Richard Kenneth Atkins

_Puzzled?!_ seamlessly fuses two traditional approaches to the study of philosophy at the introductory level. It is thematic, examining fundamental issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and more. It is also historical, introducing major philosophical arguments that have arisen throughout the history of Western philosophy. But its real innovation lies elsewhere. Each of its twelve chapters begins with a traditional argument of a thoroughly puzzling kind: a valid philosophical argument with highly plausible premises but a surprising conclusion. The remainder of the chapter shows how major innovations in the history of philosophy arise as logical responses to that argument. Written with a light touch, _Puzzled?!_ nevertheless offers a rigorous introduction to the ideas it explores and to the foundations of critical thinking itself. It will serve as effectively as a main or supplementary text in an introduction to critical thinking as it will in Philosophy 101.

Peirce’s True Gorgias is a brief dialogue from his essay “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic”, published in 1869. The True Gorgias exposes the fallacy of existential import. It has received no sustained attention in the secondary literature, perhaps because the fallacy is now familiar. Peirce’s assessment of the fallacy involved in the reasoning, however, changes between 1865 and 1869, and he only arrives at the contemporary account of existential import in 1880. Moreover, a careful examination of the context in which the True Gorgias appears reveals it provides an argument in support of Peirce’s early Aristotelian realism about universals in contradistinction to non-Aristotelian varieties of realism advocated by W.T. Harris, editor of the journal in which the True Gorgias was published.

With respect to time consciousness, “present” is ambiguous between the living present and the absolute present. The living present is a brief, occurrent phase of consciousness. It consists of three moments, a retended moment, a protended moment, and an ur-impression. Any phase of consciousness is an abstraction from the continuous flow of consciousness. Because consciousness is continuous, phases of consciousness are infinitely divisible into shorter and shorter phases of consciousness. The ur-impression, in contrast, is the absolute present. It is not a phase of consciousness at all. Rather, it is the limit between the retended moment and protended moment. The absolute present does not exist in the sense of being a discrete point or piece in the flow of consciousness. Rather, it is a theoretical construct, a merely postulated limit between two segments of the living present. I argue that Husserl and Peirce share this view, that they arrive at this position independently by countenancing the same problems with the same resources, and that their conception of the living present is a direct consequence of their conception of the continuity of consciousness.

The concept of truth is at the core of science, journalism, law, and many other pillars of modern society. Yet, given the imprecision of natural language, deciding what information should count as true is no easy task, even with access to the ground truth. How do people decide whether a given claim of fact qualifies as true or false? Across two studies (N = 1181; 16,248 observations), participants saw claims of fact alongside the ground truth about those claims. Participants classified each claim as true or false. Although participants knew precisely how accurate the claims were, participants classified claims as false more often when they judged the information source to be intending to deceive (versus inform) their audience, and classified claims as true more often when they judged the information source to be intending to provide an approximate (versus precise) account. These results suggest that, even if people have access to the same set of facts, they might disagree about the truth of claims if they attribute discrepant intentions to information sources. Such findings may shed light on the robust and persistent disagreements over claims of fact that have arisen in the “post-truth era”.

