Rimsha Zahid

This article aims to improve the understanding of corporate governance and environmental reporting literature by analyzing the impact of board gender diversity (BGD) on environmental performance, environmental disclosure, and greenwashing behavior. The panel regression estimation technique with fixed effects was applied to Chinese firm data. As a result, it was found that more women who served on corporate boards enhanced the company's environmental performance and disclosures while limiting greenwashing behavior. The result indicated that women in top management play a constructive role in establishing firms' active environmental initiatives. Furthermore, this relationship was nonlinear and exponentially increased when women's representation reached the threshold of 33.5% representation on board or higher. Based on the findings, no internal bias was found even after other governance and firm-level control factors and probable endogenies were considered and variable biases were omitted. Notably, the results present important implications for regulators and policymakers by highlighting the influential role of BGD in promoting environmentally responsible practices and reducing greenwashing.

The Chinese government capped executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to address income inequality and promote a more equitable distribution of wealth. This study investigates whether regulating top executives' pay alters their motivation for corporate green innovation (GI) initiatives. Using data from 2006 to 2018 for Chinese-listed SOEs, the regression analysis and difference-in-difference methods revealed that government restrictions on executive compensation negatively affect GI. Furthermore, the types of SOE results show that the negative effect of pay restrictions on GI exists only in local SOEs, as opposed to central SOEs. Moreover, high managerial shareholding positively moderates this negative effect, demonstrating that the adverse effects of compensation restrictions are mitigated by the convergence of interests between managers and stakeholders. These findings are robust to instrumental variables and other robustness tests. This study provides policy recommendations for the government to boost its assistance in GI and establish new environment-related incentives that motivate managers to promote GI and inspire enterprises to deploy sustainable environmental initiatives.

The current study investigates whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officer to be socially responsible. Furthermore, it explores the role of sub-national institutional contingencies [i.e., state-owned enterprises vs. non-SOEs, foreign-owned entities vs. non-FOEs, cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed, developed region] in CEO tournament incentives and the corporate social responsibility performance relationship. Data were collected from all A-shared companies listed in the stock exchanges of China from 2014 to 2019. The study uses the baseline methodology of ordinary least squares and cluster OLS regression. Moreover, firm-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares regression, and propensity score matching deal with the endogeneity problem and check the robustness of the results. The results provide reliable evidence that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. On the other hand, sub-national institutional contingencies positively affect the association between CEO tournament incentives and CSRP. The findings have important implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSP by providing incentives to top managers.