Robbie Davies

The prevalent view of dreaming in western culture (the ‘standard view’) has only occasionally been challenged. It suggests dreaming is a perception-like experience that occurs during sleep and is encoded into memory for recall upon waking. A central assumption in therapy for dream symptoms has not been the subject of sustained challenge. It suggests the retelling of dream narratives is required for the treatment of those symptoms. Theories of dreams and their treatment are clinically relevant: nightmares and other sleep disturbances (NSDs) are key symptoms of trauma-related conditions such as PTSD, and trauma is commonplace. However, theoretically well-founded treatments are difficult to find, so confusion around what dreams are and how they can be treated is a pressing matter for the therapeutic trade. We assess a number of assumptions underlying the treatment of NSDs, and argue that these assumptions stem from the ‘standard view’ of dreaming. We outline theoretical and practical deficiencies in that view and present an alternative on the basis of which divulging dream narratives is not, in principle, required for dreamwork. The alternative view has the potential to increase the range of interventions available for the treatment of NSDs, and thereby to change the nature of interactions with trauma-recovery clients, and others.

In well-documented cases, it is plausibly unethical to ask trauma sufferers for details relating to their trauma. We propose that the reasons are twofold: First, the details requested are not required by those asking for them; second, the request comes with potential for significant harm for the victim arising from the exchange. Requests meeting these conditions are widespread, including in predominant forms of psychotherapy, so accepting these conditions has surprising and challenging consequences for a wide range of interactions with the victims of trauma, including well-meaning ones. Given these surprising and challenging consequences, we explore what, if anything, could offset the two conditions, focusing primarily on therapeutic interactions, which are sometimes thought to have a distinctive or sui generis character. We conclude that none of the options we consider wholly off-set the two conditions, and that they are only partly off-set by insufficient research into alternatives. We outline implications for the status of treatments which require the recollection of trauma as the default kind of intervention, and for interactions with victims of trauma more broadly.