Richard Michael McDonough

Many philosophers have puzzled over the nature of the logically simple objects, the “substance” of the world, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-logico-philosophicus (TLP). Such questions are misplaced because TLP is committed to the view that talk of such metaphysically problematical entities is part of the “ladder” that must be “thrown away” after one has climbed it. Further, TLP’s demotion of its logically simple objects to mere logical subjects requires an increased emphasis on the relations between these alleged objects. TLP’s account of its logically simple objects is an application of Russell’s relational view of mathematical objects from his Principles of Mathematics applied to “reality”. Carnap develops an analogous relational or “structural” view of reality in The Logical Structure of the World. Despite important differences between them, these three philosophers can profitably be seen as replacing the traditional emphasis on substances with a relational model of reality.

Many influential philosophers have argued that in pgh. 608 of Zettel (hereafter Z608) Wittgenstein appears to say that language and thought might emerge out of physical chaos at the neural “centre”. By contrast, the present paper argues that these scholars are, in a fashion that would be readily understandable by Thomas Kuhn, assuming the very Anglo-American paradigm that Wittgenstein is actually critiquing in Z608 when they interpret his remarks. In opposition to this, the paper argues that Wittgenstein’s notion of emergence, chaos and the center in Z608 (and elsewhere in his works) is better understood in terms of the universal cross-cultural archetypes, emphasized by Carl Jung and Mircea Eliade of emergence, chaos and the center found in numerous religious and cosmological traditions around the world. The paper also points out that Wittgenstein also uses many other cross-cultural symbols also emphasized by Jung and Eliade, including the Shadow (which, in Jung, represents the opposite of the ego), the Trickster (or Devil), the mandala, the labyrinth, the microcosm, the crystal, the abyss, darkness, circular movement and creation (genesis), in order to illustrate his view. Perhaps the most fascinating of these concerns the archetypal cosmological symbolism in Wittgenstein’s self-reported but largely ignored“ alchemical” dream, including the Indian mandala symbolism in that dream. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein that is not restricted by Anglo-American “analytical” philosophy or the associated “scientistic” paradigms but is informed by a way of looking at things implicit in a fundamental archetypal symbolism found in very different cosmologies, religion and cultures all around the globe

This paper discusses Wittgenstein’s striking remark at para. 608 of Zettel, hereafter Z608, which, according to most commentators, suggests that the order of language and thought might arise out of physical chaos or nothingness at the neural center of normal language users. In opposition to this orthodox interpretation, the present paper argues that Z608, following Spengler, who is himself influenced by Goethe and Nietzsche, is actually suggesting that the order in language and thought might arise out of the creative chaos at what Spengler sees as the true center of human life, namely, human history.

A central aim of the contemporary reductive scientistic project is the task, inherited from the French Enlightenment, of producing a machine model of man. Cognitive science is the attempt at that most difficult part of this project, namely, to do for mind what Newton had already allegedly done for corporeal nature. Kant has recently been claimed as a precursor of this French project. The most detailed picture of a cognitive-scientistic Kant is defended by Kitcher. Contra Strawson, she claims that in his transcendental psychology Kant is “offering hypotheses about the mechanisms that carry out [cognitive] tasks.”

Dennis C. Rasmussen has produced an excellent account of “the greatest of all philosophical friendships” between two of the great thinkers of the underappreciated “Scottish Enlightenment”, Adam Smith, Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and, in his The Wealth of Nations, often seen as the founder of capitalism and creator of the modern science of economics, and David Hume, who never became an academic but who took “British Empiricism” to its logical sceptical conclusion and is often seen as the most influential philosopher ever to write in the English language. The book covers the span between Smith’s and Hume’s first meeting in 1749 until Smith’s eulogy upon Hume’s death in 1776. It describes how they commented on each other’s work, supported each other’s careers and literary ambitions and advised each other on personal issues. They had many of the same friends, joined the same clubs, and were interested in many of the same subjects beyond philosophy, including psychology, history, politics and Britain’s conflict with the American colonies. Each chapter focuses on an historical episode and theme, beginning with an introduction to Hume and his works (Chap. 1), Smith’s discovery of Hume’s writings and acquaintance with Hume (Chap. 2), their developing friendship (Chap. 3), Hume’s conflict with the Church of Scotland (Chap. 4), Smith’s work on The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Chap. 5), Hume’s fruitful sojourn in France (Chap. 6), Hume’s friendship and eventual conflict with the moody paranoid Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chap. 7), the last years of Hume’s and Smith’s friendship (Chap. 8), Smith’s publication of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chap. 9), the dispute over Smith’s reluctance to publish Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Chap. 10), Hume’s final days (Chap. 11), Smith’s Eulogy to Hume (Chap. 12), and Smith’s final years in Edinburgh (Epilogue).

