Robert C. Scharff

Marc Van den Bosche suggests that Heidegger’s conceptions of Gestell and Gelassenheit, taken together with his analysis of Nietzschean Nihilism, depicts our era in a way that “supplements” Andrew Feenberg and Don Ihde’s work. Weaving these sources together, he sees the possibility of our becoming “technicians” that “live, in a released way, within the groundless.” Here, I raise some questions about whether the author has really fitted all these sources together and argue that his idea of becoming post-modern “technicians” appears to require that we first practice a very un-Heideggerian kind of “renunciation.”

In recent decades, widespread rejection of positivism’s notorious hostility toward the philosophical tradition has led to renewed debate about the real relationship of philosophy to its history. How History Matters to Philosophy takes a fresh look at this debate. Current discussion usually starts with the question of whether philosophy’s past should matter, but Scharff argues that the very existence of the debate itself demonstrates that it already does matter. After an introductory review of the recent literature, he develops his case in two parts. In Part One, he shows how history actually matters for even Plato’s Socrates, Descartes, and Comte, in spite of their apparent promotion of conspicuously ahistorical Platonic, Cartesian, and Positivistic ideals. In Part Two, Scharff argues that the real issue is not whether history matters; rather it is that we already have a history, a very distinctive and unavoidable inheritance, which paradoxically teaches us that history’s mattering is merely optional. Through interpretations of Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, he describes what thinking in a historically determinate way actually involves, and he considers how to avoid the denial of this condition that our own philosophical inheritance still seems to expect of us. In a brief conclusion, Scharff explains how this book should be read as part of his own effort to acknowledge this condition rather than deny it

Abstract   No one doubts the radically transformative power of contemporary technologies and technoscientific practices over the material dimensions of our experience. Yet with the coming of all the exciting changes and the promise of ever better material conditions, what kinds of lives are we implicitly being encouraged to live? One would think that current philosophical studies of technology would make this a central question, and indeed, a few have done so. But many do not. Following the lead of thinkers who have made the so-called “empirical turn,” many demur, usually with some remarks about the question being too abstract and general—too likely to suck us into utopian or dystopian speculations—when what is called for are truly informative and “concrete” studies of what it is like to be with actual technologies. My paper considers the good life question—and the philosophical price one pays for not asking it—in light of Auguste Comte’s theory of the three stages of intellectual development. Comte’s depiction of the third, positive scientific stage is much less dated than one might assume. In fact, it is useful to think of our own era as arriving with a Comtean story attached, that is, a story of life in the “developed” world becoming ever better thanks to modern science and technology. Because this story now seems less deserving of the unqualified optimism Comte had about it, I argue that thinking of our own experience as permeated by Comte’s conception of third-stage life gives us a fresh way to consider our misgivings about this default position without either lapsing into utopian or dystopian speculation, or confining one’s focus to purely postphenomenological or pragmatic studies of technoscientific life as it now “appears.” Content Type Journal Article Category Research Article Pages 1-25 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0047-2 Authors Robert C. Scharff, Department of Philosophy, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824-3574, USA Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433.

Gert Goeminne’s paper is primarily concerned with “the politics of sustainable technology,” but for good reasons he does not start with this topic. He knows that technology studies as he conceives it must clear a space for itself in a philosophical atmosphere that discourages its pursuit. He therefore begins with a critique of this objectivistic and technocratically defined atmosphere, before moving on to embrace a postphenomenology of technological multistabilities, and then further to introduce what he calls (in an adaptation of Rudolf Boehm) the “topical measure” of technoscientific life. The problem I raise is not about Goeminne’s aims, with which I mostly agree, but with his presentation of how to achieve them. I argue that if one were actually to follow his advice—that is, start with critique, move on to postphenomenology, and end with “political” evaluation of technoscientific life, the project would be doomed to failure. For in our world, no one Understands this pluralizing vision. According to the understanding we actually live through and speak from, some of postphenomenology’s multiple disclosures already arrive in our experience with significantly greater ontological power than others, and sincerity about topical measure notwithstanding, the very identification of something as an interest or “value,” especially if it allegedly comes from a “layperson,” already condemns it to secondary status

The new edition of this authoritative introduction to the philosophy of technology includes recent developments in the subject, while retaining the range and depth of its selection of seminal contributions and its much-admired editorial commentary. Remains the most comprehensive anthology on the philosophy of technology available Includes editors’ insightful section introductions and critical summaries for each selection Revised and updated to reflect the latest developments in the field Combines difficult to find seminal essays with a judicious selection of contemporary material Examines the relationship between technology and the understanding of the nature of science that underlies technology studies.

