Risalatul Hukmi

Looping effects are often taken to undermine psychiatric validity by rendering diagnostic categories unstable once they are taken up by those they classify. I argue that this diagnosis of the problem is mistaken. Looping effects do not threaten psychiatric validity; they reveal its normative structure. Even where a diagnosis tracks a stable causal pattern, causal explanation alone cannot determine whether that pattern warrants classification as pathological. Disorder attribution irreducibly involves evaluative judgments about harm and impairment that cannot be insulated from classificatory uptake. I propose that psychiatric diagnoses are best understood as normatively constrained causal kinds whose validity depends on their capacity to sustain explanation and intervention while remaining normatively adequate under conditions of reflexive engagement. Psychiatric validity is therefore a dynamic epistemic achievement rather than a static correspondence to value-independent kinds.

The collapse of essentialist theories of natural kinds has left philosophy of science facing a crucial choice: eliminativism or pluralism. I defend a third option, a refined pluralism. I argue that we should keep the natural kind category, but only as a meta-level epistemic norm that coordinates heterogeneous classificatory practices. On my view, natural kinds are not unified by a common ontology but by satisfying a principle of generality: they are classifications built and maintained so that their inferential roles and evidential standards can be exported, translated, and integrated across distinct contexts of inquiry. This principle is more than sociological description. First, I diagnose the limitations of meta-monism, meta-eliminativism, and merely descriptive meta-pluralism. Second, I articulate generality as a necessary and defeasible criterion that explains why some classifications count as scientific kinds while others remain merely local. Third, I model coordination in terms of the preservation of inferential roles under cross-context uptake, and show how worldly structures constrain which classificatory projects can successfully meet the generality demand. The resulting position is a pluralist realism: there is no single true theory of kindhood, but there are worldly regularities that make generality a substantive, non-optional constraint on scientific classification.

Penulisan artikel ini sepenuhnya didasarkan pada perdebatan moral dalam diskursus etika yang cender- ung melihat nilai secara “an sich”, sehingga atas nilai tersebut digantungkan suatu bentuk kehidupan yang lebih ideal. Dalam hal ini, penghadiran Nietzsche dimaksudkan untuk memberi kritik tajam dengan membongkar semua kekeliruan dalam seluruh prasangka moral yang ada. Melalui genealogi yang diartigunakan sebagai penelusuran asal-usul dengan pendekatan fisio-psikologis, Nietzsche secara tidak langsung telah mewartakan bahwa moralitas telah berakhir dalam ketidakbermaknaannya bagi kehidupan.

The main objective of this book is to provide an ontological account for the category ‘religion’ that is disputed in some social constructionist works and justify its significance for religious freedom. The primary source of this study is the literature from constructionist theory of religion and the new critics of religious freedom. This study utilizes Sally Haslanger’s framework on realist social constructionism to argue that social constructions do not necessarily imply eliminativism. Hence, this thesis argues that: 1) religion exists and is real as a distinctive social category though it is socially constructed because it has a distinctive causal power in society. The existence of religion is observer-dependent but epistemically objective since it is part of collective intentionality shared by certain groups of people. 2) The ontological status of religion is significant to justify religious freedom to combat discrimination and coercion based on religion and belief. Thus, the absence of the category ‘religion’ would delegitimize any social and political justice advocacy for protecting religious minorities.

Artikel ini dilatarbelakangi oleh beberapa kesalahan pembacaan terhadap Nietzsche mengenai ide tentang kematian Tuhan. Kesalahan tersebut terletak pada upaya apologetis untuk mempertahankan eksistensi Tuhan yang telah mati. Tentu saja seluruh upaya tersebut akan selalu gagal jika kematian Tuhan dipahami melulu dalam kerangka teologis, karena pada akhirnya akan terjerembab kembali ke dalam asumsi metafisis yang sedari awal telah ditolak oleh Nietzsche. Tulisan ini merupakan suatu penawaran cara pandang baru terhadap ide tentang ‘kematian Tuhan’ dalam kaitannya dengan logika, bahasa, dan metafisika sebagai pokok penting dalam diskursus filosofis. Dengan memahami seluruh dasar argumentasi tersebut diharapkan tidak ada lagi upaya yang ceroboh untuk kembali menghidupkan Tuhan yang kematiannya begitu niscaya.