•  44
    According to the moral error theorist, all moral judgments are mistaken. The world just doesn't contain the properties and relations necessary for these judgments to be true. But what should we actually do if we decided that we are in this radical and unsettling predicament--that morality is just a widespread and heartfelt illusion? One suggestion is to eliminate all talk and thought of morality. Another is to carry on believing it anyway. And yet another is to treat morality as a kind of conven…Read more
  •  25
    Chisholm on socratic interrogation
    Philosophia 7 (3-4): 441-460. 1978.
  •  24
    Austin on entailment
    Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72): 216-224. 1968.
  •  33
    On saying what is true
    Noûs 6 (3): 201-224. 1972.
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    Beardsley, Firth and the ideal observer theory
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (4): 618-623. 1967.
  •  89
    Beyond morality
    Temple University Press. 1994.
    "Morality and religion have failed because they are based on duplicity and fantasy. We need something new." This bold statement is the driving force behind Richard Garner's "Beyond Morality." In his book, Garner presents an insightful defense of moral error theory-the idea that our moral thought and discourse is systemically flawed. Establishing his argument with a discerning survey of historical and contemporary moral beliefs from around the world, Garner critically evaluates the plausibility o…Read more
  •  44
    Confucian Moral Self Cultivation
    Philosophy East and West 49 (4): 533. 1999.
  •  57
    On the use of proper names and definite descriptions
    Philosophical Quarterly 19 (76): 231-238. 1969.
  •  38
    Nonreferring uses of proper names
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3): 358-368. 1971.
  •  553
    On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2). 1990.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  549
    Abolishing Morality
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5): 499-513. 2007.
    Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore…Read more