Richard E. Aquila

The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis.” From here, and with a new reading of Kant’s discussion of the “transcendental object = X,” new possibilities open for a sense in which even a phenomenalistic Kant might – without regarding them as also existing in themselves – regard empirically real objects as more than mere “logical constructs” out of the Aesthetic’s “appearances.”

The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis.” From here, and with a new reading of Kant’s discussion of the “transcendental object = X,” new possibilities open for a sense in which even a phenomenalistic Kant might – without regarding them as also existing in themselves – regard empirically real objects as more than mere “logical constructs” out of the Aesthetic’s “appearances.”

The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis”. From here, and with a new reading of Kant's discussion of the “transcendental object = X ”, new possibilities open for a sense in which even a phenomenalistic Kant might - without regarding them as also existing in themselves - regard empirically real objects as more than mere “logical constructs” out of the Aesthetic's “appearances”.

The overall theme of this superb collection concerns the complex of relations among Kant's views of art and aesthetic experience, the interests of morality and society in the latter, and more generally the connection between morality and human sensibility. Except for the last and perhaps the penultimate chapter, Guyer's main approach is from the direction of issues raised by the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." However, the last and longest chapter, specially written for the book, is a detailed and penetrating examination of the extent to which Kant recognizes the moral significance of human sensibility. The chapter includes interesting comment on Kant's development and motivations, as well as helpful commentary on the different frameworks employed by Kant in his classification of virtues and duties.

Transcendental consciousness is described by Kant as 'the one single thing' in which 'as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered.' The unity of that subject depends on intellectual functions. I argue that its singularity is just the same as that of Kant's pre-intellectual 'form' of spatiotemporal 'intuition.' This may seem excluded by Kant's claim that it is through intellect that 'space or time are first given as intuitions.' But while preintellectual form is insufficient for space and time as distinct 'things,' it is sufficient for the constitution of a 'single thing' indifferently construable as both. Contrary to what are typically seen as the main differences between Kant and Hume on identity of 'self,' there is thus already a difference in play below the level of either's concern with the sorts of connections available for the combining, or illusion of combining, of manifolds of 'impressions' or 'ideas.'

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 267-268 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge Robert Greenberg. Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2001. Pp. ix + 278. Cloth, $45.00. This is one of the deepest and most carefully reasoned books on Kant I have read. It is a book for the scholar of the first Critique, not the "educated layman," but it very much needs to be read by the former. Even for Kant scholars, it is not easy. Apart from demands imposed by the tightness of the reasoning, one may simply be uneasy with the fact that, as instanced in a relentless and detailed critique of the main species of the "customary" reading--represented primarily by Allison and Guyer--Greenberg is defending a radically new view of Kant's reasoning in the Critique.Typically, one either supposes Kant really has no theory regarding the possibility of specifically a priori knowledge in the first place, or--either for excessive subjectivism, reference to "things in themselves" (in more than an Allisonian "methodological" spirit), or both--it is a disaster. (Or, as in Guyer and before him Strawson, one distinguishes between a Kant of each stripe.) On the no-theory option Kant is primarily concerned with the conditions of empirical knowledge and the relation of experience to objects. So occupied, he in effect redefines what it is to be concerned with the (non-analytic) a priori in the first place: it just is to be concerned with such conditions. In turn, he takes it for granted that, insofar as certain representations are indeed such conditions, they are sufficiently related to experience and its objects to meet the demands of knowledge. To the contrary, according to Greenberg, it is just this which Kant sees cannot be taken for granted.Regarding the ontology of Kant's theory, Greenberg argues (18-26 and chapter 2passim) that it is and ought to be distinct from that of the knowledge that is its target, that is, from the world of "appearances." But this is not to say that what is in question is a world of "things in themselves": things that, as Greenberg takes that notion, would have to be viewed "according to properties or laws that are intrinsic to them" (101), to make sense of the theory in the first place. Rather, the ontology comprises "things simpliciter": things that might (though not by us) be viewed as "things in themselves." What the theory tells us, first, is thata priori knowledge is possible only insofar as it relates to things precisely as appearances. Second, this is possible only insofar as experience itself relates to things as appearances. Thus to the contrary of standard readings, the primary focus is on the possibility [End Page 267] of experience, and its relation to objects, as a condition of a priori knowledge, not vice versa. This is of course not to deny the importance of space, time, and the categories as conditions of experience. It is just that their relevance to the possibility of a priori knowledge cannot consist wholly in the fact of such conditioning.Greenberg concedes that the book falls short of defending the objective validity of Kant's theory, as opposed to its internal coherence and--as exemplified mainly by way of a detailed analysis of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction (chapters 11-3), a convincing account (chapter 10) as to what was needed but lacking in the original version, and (chapter 9) a major independent contribution to the discussion of Kant's views regarding "logical forms" and "functions"--the validity of Kant's reasoning. That just illustrates the general point: just as the ontology of the theory needs to be distinct from that of the knowledge that is its target, the point from which the objective validity of the theory is assessed needs to be part of some further theory. This may be dissatisfying. "But is that not how things always stand in philosophy?" (269).There is no way that...