Most theories of moral agency, whether philosophical or psychological in emphasis, tend to conceive of either character or outlook as fundamental. That is, they take moral agency to consist either in the possession of certain traits of character or virtues or else in the ability to comprehend and act according to certain types of rules or standards. This dissertation is an attempt to reconcile the two conceptions of moral agency by giving a developmental account of the way in which character and…
Read moreMost theories of moral agency, whether philosophical or psychological in emphasis, tend to conceive of either character or outlook as fundamental. That is, they take moral agency to consist either in the possession of certain traits of character or virtues or else in the ability to comprehend and act according to certain types of rules or standards. This dissertation is an attempt to reconcile the two conceptions of moral agency by giving a developmental account of the way in which character and outlook begin in unity and gradually diverge as the moral agent matures. Key to this account are extended discussions of the psychological theories of moral development given by Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, and John Rawls. Although these theories together provide a satisfactory explanation of how outlook develops after a person has acquired a basic set of moral concepts, they do not satisfactorily explain the initial formation of moral concepts. That failure results in an impoverished conception of the mature moral agent, a conception which fails to appreciate the richness and variety of moral life, especially in regard to the types of motivational influence to which the mature moral agent is susceptible. Nonetheless, I maintain that these theories of moral development are satisfactory insofar as they show how a person's early moral concepts are partially displaced by later, more sophisticated concepts which make up a mature agent's outlook, but they are displaced only as far as the justification of behavior is concerned; the more primitive concepts, which initially constitute an agent's character and outlook together, continue to have a significant motivational influence that is essential for mature moral agency.