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9Some Comments to R. Aquila's Paper ‘Kantian Appearances, Intentional Gegenstände, and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism’Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1). 2020.In my commentary, I write, firstly, of the dualistic (ambivalent) use of the concept ‘appearance’ by Kant and, secondly, of the need for a semantic (referential) interpretation of the Kantian concept ‘‘appearance’ as opposed to intentional interpretation of R.Aquilla. In his reply to my objections, R. Aquila precisies his initial position and gives additional arguments in it’s favor.
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18Representational Mind: A Study of Kant's Theory of Knowledge.Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant's Transcendental DeductionPhilosophical Review 100 (4): 703. 1991.
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105The Relationship between Pure and Empirical Intuition in KantKant Studien 68 (1-4): 275-289. 1977.
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39Objectivity and Insight. By Mark Sacks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. 346. ISBN 019-8250584 , £35.00 (review)Kantian Review 5 114-119. 2001.
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8Kantian Appearances, Intentional Objects, and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism (Translation: M. Belousov)Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1). 2020.The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis.” From here, and with a new reading of Kant’s discussion …Read more
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12Kantian Appearances, Intentional Gegenstände, and Some Varieties of PhenomenalismStudies in Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1). 2020.The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis.” From here, and with a new reading of Kant’s discussion …Read more
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9"Kantian Appearances, Intentional Gegenstände, and Some Varieties Phenomenalism" (Translation: M. Evstigneev, G. Filatov)Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1). 2020.The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis”. From here, and with a new reading of Kant's discussion …Read more
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57Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of MindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1): 159-170. 1985.
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74Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3): 663-675. 1991.
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73The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy, by David Woodruff Smith (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 994-997. 1992.
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14Infinitude, Whole-Part Priority, and the Ambiguity of Kantian "Space" and "Time"In Ralph Schumacher, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Volker Gerhardt (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des Ix. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. I: Hauptvorträge. Bd. Ii: Sektionen I-V. Bd. Iii: Sektionen Vi-X: Bd. Iv: Sektionen Xi-Xiv. Bd. V: Sektionen Xv-Xviii, De Gruyter. pp. 99-109. 2001.
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19Transcendental Unity as a Quasi-Object in the First CritqueProceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress 1 483-501. 1995.
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57Imagination as a “Medium” in the Critique of Pure ReasonThe Monist 72 (2): 209-221. 1989.It is difficult to know what sense to make of Kant’s apparent assignment, in the Critique of Pure Reason, of imagination to a kind of middle position between intuition and understanding. Kant himself appears unsure about it. Sometimes he sees imagination as responsible for one or more varieties of a sub-intellectual “synthesis” of intuitions
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2Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge (review) (review)Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2): 267-268. 2002.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 267-268 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge Robert Greenberg. Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2001. Pp. ix + 278. Cloth, $45.00. This is one of the deepest and most carefully reasoned books on Kant I have read. It is a book for the scholar of the first Critique, not the "educated layman," but it very…Read more
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18Betsy Carol Postow, 1945-2007Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (2). 2007.
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88Unity of Apperception and the Division of Labour in the Transcendental AnalyticKantian Review 1 17-52. 1997.In the Critique of Fure Reason Kant distinguishes two sorts of conditions of knowledge. First, there are the space and time of pure intuition, introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. They are grounded in our dependence on a special sort of perceptual field for the location of objects. Second, there are pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, introduced in the Analytic. In one respect these are grounded in the logical function of the understanding in judgements, introduced in the f…Read more
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94Kant’s PhenomenalismIdealistic Studies 5 (2): 108-126. 1975.I want to state as clearly as I can the sense in which Kant is, and the sense in which he is not, a phenomenalist. And I also want to state the argument which Kant presents, in the Transcendental Deduction, for his particular version of phenomenalism. Since that doctrine has been stated by Kant himself as the view that we have knowledge of “appearances” only, and not of things in themselves, or that material objects are nothing but a species of our “representations,” it will of course be part of…Read more
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28Transcendental Phenomenology (review)Review of Metaphysics 44 (4): 856-857. 1991.This book, assembled in large part from previous papers and talks, consists of three chapters. The first offers distinctions between types of description and between descriptive and speculative procedures in philosophy, and then a view as to the character of "philosophical facts." Then it turns to the charge that description is really interpretation. On account of the method of composition, the challenge is met in a somewhat disjointed manner. With emphasis on the question of historical and mora…Read more
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48Space, Time, and Thought in Kant (review)International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1): 119-120. 1992.
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