Rik Peels

In his reply to my book Ignorance: A Philosophical Study, Christopher Willard-Kyle zooms in on erotetic ignorance and the Significance Condition of my account of ignorance. Erotetic ignorance is lacking the answers to certain questions when the question is sound and when there is an answer to the question. Willard-Kyle shows that my arguments for the idea that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance are wanting. In this response, I address each of his concerns about this claim and also my earlier suggestion that an account of ignorance needs to take a Significance Condition on board. I argue that my thesis that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance was, thus put, indeed too crude and Willard-Kyle's sharp arguments and convincing examples made me see that. However, a refined and more complex version of the thesis can meet his worries.

This is a reply to Duncan Pritchard's response to my critique of his normative account of ignorance. Pritchard suggests that I take a Normative Condition on board in my own account of ignorance. Pritchard's suggestion has drastic revisionary and deflationary implications for how we use words like “ignorance” and “ignorant”. I explain why I believe this is unnecessary: one can perfectly well be ignorant without displaying any kind of intellectual fault. Pritchard does convincingly show, though, that the Signifcance Condition of my account of ignorance needs revision. I explain that we can revise it by allowing for both subjective and objective significance.

This is a reply to Duncan Pritchard's response to my critique of his normative account of ignorance. Pritchard suggests that I take a Normative Condition on board in my own account of ignorance. Pritchard's suggestion has drastic revisionary and deflationary implications for how we use words like “ignorance” and “ignorant”. I explain why I believe this is unnecessary: one can perfectly well be ignorant without displaying any kind of intellectual fault. Pritchard does convincingly show, though, that the Signifcance Condition of my account of ignorance needs revision. I explain that we can revise it by allowing for both subjective and objective significance.

In his reply to my book Ignorance: A Philosophical Study, Christopher Willard‐Kyle zooms in on erotetic ignorance and the Significance Condition of my account of ignorance. Erotetic ignorance is lacking the answers to certain questions when the question is sound and when there is an answer to the question. Willard‐Kyle shows that my arguments for the idea that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance are wanting. In this response, I address each of his concerns about this claim and also my earlier suggestion that an account of ignorance needs to take a Significance Condition on board. I argue that my thesis that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance was, thus put, indeed too crude and Willard‐Kyle's sharp arguments and convincing examples made me see that. However, a refined and more complex version of the thesis can meet his worries.

Several passages in religious documents suggest that God sometimes repents. Few thinkers, however, have embraced the thought that God repents, mainly because it seems to conflict with being perfectly good and being omniscient. Two attempts to dissolve this conflict, open theism and Geachianism, are discussed. Finally, a different approach is proposed: even though God has full knowledge of the future free actions of his creatures, he does not have full knowledge of all his own future free actions. This approach is radically different from Geachianism and open theism as we find it in the literature. On this alternative line of thought, God can simultaneously be said to be omniscient, perfectly good, and a God who sometimes repents.

Polarization and the Insurrection: The relation between identity and ideology in violent right-wing extremism The Capitol Hill Insurrection on January 6, 2021, in Washington has been, to many, a shocking and inconceivable event. On the face of it, far right ideologies, both in their extreme and radical varieties seem to play a crucial role here. Evidence from interviews with insurrectionists, however, suggests otherwise. Research on polarization in the United States and on radicalization into violent extremism also emphasizes identity over ideology as key explanatory factor. We examine this relation and argue that the importance of identity and that of ideology in the insurrection have to be understood in relation to one another. The battle between Democrats and Republicans is about identity, but it is not a blind battle. Ideological issues are at stake. It is precisely the intertwinement of identity and extreme ideology, which drives radical partisanship in American democracy.