In a recent summary of his views, Margolis describes himself as rejecting most of the principle doctrines that have dominated twentieth century English-language philosophy, in preparation for a “very large transformation of philosophical vision”—an event that is in any case overtaking us, no matter how much we try to cling to old ways. At the very least, he says, this transformation will render obsolete the still widely held convictions that an epistemic view from Nowhere is possible, that there are de re necessities, that reason has a transhistorical and normatively invariant structure, that strictly “human” phenomena are ontologically suspect and may even be reducible in physicalistic terms, and finally that “mind” can somehow be adequately interpreted “solipsistically, merely biologically, or subjectively, or in [some other] way disjoined from our cognizing and legitimative powers.” To anticipate the coming transformation, Margolis suggests that we learn to view the world as a flux, all thinking as historicized, and selves as socially constructed and thus as having or being “histories rather than natures.”

Phenomenologists usually insist that their approach involves going “back” to and “starting” with technoscientific experience—that is, returning to the actual existing or living through of technoscientific life—after centuries of privileging the analysis of how things are “objectively” known and denigrating accounts of how they are “subjectively” lived with. But then who says this and how is this understood? “Who” is really a phenomenologist, when so many diverse thinkers claim the title? This paper considers some of the reasons why this is such a difficult question and argues that it is wrong to look for The Answer to it.

Heidegger’s unsympathetic reaction to Husserl’s “theoretical-scientific attitude” in his Logos article is well-known. What is not so well-known is Dilthey’s role in Heidegger’s forming this reaction. In fact, it is Dilthey’s idea of understanding historical life “in its own terms” that inspired Heidegger’s early, and quite un-Husserlian, conception of phenomenology as a philosophy requiring “hermeneutical” preparation; and in this context, it is also through Dilthey that Heidegger came to think that in Nietzsche’s second Untimely Mediation, he “understood more about [being historical] than he made known.”

This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the 'pure', thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes's inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the 'Cartesian' ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian 'project of pure inquiry' to which he aspired.

Heidegger’s unsympathetic reaction to Husserl’s “theoretical-scientific attitude” in his Logos article is well-known. What is not so well-known is Dilthey’s role in Heidegger’s forming this reaction. In fact, it is Dilthey’s idea of understanding historical life “in its own terms” that inspired Heidegger’s early, and quite un-Husserlian, conception of phenomenology as a philosophy requiring “hermeneutical” preparation; and in this context, it is also through Dilthey that Heidegger came to think that in Nietzsche’s second Untimely Mediation, he “understood more about [being historical] than he made known.”

Heidegger's "Appropriation" of Dilthey before Being and Time ROBERT C. SCHARFF IN 199 4, in his famous Time-lecture to the Marburg Theological Society, Heidegger makes it "the first principle of all hermeneutics" that gaining access to history rests upon understanding what it means to be historical? Three years later, in Being and Time, he announces that he has achieved this understanding, for the purpose of his ontological questioning, through an "appropriation" of Dilthey's work, "confirmed and strengthened by the theses of Count Yorck. ''~ Now, thanks to the recent reconstructions of Heidegger's early lecture courses, we know that this appropriation process took nearly ten years, that Heidegger first worked out his conception of philosophy as a "hermeneutical way" in terms of this process, and hence that it contributed much more to the shaping of SZ than his published work suggests.~ In fact, the record shows that it was a Der Begriff der Zeit: Vortrag vor der Marburger Theologenschaft Juli z924, ed. Hartmut Tietjen ; cited from the bilingual edition, The Concept of Time, trans. W. McNeill , 2o . ' I refer, of course, to the famous opening line of Being and Time's Section 77, where Heidegger explains that his analysis of the problem of history "has grown out of the appropriation [Aneignung] of Dilthey's..

Many philosophers of science and technology who see themselves as coming “after” Husserl also claim that their phenomenology is hermeneutical. Yet they neither practice the same sort of phenomenology, nor do they all have the same understanding of hermeneutics. Moreover, their differences often seem to be more a function of different pre-selected substantive commitments—say, to take a “material” turn or to be resolutely “empirical”—than the product of any serious effort to clarify what it is be hermeneutical. In this essay, after some discussion of Dilthey’s reception among post-Husserlians (especially Patrick Heelan and Don Ihde), I consider how aspiring hermeneuts might make their own pre-possession of substantive and methodological commitments a hermeneutical topic. This is, of course, is not just a scholarly question of how post-Husserlian phenomenologists might make themselves more phenomenological. Without thoughtful self-awareness of these commitments, one’s assumptions about the use of technology, design, the place of science in the larger culture and in relation to conceptions of human flourishing—all of these assumptions are likely to pass through into technoscientific practice with insufficient critical consideration.

The translation of the Comte-Mill correspondence is a welcome event, long overdue, and very likely to stimulate wide, multidisciplinary interest. It is fitting that it should have an Introduction by Kremer-Marietti, who in the past 20 years has probably done more substantial work on Comte, classical positivism, and its continuing relevance for contemporary history, sociology, and philosophy of science than anyone . By happy coincidence, the book appears close on the heels of a major new intellectual biography of Comte and in the same year as a full-length philosophical reconsideration of Comte=s positivism