•  13
    Lessons for ethics from the science of pain
    In Geoffrey S. Holtzman & Elisabeth Hildt (eds.), Does Neuroscience Have Normative Implications?, . pp. 39-57. 2020.
    Pain is ubiquitous. It is also surprisingly complex. In this chapter, we first provide a truncated overview of the neuroscience of pain. This overview reveals four surprising empirical discoveries about the nature of pain with relevance for ethics. In particular, we discuss the ways in which these discoveries both inform putative normative ethical principles concerning pain and illuminate metaethical debates concerning a realist, naturalist moral metaphysics, moral epistemology, and moral motiva…Read more
  •  25
    Now with Venn Diagrams, expanded Extended Examples (nice work, Robert), and the latest trends in Rhetoric, post-truth etc. (nice work, Tracy).
  •  12
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1): 1-3. 2020.
  •  67
    Moral motivation and the affective appeal
    Philosophical Studies 178 (1): 71-94. 2021.
    Proponents of “the affective appeal” :787–812, 2014; Zagzebski in Philos Phenomenol Res 66:104–124, 2003) argue that we can make progress in the longstanding debate about the nature of moral motivation by appealing to the affective dimension of affective episodes such as emotions, which allegedly play either a causal or constitutive role in moral judgements. Specifically, they claim that appealing to affect vindicates a version of Motivational Internalism—roughly, the view that there is a necess…Read more
  •  83
    The Puzzle of Moral Memory
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (2): 202-228. 2020.
    A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the o…Read more
  •  498
    Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism
    Ethics 127 (4): 821-851. 2017.
    In this article I assess Rossian Intuitionism, which is the view that the Rossian Principles of Duty are self-evident. I begin by motivating and clarifying a version of the view—Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism—that hasn’t been adequately considered by Rossians. After defending it against a series of significant objections, I show that enthusiasm for Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism should be muted. Specifically, I argue that we lack sufficient reason for thinking that the Rossian Principles are s…Read more
  •  252
    Clarifying ethical intuitionism
    European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 1097-1116. 2015.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially ju…Read more
  •  361
    Evaluative Perception: Introduction
    In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception, Oxford University Press. 2018.
    In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Eval…Read more
  •  328
    Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness
    In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception, Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something wrong. In this paper I focus on a family of objections to Epistemic Sentimentalism that all take as a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical to it: epistemic reason-responsiveness, i.e., emotio…Read more
  •  299
    C.D. Broad on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue: Methods of Ethics (3): 168-183. 2015.
    C.D. Broad’s Reflections stands out as one of the few serious examinations of Moral Sense Theory in twentieth century analytic philosophy. It also constitutes an excellent discussion of the interconnections that allegedly exist between questions concerning what Broad calls the ‘logical analysis’ of moral judgments and questions about their epistemology. In this paper I make three points concerning the interconnectedness of the analytical and epistemological elements of versions of Moral Sense Th…Read more
  •  138
    Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1): 59-81. 2016.
    Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of obj…Read more
  •  129
    Moral Perception, by Robert Audi
    Mind 123 (492): 1167-1171. 2014.
    No abstract available