In the literature on conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism, we find so-called vice explanations for the extreme behavior and extreme beliefs that they involve. These are explanations in terms of people’s character traits, like arrogance, vengefulness, closed-mindedness, and dogmatism. However, such vice explanations face the so-called situationist challenge, which argues based on various experiments that either there are no vices or that they are not robust. Behavior and belief, so is the idea, are much better explained by appeal to numerous situational factors, like one’s mood or how orderly one’s environment is. This paper explores the situationist challenge to vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism in more detail by assessing the empirical evidence, analyzing the argumentation based on it, and drawing conclusions for where this leaves vice explanations. The main conclusion is that vice explanations for such extreme behavior and extreme beliefs need to be fine-tuned on various points, but that there is no reason to think that they have been discredited by empirical evidence. Moreover, the situationist challenge shows that sensitivity is needed for distinguishing when vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism are appropriate, when appeal to situational factors is more fitting, and when the two can be combined.

In this book, Rik Peels explores atheism from a new perspective that aims to go beyond the highly polarized debate about arguments for and against God's existence. Since our beliefs about the most important things in life are not usually based on arguments, we should look beyond atheistic arguments and explore what truly motivates the atheist. Are there certain ideals or experiences that explain the turn to atheism? Could atheism be the default position for us, not requiring any arguments whatsoever? And what about the often-discussed arguments against belief in God—is there something that religious and nonreligious people alike can learn from them? This book explores how a novel understanding of atheism is possible – and how it effectively moves the God debate further. Believers and nonbelievers can learn much from Peels's assessment of arguments for and against atheism.

This ground-breaking book opens up new vistas on the study of the humanities. Co-authored by three philosophers, it offers an in-depth exploration of a range of questions. For example, what, if anything, unifies scholarship in the humanities? Is it possible to attain objective truth in fields like history or literary studies or philosophy, or is everything a matter of perspective or standpoint? It is possible for fields in the humanities to make progress, and if so, how? And what should we make of the political aims of the humanities-for example, the desire by many scholars in the humanities to uncover systems of oppression and domination? Does this interfere with "objective" scholarship or not? A host of new topics are also considered, such as whether or not replication studies are possible and worthwhile in the context of the humanities, and whether deference to other scholars is legitimate in the humanities. Finally, new "case studies" are introduced that look at how fields such as history, literary studies, and musicology advance our understanding of their topics, and a provocative set of new "rules" for interpretation in the humanities are proposed.

In the literature on conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism, we find so-called vice explanations for the extreme behavior and extreme beliefs that they involve. These are explanations in terms of people’s character traits, like arrogance, vengefulness, closed-mindedness, and dogmatism. However, such vice explanations face the so-called situationist challenge, which argues based on various experiments that either there are no vices or that they are not robust. Behavior and belief, so is the idea, are much better explained by appeal to numerous situational factors, like one’s mood or how orderly one’s environment is. This paper explores the situationist challenge to vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism in more detail by assessing the empirical evidence, analyzing the argumentation based on it, and drawing conclusions for where this leaves vice explanations. The main conclusion is that vice explanations for such extreme behavior and extreme beliefs need to be fine-tuned on various points, but that there is no reason to think that they have been discredited by empirical evidence. Moreover, the situationist challenge shows that sensitivity is needed for distinguishing when vice explanations for conspiracism, fundamentalism, and extremism are appropriate, when appeal to situational factors is more fitting, and when the two can be combined.

William Alston has argued that the so‐called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be responsible for our beliefs if we lack control over them? Several philosophers have argued that the idea that we bear responsibility for our beliefs can be saved, because absence of voluntary control over our beliefs is perfectly compatible with having obligations to hold particular beliefs. With others, I call this view ‘doxastic compatibilism’. It comes in two varieties. On the first variety, doxastic obligations do not require any kind of doxastic control whatsoever. I argue that this variety of doxastic compatibilism fails because it confuses doxastic responsibility with other closely related phenomena. On the second variety, doxastic obligations do not require voluntary doxastic control, but only compatibilist doxastic control (roughly, reason‐responsiveness) and we do in fact have such control. I grant that we have such control, but also argue that having such control is insufficient for bearing doxastic responsibility. The plausibility of the examples put forward by doxastic compatibilists in support of the claim that it is sufficient for doxastic responsibility derives from the fact that in these examples, the subjects have control over factors that influence what they believe rather than control over those beliefs themselves.

