Robert J. Hartman

There is a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. Consider some examples in order to make that idea concrete. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each freely take a bribe if one were offered. By luck of the courthouse draw, only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one takes a bribe. Luck is the salient difference between the agents in each case. After all, the spatial location of the pedestrian is outside of each driver’s control, and being offered a bribe is outside of each judge’s control. But we blame the killer driver more than the merely reckless driver, and we blame the bribe-taker more than the mere would-be bribe-taker. This is because we believe that the killer driver and the bribe-taker are more blameworthy than each of their counterparts. Nevertheless, the idea that luck affects moral responsibility contradicts another feature of our thinking captured in this moral principle: A person’s blameworthiness cannot be affected by that which is not within her control. This moral principle yields the verdict that the drivers are equally blameworthy and that the judges are equally blameworthy. So, to put the contradiction in concrete terms, our thinking about moral responsibility implies that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy, and the same is true for the judges. I argue that only the first strand of our thinking is correct. Certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and character can partially determine a person’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. In terms of the examples, I argue that the killer driver and the bribe-taker are more blameworthy than each of their counterparts. But if I am to make genuine progress in the moral luck debate, my arguments cannot appeal to case intuitions such as ‘the killer driver is more blameworthy,’ because the problem of moral luck is fundamentally a clash of intuitions. So, I offer arguments from diverse areas in philosophy in order to ensure that they do not bottom out in standard pro-moral luck intuitions.

Improving Character will help students to appreciate reasons to develop moral virtue, understand what some moral virtues are like, offer strategies they can try out to improve their character, and consider challenging questions about moral virtue and character improvement. It includes 45 newly commissioned essays that are concise, engaging, and mostly jargon-free. It is written for undergraduate students in their first semester. The book has four sections and an appendix. PART I: CONCEPTS AND REASONS 1. Moral virtue: The basics (Heather Battaly, University of Connecticut) 2. The need for character improvement (Liezl van Zyl, University of Waikato) 3. Reasons to improve your character traits (Robert J. Hartman, Ohio Northern University) PART II: PRACTICAL WISDOM AND MORAL VIRTUES 4. Practical wisdom (Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, University of Genoa) 5. Courage (Adam C. Pelser, United States Air Force Academy) 6. Patience (Anne Jeffrey, Baylor University) 7. Perseverance (Timothy J. Pawl, University of St. Thomas) 8. Hope (Aaron D. Cobb, Wake Forest University) 9. Temperance (Alan T. Wilson, University of Bristol) 10. Honesty (Christian B. Miller, Wake Forest University) 11. Humility (Robert C. Roberts, Baylor University) 12. Mildness (Kevin Timpe, Calvin University) 13. Justice (Mark LeBar, Florida State University) 14. Gratitude (Tony Manela, Siena College) 15. Generosity (Andrew Pinsent, University of Oxford) 16. Loyalty (John Kleinig, John Jay College CUNY) 17. Integrity (Jennifer A. Herdt, Yale University) 18. Love (Eric J. Silverman, Christopher Newport University) 19. Hospitality (Brandon Warmke, University of Florida) PART III: STRATEGIES 20. Habituation and scripts to cultivate honesty (Howard J. Curzer, Texas Tech University) 21. Friendship to cultivate practical wisdom (Kristján Kristjánsson, University of Birmingham) 22. Imitating role models to cultivate courage (Eric Yang, Santa Clara University) 23. Nudging to cultivate generosity (Bart Engelen & Alfred Archer, Tilburg University) 24. Selecting circumstances to cultivate digital temperance (Dylan F. Brown, Duke University & Michael Lamb, Wake Forest University) 25. Internalizing Stoic aphorisms to cultivate mildness (Brittany Polat, Stoicare) 26. Journaling to cultivate gratitude (Philip C. Watkins, Eastern Washington University) 27. Understanding surprising human tendencies to cultivate integrity (Marcella Linn, Loyola University Chicago) 28. Anarchist calisthenics, radical honesty, and creating social norms to cultivate justice (Jason Brennan, Georgetown University) 29. Manners to cultivate civility (David McPherson, University of Florida) 30. Running to cultivate perseverance (Sabrina B. Little, Christopher Newport University) 31. Experiencing nature to cultivate patience (Silvia Caprioglio Panizza, University of Tübingen) 32. Meatless meals to cultivate temperance (Elizabeth Foreman, Missouri State University) 33. Twelve steps in Alcoholics Anonymous to cultivate humility (Michael W. Austin, Eastern Kentucky University) 34. Christian rituals to cultivate hope (Ryan West, Grove City College) 35. Reading literature to cultivate love (Kirsten M. K. Welch, Baylor University) PART IV: QUESTIONS 36. How do we know which character traits are moral virtues? (Rebecca Stangl, University of Virginia) 37. How can you know if you have successfully cultivated virtue? (Jennifer Cole Wright, College of Charleston) 38. Is character education in the university objectionably paternalistic? (Jennifer Rothschild, Wake Forest University) 39. Is virtue signaling consonant with moral virtue? (Neil Levy, University of Oxford/Macquarie University) 40. Is suffering good when it is essential to exercising a moral virtue? (Michael S. Brady, University of Glasgow) 41. Are there serious costs to being morally virtuous? (Denise Vigani, Seton Hall University) 42. What is the relationship between luck, virtue, and flourishing? (Lorraine Besser, Middlebury College) 43. Can bad luck prevent some people from developing moral virtue? (Alexandra T. Romanyshyn, Seattle University) 44. Does character luck rule out free will and moral responsibility? (Robert J. Hartman, Ohio Northern University) 45. Can the choice to radically change your character be rational? (Marcela Herdova, Florida State University) APPENDIX A Christmas Carol (Charles Dickens)

It is conventional wisdom that appreciating the role of luck in our moral lives should make us more sparing with blame. But views of moral responsibility that allow luck to augment a person’s blameworthiness are in tension with this wisdom. I resolve this tension: our common moral luck partially generates a duty to forgo retributively blaming the blameworthy person at least sometimes. So, although luck can amplify the blame that a person deserves, luck also partially generates a duty not to give the blameworthy person the retributive blame that he deserves at least sometimes.