Rob Van Gerwen

Roger Scruton’s ontology of sound is found wanting on two counts. Scruton removes from music the importance of the performer’s manipulating of his instrument. This misconceives the phenomenology of hearing and, as a consequence, impoverishes our understanding of music. I argue that the musician’s manipulations can be heard in the music; and, in a discussion of notions developed by Richard Wollheim and Jerrold Levinson, that these manipulations have psychological reality, and that it is this psychological reality which brings to life the sui generis musical persona of musical expressiveness. AbstraktRoger Scrutons Ontologie des Klangs ist in zweierlei Hinsicht ungenügend. Scruton reduziert Musik insofern, als er den Umgang des Musikers mit seinem Instrument unterschlägt. Das führt zu einer unrichtigen Auffassung der Phänomenologie des Hörens und verengt daher unser Verständnis von Musik. Ich betone hingegen, dass in der Musik zu hören ist, wie der Musiker mit dem Instrument manipuliert; unter Berufung auf Konzepte, die von Richard Wollheim und Jerrold Levinson entwickelt wurden, argumentiere ich, dass dieses Manipulieren psychologisch real ist und dass es diese psychologische Wirklichkeit ist, die die sui generis musikalische persona musikalischer Ausdruckskraft erst schafft.

Een filmregisseur moet de werkelijkheid die zich voor de camera afspeelt transformeren tot iets op het scherm wat voor een filmkijker werkt. Het voordeel van de centrale rol van de camera is dat je ermee kunt bewijzen dat iets echt gebeurd is, dat het waar is. Maar dat gegeven kan je verhaal ook in de weg zitten. In Andrei Tarkovski’s films lijkt dit filosofisch probleem centraal te staan. Een scène is volgens Tarkovski waar over de werkelijkheid als ze uitdrukt hoe de regisseur over de werkelijke gebeurtenissen denkt en voelt – dát maakt die shots authentiek. De film toont wat de regisseur voelt bij de werkelijkheid voor de camera.

I.What are the genre characteristics of an autobiography? Is it journalism about anecdotes from the writer’s life? Or is it a personal fiction based on truthful memories that conveys the nature and logic of the writer’s youth? Biographies certainly differ from philosophical texts with their argumentative strategies. How was I to read Germs? If I just read on, like one reads a novel, I might overlook details relevant to the life recounted. Reading intently, in contrast—like you would a philosophy book—might make one miss the peculiar scope of events. Anecdotes may lack insight into the social context, the psychological background, and the future of those involved. A remark from Aristotle about the difference between art (poetry) and history motivates me in this review. Poetry, Aristotle thinks, is more philosophical than history because it delivers universal knowledge:By universal truths are to be understood the kinds of thing a certain type of person will probably or necessarily say or do in a given situation; and this is the aim of poetry, although it gives individual names to its characters. The particular facts of the historian are what, say, Alcibiades did, or what happened to him. (Aristotle, 1986, 1451b7, p. 43–44)

Een van de minst omstreden ideeën over onze waardering van kunstwerken is dat men een werk zelf moet ervaren om er esthetisch over te kunnen oordelen. Als mijn buurman mij vertelt dat hij een mooi schilderij van Picasso heeft gekocht en mijn vrouw me vraagt waar hij het over had, dan kan ik haar vertellen dat hij een Picasso heeft gekocht en dat hij het een mooi schilderij vindt. Dit soort dingen weet ik immers omdat de buurman het mij verteld heeft en ik zijn getuigenis in deze kwestie voor waar mag aannemen. Wat ik niet tegen mijn vrouw kan zeggen is dat het schilderij ook mooi is. En dat kan ik niet omdat ik het zelf nog niet gezien heb. Tot zover zijn de meesten die zich met esthetica bezighouden het eens, maar erg eenvoudig is dit niet. En sommige lezers denken misschien nu al dat zelfs als ik het doek zelf gezien heb en heb vastgesteld dat ik het mooi vind, dat dit nog niet betekent dat het ook mooi is. Dit is in een notendop de thematiek van dit boek. Het idee dat iedereen zelf moet oordelen over de schoonheid, of algemener, de esthetische kwaliteit, noemen we het principe van bekendheid. Dit principe wordt in hoegenaamd iedere moderne esthetische theorie gehuldigd. Maar ik zei al: eenvoudig is dit niet. Aan deze situatie zijn verschillende aspecten verbonden. Als de esthetische waarde van een object, daar, bij dat object gevonden moet worden en dit alleen kan door het zelf waar te nemen, wat is die schoonheid dan voor iets? Als schoonheid, of welke andere esthetische waarde bij het object zelf thuis hoort is het dan een objectieve eigenschap van het ding, en zo ja, kan het dan niet gewoon wetenschappelijk vastgesteld worden—met objectieve instrumenten en maatstaven? Als dat mogelijk is moeten we ons afvragen of het principe van bekendheid het wel verdient om zo hoog gehouden te worden. Maar toch geloven we erin—hoe zit dat? Vanuit verschillende invalshoeken hebben filosofen nagedacht over deze kwestie van de verhouding van de waarneming tot het esthetische oordeel over de schoonheid van het object. Om te verduidelijken hoe de hier behandelde filosofen over deze kwesties denken, zullen we eerst bezien hoe zij over waarneming denken en over de manier waarop het esthetische oordeel in de waarneming geworteld is.

