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9Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy) – By D. IhdeEducational Philosophy and Theory 43 (S1): 135-135. 2011.
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26Abstract machine theory and direct perceptionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 400-401. 1980.
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36Is the “cognitive penetrability” criterion invalidated by contemporary physics?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2): 303-306. 1982.
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28Principles of learning and the ecological style of inquiryBehavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1): 139-141. 1981.
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32Ecological foundations of cognition. II: Degrees of freedom and conserved quantities in animal-environment systemsJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12): 11-12. 1999.Cognition means different things to different psychologists depending on the position held on the mind-matter problem. Ecological psychologists reject the implied mind-matter dualism as an ill-posed theoretic problem because the assumed mind-matter incommensurability precludes a solution to the degrees of freedom problem. This fundamental problem was posed by both Nicolai Bernstein and James J. Gibson independently. It replaces mind-matter dualism with animal-environment duality -- a better pose…Read more
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51Ecological foundations of cognition. I: Symmetry and specificity of animal-environment systemsJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12): 11-12. 1999.Ontological and methodological constraints on a theory of cognition that would generalize across species are identified. Within these constraints, ecological arguments for animal-environment mutuality and reciprocity and the necessary specificity of structured energy distributions to environmental facts are developed as counterpoints to the classical doctrines of animal-environment dualism and intractable nonspecificity. Implications of and for a cognitive theory consistent with Gibson's program…Read more
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23An intentional dynamics approach to comparing robots with their biological targetsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6): 1058-1058. 2001.After identifying similarities in the paradigmatic problems of biorobotics and ecological psychology, we suggest a way to compare the performance of robots with that of their biological targets. The crucial comparison is between the intentional dynamics of the robot and those of the targeted animal, a measure that depends critically on recognizing and describing the underlying affordance-effectivity match of the target system.
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24Path space integrals for modeling experimental measurements of cerebellar functioningBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2): 253-254. 1997.A propagator for a path space integral can be used to represent the and provides a natural way to model a control signal that is temporally segmented by placement of pairs of stimulating and recording electrodes. Although care must be exercised in interpreting the resulting measurement, the technique should prove useful to experimenters who study cerebellar functioning
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27Modelling systems with intentional dynamics: A lesson from quantum mechanicsIn Karl H. Pribram (ed.), Origins: Brain and Self-Organization, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 53--101. 1994.
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41Explanatory burdens and natural law: Invoking a field description of perception-actionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 905-906. 2001.Although we agree with Hommel et al. that perception and action refer to one another, we disagree that they do so via a code. Gibson (1966; 1979) attempted to frame perception-action as a field phenomenon rather than as a particle phenomenon. From such a perspective, perception and action are adjoint, mutually interacting through an information field, and codes are unnecessary.
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34The job description of the cerebellum and a candidate model of its “tidal wave” functionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2): 265-265. 1997.A path space integral approach to modelling the job description of the cerebellum is proposed. This new approach incorporates the equation into a kind of generalized Huygens's wave equation. The resulting exponential functional integral provides a mathematical expression of the inhibitory function by which the cerebellum the intended control signal from the background of neuronal excitation