Peirce’s True Gorgias is a brief dialogue from his essay “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic”, published in 1869. The True Gorgias exposes the fallacy of existential import. It has received no sustained attention in the secondary literature, perhaps because the fallacy is now familiar. Peirce’s assessment of the fallacy involved in the reasoning, however, changes between 1865 and 1869, and he only arrives at the contemporary account of existential import in 1880. Moreover, a careful examination of the context in which the True Gorgias appears reveals it provides an argument in support of Peirce’s early Aristotelian realism about universals in contradistinction to non-Aristotelian varieties of realism advocated by W.T. Harris, editor of the journal in which the True Gorgias was published.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning by Todd LekanRichard Kenneth AtkinsTodd Lekan. William James and the Moral Life: Responsible Self-Fashioning. New York: Routledge, 2022. Pp. ix + 146. Hardback, $144.00; paperback $43.99.Over the course of five chapters, Lekan develops a distinctive and compelling account of James’s ethics. Any account of James’s ethics must be constructive and clarifying. As James scholars know, he only wrote one essay focused exclusively on philosophical issues in ethics: “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” Nonetheless, James’s writings are rife with ethical themes presented in piecemeal fashion. Any interpreter of James’s ethics must fit these different pieces together and smooth out apparent inconsistencies.Lekan maintains that James’s writings on ethics take on two different perspectives. First, the social moral philosopher “seeks to create an inclusive moral order through expansion of sympathetic concern among those committed to different ideals” (2). Second, the existential moral philosopher “addresses the concerns of the moral agent seeking to abate existential doubts, particularly those that arise in the face of evil and suffering” (2). These two perspectives on ethical matters constrain one another, as I shall explain.On Lekan’s account, James’s moral philosophy begins like most pragmatist theories: with persons as we find them, in the thick of life, having diverse interests, and confronting genuine problems that call for a solution. Lekan writes, “James’s starting point is that of a complex self who has limited altruism rooted in sympathetic awareness of like-minded others. Moral philosophy’s fundamental problem is how to extend this limited sympathy to others who do not share one’s values” (4).At the heart of chapter 1 and the book as a whole is Lekan’s defense of the social-moral philosopher’s “Inclusivity Ideal” (15). The Inclusivity Ideal consists of two tenets: (1) “We are morally obligated to satisfy as many demands as possible,” and (2) “among the available ideals we might choose, we are morally obligated to adopt ideals whose realization does not undermine the ideals held by others” (15). Lekan regards the Inclusivity Ideal as a second-order regulative ideal. It is an ideal that “enjoins us to continuously strive for a social order that accommodates diverse ideals” (50). One will naturally wonder what argument supports adoption of the Inclusivity Ideal.Lekan’s argument is rooted in the Sentiogenic Thesis that “goods originate from the desires of sentient beings” (16, emphasis in original). It is because sentient beings have desires that any action can be good or bad at all. Lekan grounds this thesis in James’s Darwinian naturalism according to which “sentience is a function that evolves to fulfill the organism’s need to establish harmony with its environing circumstances” (18). Lekan’s account of what harmony consists in is not developed; he seems to hold that its contrary is frustration arising from when one’s “activities are blocked” (18). I should note that in other places, Lekan phrases the Sentiogenic Thesis as the thesis that “values originate from the feelings of sentient beings” (18). Lekan is not explicit about how desires and feelings are related and how this impacts what is good or has value.Taking the Sentiogenic Thesis in its first formulation as about desires, two additional theses come into play. The first is the Demand Obligation Thesis that “some sentient being S demanding F is necessary and sufficient to generate a prima facie obligation for satisfying S’s demand for F,” and the second is the Essence of Good Thesis that “the essence of the [End Page 671] good is demand satisfaction” (16). Lekan maintains that the Sentiogenic Thesis is the “underlying context” for these two theses. It is not hard to see why: since values originate from desires, and since desires lead one to make demands, it is reasonable to conclude that the good consists in the satisfaction of those demands. Presumably, moreover, we have an obligation to do whatever is good; in this case, to satisfy a given demand. However, it is plain that not all demands can be satisfied. Moreover, the “social moral philosopher demands an impartial method...

Above all other titles, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) prized that of logician. He thought of logic broadly, such that it includes not merely formal logic but an examination of the entire process of inquiry. His works are replete with detailed investigations into logical questions. Peirce is especially concerned to show that valid inferential processes, diligently followed, will eventually root out error and alight on the truth. Peirce on Inference draws together diverse strands from Peirce's lifelong reflections on logic in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on Peirce's theory of inference. Peirce argues that each genus of inference--deduction, induction, and abduction--has a different truth-producing virtue. An inference is valid just in case the procedure used in fact has the truth-producing virtue claimed for it and the person making the inference adheres to the procedure. In successive chapters, this book shows how Peirce supports the thesis that these genera of inference have the truth-producing virtues claimed for them and how Peirce responds to objections. Among the objections given consideration are the liar paradox, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's new riddle of induction, that this may be a chance world, and that we are incapable of conceiving the true hypothesis. The book defends several controversial theses, including that Peirce does not so strongly object to Bayesianism as is sometimes claimed and that prior to 1900 Peirce had no explicit theory of abduction. It also proposes a novel account of abduction.

In _Charles Peirce and Modern Science_, T.L. Short encourages us to read Peirce’s oeuvre in the spirit of philosophical experimentalism. The result is a rewarding and refreshing book that clarifies longstanding controversies and stakes out novel positions in the debates. In these comments, I subject Short’s statements regarding the validity of induction to critical scrutiny. I argue that while much of what he states is correct, he errs in holding that induction is invalid in the short run of an individual’s life.

Some persons who believe provably false claims – such as that there were significant voter irregularities in the 2020 election – may nevertheless be evidentially rational for holding their false beliefs. I consider a person I call our average believer. In her daily life, she incidentally gathers evidence favoring the hypothesis that there were significant voter irregularities, but she does not investigate the matter. Her information environment, moreover, is such that it accidentally (through no fault of her own) excludes counterevidence to the thesis that there were such irregularities and intensifies the flow of information that there were irregularities. As a consequence, she becomes convinced that there were significant voting irregularities in the 2020 U.S. election. I argue that while she is not zetetically rational, for she does not investigate the matter, she is evidentially rational in that she apportions her belief to the evidence. While she has no right to the Cliffordian, or assertoric, belief that there were such irregularities, she is not epistemically blameworthy for having the wagered belief it is true.

Commonsensism is a thesis about commonsense beliefs: our commonsense beliefs are items of knowledge (or should be so regarded) that have epistemic or methodological priority. This account of commonsensism risks making our commonsense beliefs impervious to philosophical argument. But in Santayana's commonsensism, what deserves our trust is not our commonsense beliefs but the development of common sense over successive generations. Our commonsense beliefs deserve only a secondary or subsidiary trust; we trust them only insofar as we trust the momentum of common sense. I examine Santayana's distinctive form of commonsensism and explain why he avoids putting trust primarily in commonsense beliefs.

Implicit in C. I. Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is an account of how our ideas undergo a process of social development. Lewis's account of that process resolves a problem with Josiah Royce's theory of ideas. Royce holds that there are both sensuous and symbolic ideas. It is, however, possible for someone to have only a sensuous idea of how middle C sounds and for another person to have only the symbolic idea that middle C is 261.63 Hz. In what sense, if at all, can these two persons have the same idea, namely, the idea of middle C? On Lewis's account, while ideas in individual minds are typically constituted of both sensory correlates and pure concepts, ideas are also social products that individuals inherit through education and language acquisition. For two people to have the same idea is for them both to be heirs to the social development of the idea.

Charles Sanders Peirce proposed two different solutions to the Liar Paradox. He proposed the first in 1865 and the second in 1869. However, no one has yet noted in the literature that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution in 1903. Peirce never explicitly proposed a third solution to the Liar Paradox. Nonetheless, I shall argue he developed the resources for a third and novel solution to the Liar Paradox.In what follows, I will first explain the Liar Paradox. Second, I will briefly rehearse Peirce's 1865 solution and his reasons for rejecting it.1 Third, I will review his 1869 solution and his reasons for rejecting it in 1903. Lastly, I will propose a novel solution to the Liar Paradox by drawing upon Peirce's later..

In 1898, Peirce delivered a series of lectures titled Reasoning and the Logic of Things. Peirce scholars have found the first of those lectures—titled “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life”—especially perplexing.Some scholars have a decidedly negative assessment of Peirce’s lecture. Cornelis de Waal, for example, maintains that Peirce’s claims in the lecture are doubtful. He states that “Peirce... takes a radical stance, arguing emphatically that science should stay away from ‘matters of vital importance,’ moral problems among them, thereby denying the validity of a science of ethics”. He goes on to say that “on Peirce’s account, the ethics of inquiry seems to preclude ethical inquiry. The scientific..

Peirce repeatedly states that phaneroscopy involves analyzing the phaneron, or “the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not”.1 Here are three representative quotations from different periods of Peirce’s work, all supporting the claim that phaneroscopy involves analysis:[The business of phaneroscopy is] to unravel the tangled skein [of] all that in any sense appears and wind it into distinct forms; or in other words, to make the ultimate analysis of all experiences the first task to which philosophy has to apply itself.I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the...

In “An ‘Entirely Different Series of Categories,’” I argue that aside from Peirce’s formal categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, Peirceans should acknowledge a second set of categories I call the material categories. I also argue that the material categories are irreducible to the formal categories. However, in that article I offer no account of what the material categories are. Moreover, Peirce himself never provides a clear and explicit account of them. The present essay attempts to provide an account of the Peircean material categories. Like Peirce’s “Guess at the Riddle,” which sought to elucidate his formal categories, this is a guess at the other riddle, his material categories, with..

Charles Sanders Peirce is not known for waxing theological. Certainly, he has various writings that may be classed under the head of natural theology or the philosophy of religion, among them "Evolutionary Love", a critique of Hume on miracles, and "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God". Numerous Peirce scholars have endeavored to give expression to Peirce's philosophy of religion. Other manuscripts are suggestive of his religious practices and of how he viewed his religious beliefs (viz., as heterodox if not...

Peirce’s beta graphs are roughly equivalent to our first-order predicate logic. However, Bellucci and Pietarinen have recently argued that the beta graphs are not well-equipped to handle asymmetric relative terms. I survey four proposed solutions to the problem and find them all wanting. I offer a fifth solution according to which Peirce’s beta graphs function at three different levels of abstractness from natural language. I diagnose the problem of asymmetric relative terms as arising when we transition from the first to the second level of abstractness. Making grammatical information encoded in natural language explicit at the first level of abstractness and interpreting graphs at the second level of abstractness as shorn of grammatical information resolves the problem. The solution is both well-motivated by Peirce’s own commitments and increases the expressiveness of the beta graphs.

If we accept certain Peircean commitments, Gettier’s two cases are not cases of justified true belief because the beliefs are not true. On the Peircean view, propositions are sign substitutes, or “representamens.” In typical cases of thought about the world, propositions represent facts. In each of Gettier’s examples, we have a case in which a person S believes some proposition p, there is some fact F* such that were p to represent F* to S then p would be true, and yet p does not represent F* to S but some other fact F of which p is false. Since truth is a property of propositions with respect to their representational function, it follows that the belief is not true. Although an examination of Gettier’s two cases, this essay is not a defense of the justified true belief analysis of knowledge, for there are objections to the JTB analysis other than Gettier’s two cases. Rather, Gettier’s two cases are of particular interest for the light they shed on the nature of truth and representation.