•  66
    Where do philosophers appeal to intuitions (if they do)?
    Metaphilosophy 55 (1): 44-58. 2024.
    It might be that intuitions are central to philosophy, and it might be that this is true because when philosophers give case‐based arguments for philosophical claims (in published philosophy), the case verdict is typically (a) an intuited proposition and (b) either left undefended or defended on the grounds that it is an intuited proposition. This paper remains neutral on these global issues, however, and instead focuses on whether there is a nontrivial (or many‐membered) class of case‐based arg…Read more
  •  75
  •  25
    Limited legal moralism
    Criminal Justice Ethics 7 (2): 23-36. 1988.
  •  47
    Two difficulties for Devlin's disintegration thesis
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149): 420-423. 1987.
  •  23
    Tennis Anyone?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 2 79-85. 1985.
  •  50
    Causal Impotence and Complicity
    Public Affairs Quarterly 37 (1): 47-63. 2023.
    Moral problems such as climate change and global poverty result from widespread human action, and hence, are unaffected by changes in any individual's behavior—for instance, the harms of climate change will obtain whether I drive my car or not. This problem of causal impotence seems potentially devastating for consequentialists, but more easily addressed by deontologists. The deontologist can argue that (e.g.) even if our acts will have no effect on climate change, our using fossil fuels makes u…Read more
  •  54
    Act-Consequentialism and the Problem of Causal Impotence
    Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1): 87-108. 2020.
  • Obligations to the Cognitively Impaired in Non-Structured Contexts
    In Adam Cureton & Hill Jr (eds.), , Oxford University Press. pp. 204-226. 2018.
  •  56
    Collective Action Problems and the Ethics of Virtue
    Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (1): 139-145. 2019.
  •  67
    Freedom and the Fact of Reason
    Kantian Review 24 (1): 27-51. 2019.
    The focus of my argument is whether, and in what sense, freedom is “revealed” by the fact of reason in Kant’s second Critique. I examine the passages in which Kant refers to the fact of reason and conclude that he uses the term to refer to our taking morality as authoritative, and to our apprehending the content of the moral law. I then point out how various commentators have claimed each to be the fact of reason. Next I address how each is claimed by Kant to reveal “freedom” to us and argue tha…Read more
  •  2
    Slavery and Universalizability
    Kant Studien 90 (2): 191-203. 1999.
    In this paper I examine O'Neill's argument (from Constructions of Reason) for the inconsistency of the universalized maxim of slavery. Although I agree that the universalized maxim of slavery entails a contradiction, her argument is a bit quick and leaves room for some potentially damaging objections. I intend to show that each of these objections can ultimately be met by expanding O'Neill's argument to include a more detailed treatment of the enslavement relation and its maxim. In so doing I ho…Read more
  • Limitations on structural Principles of Distributive Justice: the Case of Discrete Idiosyncratic Goods
    with Chares Lockhart
    In Kjell Törnblom & Ali Kazemi (eds.), A Handbook of Social Resource Theory, Springer. pp. 351-372. 2012.
    Our aim is to draw a set of distinctions among types of goods which has significant implications for theories of distributive justice. We begin by providing a general account of two sets of properties--fungibility and nonfungibility, divisibility and indivisibility--and argue that goods can be distinguished according to these criteria. Further, we contend that these distinctions entail complications for structural principles of distributive justice (i.e., principles such as maximin that distri…Read more
  •  1
    Practical Uncertainty, Practical Contradiction and Logical Contradiction
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (4): 349-370. 2013.
    According to Kant’s Universal Law Formula, maxims that cannot be conceived as universal laws denote duties of perfect obligation. In the recent literature, two versions of the Contradiction in Conception test have received the most attention. When acting on a maxim would violate a perfect duty, according to the Logical Contradiction Interpretation (LCI), universalizing the maxim would make it literally impossible to perform the action as described in the original maxim. According to the Practica…Read more
  •  2
    "Kant's Two Facts of Reason"
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (1): 37-56. 2017.
    Commentators generally agree that one important difference between the arguments that Kant offers in the Groundwork and those in the second Critique is the appeal to the term “fact of reason” has a single referent, although they disagree about what that referent is. I argue that Kant employs the term to refer to two distinct phenomena. In some passages Kant claims it to be a fact of reason what we take the moral law as supremely authoritative in our deliberations, whereas in others he uses it to…Read more
  •  54
    Any number of criticisms of Kant's moral psychology are directed at his claims that actions possessing moral worth must be performed "irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire" (G 68,400),' and that actions done from duty must "set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every object of the will" (ibid). Rather than desire or inclination, it is "pure reverence for the law" that moves the will in actions done from duty (G 69,401). My present purpose is…Read more
  •  2
    Maxims and Practical Contradictions
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (4): 407. 2011.
    According to Kant’s Universal Law Formula, maxims that cannot be conceived as universal laws denote duties of perfect obligation. In the recent literature, two versions of the Contradiction in Conception test have received the most attention. When acting on a maxim would violate a perfect duty, according to the Logical Contradiction Interpretation (LCI), universalizing the maxim would make it literally impossible to perform the action as described in the original maxim. According to the Practica…Read more
  •  132
    It appears that utilitarian arguments in favor of moral vegetarianism cannot justify a complete prohibition of eating meat. This is because, in certain circumstances, forgoing meat will prevent no pain, and so, on utilitarian grounds, we should be opportunistic carnivores rather than moral vegetarians. In his paper, ‘Puppies, pigs, and people: Eating meat and marginal cases,’ Alastair Norcross argues that causal impotence arguments like these are misguided. First, he presents an analogous situat…Read more
  •  234
    Rounding up the usual suspects: Varieties of Kantian constructivism in ethics
    Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242): 16-36. 2011.
    Some commentators have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a meta-ethical constructivist. Among meta-ethical constructivist interpretations I distinguish between ‘atheistic’ and ‘agnostic’ versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order. Even though these two versions are incompatible, each is linked with central Kantian doctrines, revealing a tension within Kant's own view. Moreover, among interpretations that cast Kant as rejecting subs…Read more
  •  9
    The universal law formulas
    In Thomas E. Hill (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Some Common Misunderstandings How Different Are PGW, FUL, and FLN? The Role of the Universal Law Formulas Issues Regarding the Maxim and its Universal Counterpart The Two Hegelian Objections Contradictions in Conception Contradictions in the Will Three Persistent Problems and One Very Modest Proposal Bibliography.
  •  50
    The problems caused by anthropogenic climate change threaten the lives and well-being of millions, yet it seems that we, as individuals, are powerless to prevent or worsen these problems. In this essay we consider the difficulty of assigning moral responsibility in cases of collective action problems like the problem of anthropogentic climate change. We consider two promising solutions, the expected utility and rights based solution, and argue that both are incapable of explaining why individual…Read more