Rina Tzinman

The standard view in medical practice is that patients have to be in an appropriate state of mind to count as autonomous. For example, according to the Macarthur Competency Assessment Tool for Treatment patients need to be able to: (1) communicate a choice; (2) factually understand the issues; (3) appreciate their situation; and (4) rationally manipulate information. These capacities are normally taken to be compromised by factors that may diminish one’s capacity to properly assess one’s situation. One of these diminishing factors is depression, which is especially relevant to decisions about assisted suicide or termination of treatment, since depression might contribute to the patient’s leaning towards an action resulting in her death. I argue, however, that in certain circumstances, depression and the accompanying desires can be appropriate. Specifically, I demonstrate that even when depression is a factor in the patient’s decision, it does not automatically undermine autonomy.

According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations that seem to be empirically substantiated. One virtue of my solution is that in addition to its theoretical apparatus it appeals to empirically substantiated considerations.

According to constitution views of persons, we are constituted by spatially coinciding human animals. Constitution views face an ‘overpopulation’ puzzle: if the animal has my brain, there is another thinker where I am. An influential solution to this problem distinguishes between derivative and non‐derivative property possession: persons non‐derivatively have their personal properties, while inheriting others from their constituters. I will show that this solution raises a new problem, by constructing a puzzle with the absurd result that we instantiate certain properties incompatibly. In setting up the puzzle, I demonstrate the relevance of the bodily awareness and self‐awareness literatures to overpopulation puzzles.

According to a prominent view of organism persistence, organisms cease to exist at death. According to a rival view, organisms can continue to exist as dead organisms. Most of the arguments in favor of the latter view rely on linguistic and common sense intuitions. I propose a new argument for somaticism by appealing to two other sources that have thus far not figured in the debate: the concept of naturalness, and biological descriptions of organisms, in particular in ethology and ecology. I show that if we hone in on the relevant notion of naturalness, we can show that organisms can continue to instantiate the natural property being an organism after death.