What, according to proponents of doxastic deontologism, is responsible belief? In this paper, we examine two proposals. Firstly, that responsible belief is blameless belief (a position we call DDB) and, secondly, that responsible belief is praiseworthy belief (a position we call DDP). We consider whether recent arguments in favor of DDP, mostly those recently offered by Brian Weatherson, stand up to scrutiny and argue that they do not. Given other considerations in favor of DDP, we conclude that the deontologist should maintain that doxastic responsibility is a concept about freedom from appropriate blame.

This paper aims to provide clear guidelines for researchers studying conspiracy theory belief. It examines the meta-linguistic question about how we should conceptualize 'conspiracy theory' and its relationship to the evaluative question of how we should evaluate beliefs in conspiracy theories, addressing normative issues surrounding the meaning, use, and conceptualization of ‘conspiracy theory’, as well as how these issues might impact how researchers study conspiracy theories or beliefs in them It argues that four norms, the Empirical Accuracy Norm, the Linguistic Norm, the Social Norm, and the Academic Fecundity Norm, underlie debates about how we should conceptualize or define ‘conspiracy theory’. We zoom in on the linguistic norm, as it has been treated as more fundamental than the other norms. We then scrutinize the argument that normative conceptualizations prematurely settle the question of how conspiracy theories and belief in them should be evaluated, and argue that it fails. Subsequently, we turn to the risks normative conceptualizations pose when it comes to certain assumptions and biases in the study of conspiracy theory belief. Finally, we explore where this leaves us regarding the meta-linguistic and evaluative questions, and formulate seven guidelines for studying conspiracy theory belief, whether it be theoretical, historical, or empirical.

This chapter provides a conceptual map of scientism: an overview of the varieties of scientism and their relations. It argues that a plausible understanding of scientism is the thesis that the boundaries of natural science should be expanded in order to include academic disciplines or realms of life that are widely considered not to belong to the realm of science. Every participant in the debate on scientism should make clear which variety of scientism she or he adheres to or criticizes by specifying whether she is talking about (a) academic or universal scientism; (b) eliminative, methodological, epistemological, ontological, moral, or existential scientism; (c) full or partial scientism; and (d) in the case of moral and existential scientism: replacement or illusion scientism. The aim of this map is to provide clarity in a debate that is often confused and to help one see what one is committed to in adopting a particular scientistic position.

a brief history of the study of ignorance. There is a lack of serious investigation into ignorance: apart from the apophatic tradition in the ancient world and the Middle Ages and the more recent fields of agnotology, philosophy of race, and feminist philosophy, ignorance itself has received little philosophical attention. It is then laid out how the field that one would expect to have studied ignorance in detail, namely, epistemology, has failed to do so. The chapter also explores why this could be the case. Subsequently, it is explained what is new about this book and how this fills the important gap in the study of ignorance: it develops and applies an epistemology of ignorance. Finally, it gives a brief overview of the chapters ahead.

I first list what I consider to be the main virtues of Goldberg’s novel and challenging account of epistemic pressure in speech exchange. I then zoom in on proper doxastic responses to assertions in conversations and argue that they comprise four things: (1) one believes the position that is testified to rather than just seeking, ensuring, trying, or aiming to believe the testifier on that proposition; (2) one believes the testifier; in other words, one wrongs the speaker not only if one disbelieves her but also when one simply fails to believe her; (3) one believes the relevant proposition rather than merely accepting, presuming, assuming, or displaying some positive propositional attitude that does not imply belief; (4) one believes the proposition in question to a sufficiently high degree. Finally, I explore how we should make sense of the epistemic partiality that friendship seems to come with. I argue that it is not merely that one seeks evidence in support of the assertion of one’s friend or an interpretation that affirms the testimony of one’s friend. It is also that one actually lowers the evidential bar for rationally or epistemically justifiedly believing their testimony.

Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism. Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy?

Degree-sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.