Aesthetics, or the philosophy of the arts, is not first philosophy as this has been conceived of in the last two millennia—it is not metaphysics, not about how the world is independent of human perceivers. Nor is it a science, if we take that to be the effort to account for the nature of events and objects in the world in objective terms. Instead, aesthetics is an applied philosophy—a philosophical approach of how we perceive or represent the world, and this includes art: aesthetics is also about art, as this too is concerned with how we perceive and represent the world (I am not saying that artists are in the business of representing the world; most of them are not). I wonder, though, how aesthetics so conceived could fail to be the first among philosophical disciplines? What can be more urgent than understanding how we perceive and represent the world? The world itself—or God, or the big bang, or genes, atoms and neurons—as if these answers can do without perception and representations?

In this Editor’s column I discuss certain fruits and limits of applying the notion of ‘performance’ to works of art. Art works can be viewed as perfor- mances, the public furnishing of works’ final form. Concerts can be viewed as performances of a work scored by someone else, the composer, but not all arts are double in this sense. Moreover, art can be viewed as mirroring the psychological, phenomenological and rhetorical aspects of human interaction, which exemplify the way people scrutinise moral situations. Not all performances are artistic, let alone art.

Robert Bresson's cinematography allows him to show the affordances that things and situations have for characters in a film. By intimating these affordances, Bresson authentically presents the affordances as well as the characters. The fact that Bresson views and conceives of his `actors' as models, rather than as malleable actors, illustrates, again, an effort to authentically film real persons in real situations. Recognising people authentically is done in real-life through a reciprocal gaze, which is not automatically available to the camera's lens, an apparatus that does not look back at one. Perhaps, Nuri Bilge Ceylan's approach fits this effort better: not a writing with sounds and images, but an intuitive use of homeliness.

Certain art theorists think of what artists do as artistic research. But research is fact- and theory-driven, whereas when a film is being made what directors do is scrutinise what they see happening before their eyes. This scrutiny is guided by aesthetic judgement, individual style, and subjective intuition. It makes good sense to investigate the research that went on before a work was made, and to look at the theoretical implications of that work. But the most important work to be done is our paying attention to the scrutiny that went on during the work's actual creation. The importance and meaning of art are in the artist's scrutiny.

Iconic photographs are visual arguments depicting an, often dramatic, particular situation showing victims of disasters. Spectators watching the photo of the particular situation, empathise with it, and project the feelings evoked onto the events that form the context for the scene in the picture. This mobilises them into political action. In the process, however, the depicted personal misery is perused to exemplify the larger events. The tragedy of iconic photographs is analysed not as the misery experienced by the depicted persons, but as the breach of their right to shame which is required for the photo to acquire iconicity. Examples are addressed, as well as the contrast classes of the self-portrait and Byzantine icons.

It is rather intriguing that we will often try to persuade people of what we find beautiful, even though we do not believe that they may subsequently base their judgement of taste on our testimony. Typically, we think that the experience of beauty is such that we cannot leave it to others to be had. Moreover, we are often aware of the contingency of our own judgements’ foundation in our own experience. Nevertheless, we do think that certain aesthetic, evaluative conceptions do relate to specific experiences in a non-trivial way, especially that of aesthetic excellence. Now certain analytical aestheticians ascribe truth values to aesthetic judgements of various kinds. Such ascription would evidently have a bearing on the problem of aesthetic experience’s relevance for evaluation, as we may in the end be better off neglecting the experiential altogether in virtue of treating aesthetic values in objectivist ways, as natural properties, or as reducible to such properties, descriptions of which will then indeed be true or false.1 However, I think that it is too early yet to bury subjectivism. So let us instead defend it and try to get a better grasp on its suppositions. In this we may profit from ideas advanced by David Wiggins, who neither denies the role played by objective properties, nor neglects the subjective import. According to him, aesthetic values are somehow kinds of relations, which are established by an elaborate process of criticism and refinement of perceptions of, and feelings toward specific natural properties.2 The argument in this paper suggests that the analysis of a paradigmatic pair regarding ‘aesthetic excellence’ provides us with inter-

