Richard Hanley

Conventional wisdom holds that human bodies do not and cannot persist through beaming: scanning and destruction of the body, followed by transmission of the scan information and replication of the body in another location. I argue that given the minimal time travel assumption that information can be sent into the past, it is logically possible for (duplicates of) human bodies to exist in object loops. If so, then conventional wisdom is wrong, and bodies can persist through beaming. The lesson generalizes to all composite material objects that can persist through intrinsic change.

Basic folk psychological explanation of behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires is inadequate. The best explanation of human behaviour in several domains, such as childhood games of pretence, properly adverts to the postulated propositional attitude of make-belief. Adding make-beliefs to the basic ontology of thoughts has considerable theoretical benefit in the philosophy of fiction. Production of fiction is centrally a communicative act with the intention of inviting make-belief; direct appreciation of fiction centrally is a matter of adopting appropriate attitudes of make-belief; and most indirect appreciation of fiction adverts to the make-belief invited by particular fictions. This last observation offers a naturalistic, truth-conditional, intensional semantics for fictional statements such as 'Holmes lived in Baker Street', without quantifying over so-called fictional entities, by rendering such a statement as the intensional 'In the Holmes story, Holmes lived in Baker Street'. Its truthmaker is, roughly, the fact that the Holmes story invites the make-belief that Holmes lived in Baker Street. The basic account is then developed into a truth-conditional semantics for statements such as 'Holmes is smarter than Clouseau', and 'Ralph admires Holmes'. Many of the traditional problems in the semantics of fiction are dissolved by this approach, which in addition makes some interesting predictions about human cognitive architecture

An examination of a somewhat neglected topic in the ethics of warfare: the training and treatment of one's own forces. The creation of clone soldiers with diminished autonomy in _Star Wars_ has parallels with actual military training procedures that reinforce obedience by manipulating nurture rather than nature. I argue that objections to cloning and eugenics in general do not have much force in mounting a case against the use of diminished clones. Indeed, there likely are situations in which training and deploying such soldiers is preferable to standard military practice.

Universities and colleges all over the United States are currently revising and implementing policies concerning sexual harassment and sexual misconduct, under the generally expressed concern to comply with Title IX requirements. But there is a very basic problem of equivocation. Both “sexual harassment” and “sexual misconduct” are used in very different ways in different contexts, often by the same entity. The result is a mess in which members of campus communities cannot be sure of their obligations or protections, and which presents a serious threat to academic freedom.

David Lewis’s attempt to defuse grandfather paradoxes consistently without special restrictions on the ability of time travelers to act in the past is controversial. Kadri Vihvelin uses the case of possible autoinfanticide—killing one’s infant self—to argue on Lewisian grounds that Lewis is wrong, since all counterfactual attempts at autoinfanticide would fail. I present a new defense of Lewis against Vihvelin premised on the possibility of personal _reinstatement_, where a person who dies prematurely is replicated from information collected from a previous live scan. I argue on Lewisian grounds that in a Vihvelin case where Suzy does not attempt to kill Baby Suzy, Vihvelin has not shown that Suzy would have failed had she tried to kill Baby Suzy. For, Baby Suzy might have been reinstated. Hence, even granting Vihvelin’s own assumptions, a Lewisian can assert that Suzy can kill Baby Suzy. Reinstatement does not require a “big” miracle; so autoinfanticide is no biggie.

A minor philosophical industry has sprung up in recent years defending the possibility and epistemic utility of miracles: supernatural interventions in the world by a Christian God. By examining some staples of science fiction, this chapter finds a way to agree: miracles are possible, and could tell us something about reality. Nobody is sure exactly what David Hume himself thought, but there is an identifiable Humean tradition on miracles. It makes two main points. First, by definition a miracle is in some relevant sense beyond what the laws of nature can describe and explain. The second point is intended to generally undermine claims of an established marvel which is contrary to our understanding of the laws of nature; to prevent a miracle claim even getting a toehold. The chapter then focuses on three miracle monger's favorite Sci‐Fi things: time travel, other dimensions, and simulations.

Professor Richard Hanley faced the dilemma plaguing so many philosophy professors today—how to entice students into the classroom. Based upon his own successful course, Is Data Human presents a thoroughly unique and enjoyable way of introducing students to the basic concepts of philosophy as seen through the lens of Star Trek. From the nature of a person, of minds, and of consciousness, to ethics and morality, to the nature and extent of knowledge and free will, Hanley brings a fresh perspective to the contemporary debates concerning humankind’s place in the world.Dare to boldly go where no philosophy professor has gone before—a classroom packed with eager and enthusiastic students.

Peter Singer does not think that eating meat is wrong in and of itself. The case he makes in Practical Ethics against the use of non-human animals for food consists of two connected arguments.1 It will be convenient to call them the Suffering Argument and the Killing Argument. The Suffering Argument is primarily an argument against factory farm- ing—the mass production of meat and animal products as it occurs in developed nations at least—and is well expressed by paraphrasing an explicit argument Singer gives (230–231) concerning absolute poverty.

Cloning scares the hell out of people, because the idea of cloning people scares the hell out of people. Some of this fear is well-founded. Like any new reproductive technology, the cloning of entire human organisms can be put to good or bad effect, for good or bad reasons. But much of the fear is not well-founded. Before you could say “Hello, Dolly,” the U.S. administration moved to ban federal funding of human cloning research; and there is considerable support in Congress for an outright ban on the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology for the purpose of human cloning. Why? Here is part of Clinton’s statement announcing the funding ban.

There have been many objections to the possibility oftime travel. But all the truly interesting ones concern the possibility of reversecausation. What is objectionable about reverse causation? I diagnose that the trulyinteresting objections are to a further possibility: that of causal loops. I raisedoubts about whether there must be causal loops if reverse causation obtains; but devote themajority of the paper to describing, and dispelling concerns about, various kinds ofcausal loop. In short, I argue that they are neither logically nor physically impossible.The only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidenceis required to explain them. Just how coincidental a loop will be varies: some arereally quite ordinary, and some are incredibly unlikely. I end by speculating thatthe tendency amongst physicists to avoid discussion of causal loops involving intentionalaction may have been unfortunate, since intentional action is an excellent way tonon-mysteriously bring about what otherwise would have been an unlikely coincidence. Hencecausal loops may be more likely in a world with beings like us, than in one without.