Ritwik Agrawal

In this essay, I argue that Keith Lehrer’s account of freedom of choice, when allied to the Performance/Competence distinction commonly deployed in cognitive Science (by scholars such as Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor) helps us distinguish the human capacity for freedom, which looks free and “uncaused”, as Sartre influentially puts it in Being & Nothingness, from the external/performance aspects of freedom. Analytic philosophers have been preoccupied with the latter, performance aspect of freedom. Attending to the internal aspect, that is, the capacity for freedom, helps us form a richer and more complete picture of the possibilities of human freedom. This approach ties Lehrer’s innovative account of freedom of choice with the broader rationalist tradition in cognitive science and philosophy, and also allows us to better appreciate the Sartrean strain in Lehrer’s work.

We offer an account of the nature and structure of the immorality of colonialism. We distinguish between the fundamental wrong of colonialism and the other wrongs that the fundamental wrong facilitated. On our view, the fundamental wrong was that colonizers regarded the colonized as incapable of managing their own affairs, in effect relegating them to the status of minors or mentally incompetent adults. We call this the nonautonomy assumption. It could also be called the inferior status assumption, for reasons that will become clear as we proceed. We argue that, in addition to the nonautonomy assumption, the most serious wrongs of colonialism were severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation, and that these wrongs can reasonably be seen to be facilitated by or grounded in the fundamental wrong. We make the case that our analysis has two virtues: it provides a more comprehensive characterization of the wrongs of colonialism and the relationships between them than extant philosophical accounts and it helps make sense of the concepts of neocolonialism and internal colonialism, which extant accounts are unable to do. This has the added advantage of bringing discussions that have hitherto taken place in fields such as political theory, postcolonial studies, history, and critical theory into the ambit of analysis by political philosophers, using tools and concepts that philosophers have at their command, such as the notions of autonomy and inferior status. After developing our own view, we offer a critical appraisal of three prominent recent attempts to identify “the wrong” of colonialism, the views of Anna Stilz, Massimo Renzo, and Lea Ypi. We argue that by focusing on defects of the political structure of colonialism such as the deprivation of collective self‐determination, these accounts do not clearly identify the fundamental wrong of colonialism and either completely ignore or pay insufficient attention to severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation; and that they also render the notions of neocolonialism and internal colonialism unintelligible. While acknowledging that the nonautonomy assumption encouraged colonialists to deprive the colonized of collective self‐determination and recognizing that this was a serious wrong, we deny that the deprivation of collective self‐determination was the fundamental wrong of colonialism, as the denial of autonomy is more basic than the denial of political self‐management. The analysis we offer makes it clear that colonialism is not a topic of merely historical interest. The most serious wrongs suffered by colonized people did not end with decolonization, that is, the achievement of independent statehood. The fundamental wrong of colonialism was grounded in inequalities of power that persist today and that continue to contribute to economic injustices and to the failure to regard the weaker as equals, in a variety of contexts, including, but not limited to the case of formerly colonized peoples.

Feminist aesthetics is the evolving study of both the explicit and the implicit role of gender and sexuality in the activities of creativity, the aesthetic experience of art and nature, and resulting value judgments. The perception, interpretation, and evaluation of occasions of aesthetic appreciation are infused with cognitive preconceptions, implicit biases, emotions, skills, and knowledge based on past lived experiences. In practice, feminist aestheticians have paid close attention to the role of race, class, age, ability, and other social factors in the creation and evaluation of artworks. Whereas modern western European aesthetics deemed an artwork’s contextual factors peripheral to the essence of a viewer’s purely aesthetic, noncontextual, disinterested, or “distanced” experience, 20th-century feminists pioneered a radical break with norms of “good” art by invoking the familiar adage, “The personal is the political.”