In this article I propose to understand inertia in art as a “disposition to meaning”. I compare inertia in art with that of a face of a person recently deceased. To acquaintances, i.e. to family and friends, it holds a promise of memories (of the deceased); to all the others the corpse offers the possibility of a projection of meanings. Art is made of plain, or extra-ordinary stuff, which is turned into artistic material. The artist is to bring the inert potency of stuff to artistic life, and to turn it into something that is expressive. If she is successful, then the work will offer its audience a concentrated, absorbing experience. Art is autonomous in that the aimed for experience is morally neutral. In the view of many contemporary artists, such experiences fail art’s deeper significance: absorbing experiences are, simply, too easy. If artists want to really move the audience (to emotion), or so they feel, they should also move the audience into action. Wanting to achieve this is not just difficult; it is a paradox

A philosophical analysis of the future of art must explicate art’s nature, as well as discuss the historical nature of art practice. Only so can one explain those contemporary developments in art which have led many people to doubt whether art even has a future. Arguably, art practice as we know it started with the installing of the modern system of the fine arts. I explain the pragmatics of art so understood, and suggest that we can define art, internally. We need not resort to a nominalist approach that claims that something is a work of art if some representative of the art world says it is. Instead of such empty proceduralism, I explain how all art’s focal objects, persons and activities are mutually adjusted and can only be understood in light of the whole. Within that whole of art practice, the contemporary samples of art’s alleged failure can be assessed. Now the modern system treats the arts as aesthetic, and prescribes that to judge a work one has to experience it for oneself. Why this should be so, I explain in terms of the perceivability of the artist in the work. Next, art develops as a whole rather than in a piecemeal manner. Particular contemporary works may alienate the audience from art practice, yet once they are recognisably in a procedure which has clear artistic potency they can be incorporated fruitfully in the modern system as explained. In all, the future of art is the future of the modern system, unless the system as a whole goes. We see this happen with the Taliban, but do not ourselves seem to be vulnerable to such onslaught. Yet, our culture may be in the process of eliminating the human mind from the objective reality, and if nothing stops us, art too will come to an end. Luckily, by then we will not be such as to lament that demise.

This paper discusses the viability of claims of mathematical beauty, asking whether mathematical beauty, if indeed there is such a thing, should be conceived of as a sub-variety of the more commonplace kinds of beauty: natural, artistic and human beauty; or, rather, as a substantive variety in its own right. If the latter, then, per the argument, it does not show itself in perceptual awareness – because perceptual presence is what characterises the commonplace kinds of beauty, and mathematical beauty is not among these. I conclude that the reference to mathematical beauty merely expresses the awe in the mathematician about the intricate complexities and simplicity of certain proofs, theorems or mathematical “objects.”

Much contemporary art seems morally out of control. Yet, philosophers seem to have trouble finding the right way to morally evaluate works of art. The debate between autonomists and moralists, I argue, has turned into a stalemate due to two mistaken assumptions. Against these assumptions, I argue that the moral nature of a work's contents does not transfer to the work and that, if we are to morally evaluate works we should try to conceive of them as moral agents. Ethical autonomism holds that art's autonomy consists in its demand that art appreciators take up an artistic attitude. A work's agency then is in how it merits their audiences' attitudinal switch. Ethical autonomism allows for the moral assessment of art works without giving up their autonomy, by viewing artistic merit as a moral category and art-relevant moral evaluation as having the form of art criticism

Roger Scruton’s ontology of sound is found wanting on two counts. Scruton removes from music the importance of the performer’s manipulating of his instrument. This misconceives the phenomenology of hearing and, as a consequence, impoverishes our understanding of music. I argue that the musician’s manipulations can be heard in the music; and, in a discussion of notions developed by Richard Wollheim and Jerrold Levinson, that these manipulations have psychological reality, and that it is this psychological reality which brings to life the sui generis musical persona of musical expressiveness.