Rich Cameron

This dissertation undertakes the twofold task interpreting Aristotle's account of the nature of life and evaluating that account in light of the findings of contemporary science and philosophy of biology. I argue that Aristotle defines being alive teleologically: a is alive just in case a possesses intrinsic teleological directedness. Further, this account of life reveals itself to be philosophically astute and scientifically sound. ;The dissertation's central chapters defend these general theses in both scholarly and contemporary contexts. Given the central place of teleology in the analysans of life, chapters three and four investigate Aristotle's commitments concerning teleology. I argue that Aristotle has moderate, plausible and strong reasons for being a realist about teleological commitment, that the scope of his commitment to teleology is compatible with his defining life teleologically, and that his conception of the final cause is nonreductive; teleology is, for Aristotle, a sui generis unreduced causal factor in the structure of the natural world. ;This interpretation of Aristotle's ontic commitments vis-a-vis teleology raises serious doubt concerning the contemporary adequacy of his view. I argue that these doubts are unfounded. I argue in chapter five that the presumptive contemporary reductivist account of teleology fails to provide an adequate theoretical definition of teleology. Chapter six argues that the failure of the best reductive account does not support eliminitivism concerning teleology for two reasons. First, common objections to Aristotelian teleology are ill-founded. Second, we have strong evidence from quantum mechanics that the ontology of the physical world is---contrary to popular presupposition---congenial to the postulation of sui generis Aristotelian teleology. If we accept the ontic authority of science rather the modern presupposition that sui generis teleology is ontically or methodologically unacceptable in a scientific conception of the world, then Aristotle's commitments reveal themselves to be, again, plausible, moderate and sophisticated. ;With foundational work on the definition's central notion completed, chapter seven returns to the exegetical task of uncovering the details of Aristotle's account of life. The result indicates that Aristotle possessed a philosophically sophisticated and defensible conception of life even in contemporary terms; Aristotle's account of life deserves serious contemporary consideration

Contemporary discussion of biological teleology has been dominated by a complacent orthodoxy. Responsibility for this shortcoming rests primarily, I think, with those who ought to have been challenging dogma but have remained silent, leaving the orthodox to grow soft, if happily. In this silence, champions of orthodoxy have declared a signal victory, proclaiming the dominance of their view as one of philosophy’s historic successes. But this declaration is premature at best—this would be neither the first nor probably the last time that a narrow school of philosophy has declared the resolution of age-old problems only to have those problems rise from the ashes of their better selves when a broader view is articulated. I propose to challenge orthodoxy by undermining its fundamental assumption and to enlist the help of others in articulating a formidable heterodox alternative to contemporary dogma concerning biological teleology, perhaps on the model I sketch below.

Modern philosophy is, for what appear to be good reasons, uniformly hostile to sui generis final causes. And motivated to develop philosophically and scientifically plausible interpretations, scholars have increasingly offered reductivist and eliminitivist accounts of Aristotle's teleological commitment. This trend in contemporary scholarship is misguided. We have strong grounds to believe Aristotle accepted unreduced sui generis teleology, and reductivist and eliminitivist accounts face insurmountable textual and philosophical difficulties. We offer Aristotelians cold comfort by replacing his apparent view with failed accounts. And so we ought to admit Aristotle’s prima facie commitments and deal with — if not accept — the consequences.

Teleology is the study of ends and goals, things whose existence or occurrence is purposive. Aristotle’s views on teleology are of seminal importance, particularly his views regarding biological functions or purposes. This article surveys core examples of Aristotle’s invocations of teleology; explores philosophically puzzling aspects of teleology (including their normativity and the fact that ends can, apparently, act as causes despite never coming to exist); articulates two of Aristotle’s arguments defending commitment to teleology against critics who attempt to explain nature solely through appeal to nonteleological efficient and material causes; and argues that Aristotle was an ontological realist when it came to teleology: he conceived of ends as an irreducible and ineliminable aspect of the causal structure of reality. Other interpretive controversies are addressed more briefly.