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50Aspect‐switching and visual phenomenal characterPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 508-518. 2009.John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect‐switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect‐switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect‐switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not incl…Read more
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100Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal ConceptsPhilosophical Review 121 (3): 464-467. 2012.
Oxford, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |