre a natureza da experiência estética. As recentes descobertas da neurociência têm afetado a nossa forma de ver a estética e a arte. Todavia, enquanto é frequentemente sugerido que a neurociência vai, em breve, obter urna descrição completa da natureza da mente e, portanto, da experiência estética, …Read more
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9Situated Aesthetics: Art Beyond the Skin (edited book)Imprint Academic. 2011.This book focuses on externalist approaches to art. It is the first fruit of a workshop held in Milan in September 2009, where leading scholars in the emerging field of psychology of art compared their different approaches using a neutral language and discussing freely their goals. The event threw up common grounds for future research activities. First, there is a considerable interest in using cognitive and neural inspired techniques to help art historians, museum curators, art archiving, art p…Read more
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4From artificial intelligence to artificial consciousnessIn Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness, Imprint Academic. pp. 174-190. 2007.
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68A process oriented view of conscious perceptionJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6): 7-41. 2006.I present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between the activity in the brain and the perceived event in the external world. I use the rainbow to provide a first example, and subsequently extend the same rationale to more complex examples such as perception of objects, faces and movements. I use a process-based approach as an explanation of ordinary perception and other variants, such as illusions, memory, dreams and mental imagery. This approach provides new insigh…Read more
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107Artificial Intelligence and ConsciousnessIn Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), Ai and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches, Aaai Press, Merlo Park, Ca. 2007.
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66What does “isomorphism between conscious representations and the structure of the world” mean?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3): 346-347. 2002.Perruchet & Vinter's provocative article challenges a series of interesting issues, yet the concept of isomorphism is troublesome for a series of reasons: (1) isomorphism entails some sort of dualism; (2) isomorphism does not entail that a piece of the world is a representation; and (3) it is extremely difficult to provide an explanation about the nature of the relation of isomorphism.
Riccardo Manzotti
IULM University
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IULM UniversityAssociate Professor
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |