My research focuses on the metaphysics of free will and action. I am interested in developing an account of free action that I can apply to problems in philosophical theology, especially the problem of heavenly freedom – how it is that the saints in heaven are free, but necessarily cannot sin. I develop an incompatibilist, non-causal account of free action. I argue that event-causal libertarians lack a metaphysics of control that allows them to respond to the luck objection, and that compatibilist approaches to control fail to deal with the active nature of the agent in action. Contra Davidson, only a non-causal account of action explains how…
My research focuses on the metaphysics of free will and action. I am interested in developing an account of free action that I can apply to problems in philosophical theology, especially the problem of heavenly freedom – how it is that the saints in heaven are free, but necessarily cannot sin. I develop an incompatibilist, non-causal account of free action. I argue that event-causal libertarians lack a metaphysics of control that allows them to respond to the luck objection, and that compatibilist approaches to control fail to deal with the active nature of the agent in action. Contra Davidson, only a non-causal account of action explains how what we do can be undetermined, but controlled. Furthermore, the non-causalist is best placed to explain an agent’s relation to reasons, and motivation. However a nuanced approach is needed, because a lot of our agential activity is controlled through causal determination. I develop an account of character to deal with these dual aspects of control.
I apply this theory of free action to issues in philosophical theology, examining the conditions in which agents remain free while under divine influence. In my doctoral work I examine how this theory, and not knowledge gained in the beatific vision, explains why God can prevent heavenly sin, without destroying the capacity of agents to act freely, and how heavenly agents are left with significant alternative possibilities.
I will extend this work by continuing to interact with challenges facing non-causal theories of action: the causal theory of action, what it is to act for reasons, motivation, luck and contrastive explanation, and especially the relationship between causation and control. There is also scope to pursue the connections with mental causation, ontology and emergence. I am working on a book discussing the role of freedom in philosophical theology that applies the tools of a non-causal analysis of action to the primal sin, original sin, justification, sanctification and glorification. I also hope to apply an analysis of agency to problems in the metaphysics of Christology, and of Social Trinitarianism. In the longer term, I will explore connections with the cognate philosophical problem of what constitutes moral responsibility.
