Richard Frohock

Experts are an essential part of our social epistemology. They grant us access to knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible. Because of this, experts are also typically seen as invaluable political contributors. Without expert contributions, public policy risks being ill-informed and therefore incapable of addressing society’s needs. Recently, however, the extent to which expertise should inform public policy has come into question. Fueled largely by disinformation, there is a growing movement against traditional experts. Those within this movement argue that experts have overstepped their bounds and are working against the societies they are meant to be helping. Fearing that that the democratic system of political legitimization might empower this movement to install their own disinformed “experts” into positions of political authority, some philosophers have proposed alternative to democracy which prioritize expert voices over much of the population. Such systems, they argue, ensure that political authority is dispelled competently and that disinformation does not find its way into politics. However, as this dissertation argues, such systems are ultimately unable to live up to this aspiration. Like democracy, they are vulnerable to legitimizing disinformed positions as politically authoritative. Unlike democracy, though, these alternatives lack the mechanisms to easily expel disinformation once it becomes entrenched. Their structures of authority are simply too rigid to easily change. Additionally, these alternatives require moral transgressions in order to be properly implemented. Failing to ensure a more competent political system, these transgressions lack justification. Consequently, despite its shortcomings, this leaves democracy as the preferable system of political legitimization even as disinformation’s influence continues to expand.

Since the release of ChatGPT,, philosophers have been increasingly interested in the future of artificial intelligence (AI). Chief among them is whether AI can provide knowledge-generating testimony. Despite these worries, AIs are being thrust into the expert role in various domains like sales, customer service, and even healthcare. Reflecting on these developments, this article advances the idea of what I am calling expert deserts. Similar to a food desert, an expert desert refers to an epistemic environment in which diverse and high-quality expertise is largely inaccessible. As AI continues to occupy more expert roles, expert deserts are apt to become a more prevalent feature of our epistemic environments. As philosophers in the contemporary world, it is our responsibility to remain vigilant of AI’s encroachment on expertise so that we can identify – and hopefully rectify – the ways in which AI has worsened our epistemic positions.