Robert D. Walsh

This paper approaches philosophical counseling practice from the idea that philosophy itself is primarily a way of living and only secondarily a subject matter to be grasped and comprehended. Three things are shown to follow from this view: first, charging a fee for access to this practice is inimical to the practice itself; secondly contrary to scientific 'objectivity' as the means to truth-speaking this view of philosophy calls for a consciously articulated autobiographical expression or personal admission on the part of the philosophical practitioner; and, finally, an understanding of philosophical counseling practice emergesfrom this view of philosophy that is depicted as naturally occurring therapeutic interacting.

Utilizing all of his major philosophical texts from 1930 to 1987, this phenomenological study investigates, historically and thematically, Emmanuel Levinas' argument for the ontological priority of ethical responsibility. The analysis of responsibility is constructed from the context of Levinas' critique of Husserl and Heidegger worked out under the influence of the horror of the Holocaust. ;According to Levinas, responsibility is a pre-conscious, sensible responding to the exteriority of the Other. Insofar as the invisible alterity of the Other is irreducible to comprehension, it necessarily involves a critique of the primacy of rationality, consciousness, and freedom as the meaning of the human. This leads to a new understanding of subjectivity. For Levinas, subjectivity 'is' responsibility. If we define the human by rationality, consciousness, and freedom, i.e., as an individual or agent, this leads to the problem of explaining how the transcendence of intersubjectivity is possible. It also leads to atheism and totalitarianism. Levinas overcomes this problem by arguing that human being is both separate and not separate, an identity in difference, a transcendence-in-immanence, an ambiguity. ;The 'positive' content of this critical position, however, is wholly 'negative'. It is a skepticism pointing toward an unachievable utopia. Nowhere in Levinas' ethical phenomenology will one find him taking a stand on particular moral issues. Despite his critique of the primacy of theory, his work is thoroughly theoretical. The argument for the priority of responsibility is a theory of ethics. Levinas' theory of responsibility is an ontological or fundamental ethics in that it asserts how things are rather than how they should be. The most positive aspect of the theory is the conception of subjectivity that emerges from this critique and the argument for the possibility of transcendence it entails. But exactly what difference this will make concretely is not made clear. That one is responsible for all others is one thing, but how one should actualize this responsibility is another.

The purpose of Plato’s investigation of justice in the ideal polis of the Republic is neither to formulate an abstract conception of justice in itself nor to work out a blueprint for the perfectly just state. Rather, through the contemplation of an ideal social/political order where justice might be found “writ large,” Plato intends to bring about the actualization of justice in the “polity” of the individual soul. It must be kept in mind, of course, that, while possessing a notion of the individual, the Greeks lacked our modern, Cartesian conception of subjectivity, burdened as it is with the existential task of creating and sustaining a meaningful cosmos. But precisely for this reason the ancients had a clearer perspective of the synergistic and mutually determinative dialectic that conjoins the individual and the state, a conjunction grounded in the ethical. This can be seen, Hegel suggests, in terms of the “unwritten and infallible law” that Antigone takes to be the “law of the gods” which “is right because it is what is right,” placing the individual “within the ethical substance; and this substance is thus the essence of self-consciousness.”