Richard Davies Gill

As theories about the mind and consciousness are conducted through the medium of language, this must this impose restrictions on what sorts of theories can be constructed. All the other tools of man have limitations, but are still useful and essential within their limited domains. In this paper I want to draw attention to the boundaries of language and theories of the mind that result from the very different data bandwidths of the eye and the ear, and the irreversibility of neural activity. These both have implications on the quest to understand the mind. Consideration of either physiology or the very different bandwidths needed to transmit telephone messages or television images shows that the bandwidth of the eye is more than 2000 times that of the ear. One immediate consequence is that the ear will not be able to reconstruct visual images, and that visual experiences cannot be reproduced by words. As irreversible processes take place when neurons fire, messages can only go from senses to the mind, and from the mind to the output organs of muscular control. Vision to action, but not, for example, touch to smell. However, the unidirectionality is ingeniously broken by language and speech. A sentence can be heard, and spoken, and exact replicas can be made and experienced of the original. Replication can also be recreated by recirculation within the mind.

The idea that everything is ultimately composed of a single entity has a long history, and the contemporary philosophy of physicalism is firmly established, even though it faces difficulties when applied to things of the mind and mental causation. This paper presents an alternative based firmly on the physical sciences, yet allows for a clear conceptual understanding of things not overtly physical. I argue that everything can be thought of as arrangements from the fundamental particles of physics to those that are not obviously of a physical nature, such as laws of physics, money, the rules of chess, or mental concepts. This is a version of philosophical monism that resolves the longstanding difficulties that arise in both dualism and physicalism in understanding the mind and mental causation.

This book is about trying to comprehend the mind from both scientific and philosophical standpoints. In recent years interest has revived in the difficult problem of consciousness. The many difficulties of understanding our minds have been considered in the past, mainly from philosophical or religious viewpoints, but only more recently from scientific perspectives. The book charts the landscape and proposes that the fundamental thing in the world is an arrangement, and this concept can encompass both material objects and things of the mind. This eliminates the old contrast between mind and matter as both should be properly considered as arrangements, producing a philosophical monism that is consistent with modern science. The idea that all mental activity should be viewed as essentially physical is considered not wrong but misconceived and irrelevant, as it is far from the most parsimonious explanation of many mental events. A viewpoint is developed that is sufficiently wide to encompass most human activities but narrowed to exclude certain philosophical puzzles. Suggestions are made about how some of the tough problems in the philosophy of mind, such as causality, intentionality, and the nature of qualia, can be resolved by considering the fundamental structures and limitations of thought, linguistic processes, and our position in the web of life and its evolution. The nature of acts of creation and their importance in the arts are considered, and suggestions are made about the place in our lives for spiritual beliefs. This book is different from others as it aims to provide a complete overview of the territory of the mind in a way that removes older philosophical dilemmas but is compatible with modern science. It offers a new perspective on the old difficulties of understanding the mind and presents new avenues of thought.