There has been considerable disagreement about the relationship between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and his Philosophical Investigations with some scholars arguing that there is considerable continuity between them and some arguing that they are completely opposed. The paper argues that this breadth of disagreement is not surprising because the relation between TLP and PI is analogous with that described in Hegel’s dialectical model of philosophical truth in the Phenomenology of Spirit. One might say that TLP is “refuted” by PI but there is also a sense in which PI is “the truth” of TLP. TLP and PI are both essential stages in “the progressive unfolding of truth” bound together like the successive stages in a single living organism where the view of the former is both “annulled” and “preserved at a higher level” in the view of the latter. The paper thereby helps to facilitate Rorty’s attempt to usher “analytical philosophy” from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage.

One of Marx‘s and Engels‘ main claims (hereafter ―original Marxism) in their account of the historical ―inevitability of the collapse of capitalism is that one‘s material (economic) conditions, not one‘s ideas, arguments or philosophy, determines one‘s ―consciousness and actions. However, the self-reference in this characterization of philosophical views generates a paradox analogous to the 7th century B.C. Epimenides ―Liar paradox. The Epimenides-paradox arises when Epimenides, a Cretan, states that all Cretans are liars. Epimenides-statement is paradoxical in the sense that if it is true then it is false. Similarly, the Marxist claim that all philosophers who purport to state the cause of all social changes must be wrong, where Marx and Engels are themselves philosophers stating just such a claim, generates a paradox analogous to the ― Epimenides Liar paradox. This leads to what Engels himself calls a―false consciousness, i.e., a failure to understand the true causes of social change. This paradox can only be escaped by abandoning at least one of original Marxism‘s core doctrines.

Scholars have often struggled with the notion of mysticism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-logico-philosophicus (TLP). The paper develops a taxonomy of the multiple species of mysticism in TLP in order to show that its notion of the mystical actually has a complex hierarchial structure. A key notion in TLP’s account is its neglected notion of the “life-world” (5.621), specifically, that realm in which the “mystical” “shows itself [zeigt sich]”. A comparison is made with Heidegger’s notion in Being and Time of the fundamental phenomena of phenomenology as that that sort of phenomena that “shows itself [sich zeit].” That is, TLP’s notion of the mystical is at the same time a sketch the phenomenological structure of the “life-world”. On this basis it is argued that TLP’s account of linguistic meaning is parasitic on its notion of the “mystical” dimension of the “life-world”, which has the consequence that one cannot separate the “safe” logical and scientific portion of TLP from its mysticism as Russell and the logical positivists tried to do. The “mysticism” and “phenomenology” must stay. Finally, the paper argues that TLP is not, as often thought, a proponent of Russell’s method of analysis into “logical atoms” but actually presents a powerful critique of the analytical method.

Biographical account of Thomas Merton who was one of the leading Christian spiritual leaders of the 20th century. He authored more than 60 books and many reviews and essays primarily on spirituality, social justice and pacifism. His autobiographical account of his spiritual journey in The Seven Story Mountain proved immensely inspirational to many and is listed as one of the 100 best non-fiction books of the 20th century by the National Review. In later life, Merton engaged in dialogue with major Eastern spiritual figures like the Dali Lama, Thai Buddhist monk Buddhadasa, Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh and Japanese writer D.T. Suzuki. Merton wrote books on Zen Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism at a time when this was not common among Christian theologians. ​