Robert Crease

Trust is a central concept in the philosophy of science. We highlight how trust is important in the wide variety of interactions between science and society. We claim that examining and clarifying the nature and role of trust (and distrust) in relations between science and society is one principal way in which the philosophy of science is socially relevant. We argue that philosophers of science should extend their efforts to develop normative conceptions of trust that can serve to facilitate trust between scientific experts and ordinary citizens. The first project is the development of a rich normative theory of expertise and experience that can explain why the various epistemic insights of diverse actors should be trusted in certain contexts and how credibility deficits can be bridged. The second project is the development of concepts that explain why, in certain cases, ordinary citizens may distrust science, which should inform how philosophers of science conceive of the formulation of science policy when conditions of distrust prevail. The third project is the analysis of cases of successful relations of trust between scientists and non-scientists that leads to understanding better how ‘postnormal’ science interactions are possible using trust.

The Second Creation is a dramatic--and human--chronicle of scientific investigators at the last frontier of knowledge. Robert Crease and Charles Mann take the reader on a fascinating journey in search of "unification" with brilliant scientists such as Niels Bohr, Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Erwin Schrödinger, Richard Feynman, Murray Gell-Mann, Sheldon Glashow, Steven Weinberg, and many others. They provide the definitive and highly entertaining story of the development of modern physics, and the human story of the physicists who set out to find the "theory of everything."

The collection of essays in this special issue point toward the rich and diverse themes under which the phenomenologist might analyze quantum mechanics. The authors in the collection demonstrate that the tradition inaugurated by Husserl promises to dispel the many experiential quandaries of quantum mechanics. They interrogate the meaning of the theoretical entities described by the mathematical equations and analyze their manner of appearing to the physicist. To this end, the efforts of the authors show that increased clarity at forefront of physics requires more than progressively refined models and instruments, but understanding how the subject grasps nature.

What makes it hard to dance? Twentieth-century phenomenologists drew attention to the importance of the lived body, and dance is the art form for which the lived body is literally central. Why then isn’t dance the easiest art form to engage in? Phenomenologists are drawn to situations where a phenomenon breaks down, which can open insights into the phenomenon itself. Here the phenomenon is the ability to dance where one might normally expect to. This paper invokes Marion Milner’s book On Not Being Able to Paint. It discusses views of David Kleinberg-Levin, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Iris Young, and others. Parallel to Heidegger’s notion of the Enframing, what causes the disappearing dimensions of animate formanimate form is the Interring.

Arendt’s explorations of the dynamics of politics, facts, and truth in the public sphere contain important insights into the authority of science and science denial. This article reviews and contextualizes Arendt’s views on modern science and technology, discusses her views on authority, and identifies some insights that her writings provide on the dynamics of science denial. Arendt’s writings point to another possible source of authority besides Weber’s three categories (traditional, legal-rational, charismatic), based on a relationship between ruler and ruled that precedes the issuance of commands. Her writings help clarify what makes scientific findings vulnerable to denial, expose some of the specific tactics of science denial, and include some clues for what it would take to keep the public space open, and to nourish the compelling element that would have to underlie scientific authority.

Dreyfus's model of expert skill acquisition is philosophically important because it shifts the focus on expertise away from its social and technical externalization in STS, and its relegation to the historical and psychological context of discovery in the classical philosophy of science, to universal structures of embodied cognition and affect. In doing so he explains why experts are not best described as ideologues and why their authority is not exclusively based on social networking. Moreover, by phenomenologically analyzing expertise from a first person perspective, he reveals the limitations of, and sometimes superficial treatment that comes from, investigating expertise from a third person perspective. Thus, he shows that expertise is a prime example of a subject that is essential to science but can only be fully elaborated with the aid of phenomenological tools. However, both Dreyfus's descriptive model and his normative claims are flawed due to the lack of hermeneutical sensitivity. He assumes an expert's knowledge has crystallized out of contextual sensitivity plus experience, and that an expert has shed, during the training process, whatever prejudices, ideologies, hidden agendas, or other forms of cultural embeddedness, that person might have begun with. One would never imagine, from Dreyfus's account, that society could possibly be endangered by experts, only how society's expectations and actions could endanger experts. The stories of actual controversies not only shows things do not work the way Dreyfus claims, but also that it would be less salutary if they did. Such stories amount to counterexamples to Dreyfus's normative claims, and point to serious shortcomings in his arguments.

Covariant Realism Hermeneutic phenomenology of science implies a particular version of realism. It approaches scientific entities in a twofold perspective: in their relation to other parts of the theory (as elements in a theoretical "language"), and in relation to the lifeworld as mediated by laboratory practices; as "fulfilled" in laboratory situations that "produce" worldly objects. The question then arises of the relation between the two perspectives; as Ginev has pointed out, there is danger of a theoretical essentialism which is implied when the mathematical projection is conceived as operationalized by experiment. Ginev's proposal to avoid this involves the concept of "inscription." This paper proposes another approach, covariant realism, which draws from Heidegger's notion of formal indication and which makes explicit the temporality of theoretical objects in the flow of the research process. Formal indication does not so much describe phenomena as call them to our attention in a way that we can activate ourselves (as in laboratory contexts); it characterizes phenomena which are understood to be provisionally grasped, already interpreted, and anticipated as able to show themselves differently in different contexts. The value of this approach suggests deeper possibilities for hermeneutic phenomenology of science than have hitherto been explored.