Ritu Sharma

Hornsby and Langton (H&L), put forward the idea of silencing as an “illocutionary disablement”. Appealing to Austin’s speech act theory, they situate silencing as opposite to speech act and argue that when there is silencing, people’s illocutionary act fails and their right to free speech is violated. This paper presents a defence of H&L’s account of silencing, against objections raised by Ishani Maitra (2009). Maitra questions the model of illocutionary silencing by arguing that Austin’s illocutionary model is inaccurate and vague hence, not useful for the discussions of silencing. In response, I argue that Maitra’s understanding of the perlocutionary act is misguided and requires a critical examination. Maitra discusses the notion of the perlocutionary act as the goals that the speaker achieves by securing the uptake. I oppose such a view by arguing that securing the uptake does not ensure the performance of a perlocutionary act.

In this paper, I claim that even though the conventional account of illocution (Sbisà, in Lodz Pap Pragmat 5(1):33–52, 2009a; In: B Fraser, K Turner (eds) Language in life, and a life in language. Emerald, pp 351–357, 2009b) makes an attempt to theorize social relations in illocutions, the attempt is unsuccessful. Sbisà's conventional account fails to describe the ways in which a fair social agreement can be established. A fair social agreement is a key element for the idea of social relations in the conventional account of illocution. However, considering the role of gender and power relations embedded in social construction, it is difficult to accept the possibility of such an agreement. Since Sbisà fails to provide a probe into power relations, her attempt to establish the point of social relationships remains insufficient. The main argument here is that in the unjust social milieu, the kind of social agreement essential to illocution is difficult. Moreover, what may look like a social agreement might be a result of the systemic oppression done to one particular group. In what follows, I claim that the problem of theorizing the social relation in illocutions remains unresolved.

Heidegger Being and Time, Sein und Zeit (1927): An Index By Daniel Fidel Ferrer and Ritu Sharma 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Heidegger, Martin; -- Wörterbuch. 7). Sein und Zeit. English. 8). Ontology. 9). Space and time. 10). Being and Time [Sein und Zeit]. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. II. Sharma, Ritu. Pages for this volume 1-655. Total words indexed: 24,638. For the two volumes that are indexed: pages 1 to 1106. Total pages in this volume is 654. The actual texts are not included because of copyright. This is an experiment in to indexing two different languages: German and English in the same index. The following is a machine index of two volumes written by Martin Heidegger. The first volume is the German edition of Sein und Zeit, GA 2. The second is the same volume only translated into English by Joan Stambaugh as Being and Time (1996). Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (German edition Sein und Zeit) published in 1927 is one of the most famous philosophical book published in the 20th century; and remains his most renowned book. Being and Time is listed in the overall ranking of the 100 most cited books of the 20th century. Boston Public Library ranks it as number 1 out of 100. Argument from authority, Being and Time is an incredibly influential book. Example from the Main Index: Abandon[5], 1051, 1089, 1090, 1092 abandon[2], 679, 749 abandoned[5], 677, 808, 841, 970, 992 abandoning[2], 780, 1099 Abandonment[1], 1040 abandonment[4], 875, 945, 1098, 1099 abandonrnent[1], 1092 abandons[1], 972 Abart[1], 216 Abbiendung[1], 271

Empirical studies suggest that rape in marriages continues to be treated as a less severe crime than other forms of rape. Although the psychological and legal dimensions of marital rape have received some attention, its epistemic harms remain under-theorised. This article argues that these harms are not exhausted by hermeneutical injustice, where victims lack the conceptual resources to identify or articulate their experience as rape. We introduce the concept of experiential injustice to capture a deeper epistemic harm in which victims, shaped by trauma or internalised oppression, lose evaluative grip on their own experience. Drawing on victims' testimonies, we show how marital rape can erode epistemic self-trust and diminish the capacity to register harm as experientially significant. These harms resist easy remediation and call for a broader framework to understand how epistemic injustice occurs in the contexts of marital rape. Recognising these layered epistemic harms is crucial for legal and social reforms addressing marital rape.