• Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii, Clarendon Press. 2007.
  • Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2 133-148. 2007.
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    Prichard, Falk and the End of Deliberation
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (Supplement): 131-147. 2007.
  •  3
    The Authority of Reason
    Mind 111 (443): 676-679. 2002.
  • The clinics are now available online!
    with Edward G. McFarland, W. Ben Kibler, D. Greg Anderson, Gregory A. Helm, Mark K. Bowen, and Gordon W. Nuber
    Ethics. forthcoming.
  •  41
    Prichard, Falk, and the end of deliberation
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5). 2007.
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    Was Kant a virtue ethicist?
    In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues, De Gruyter. pp. 61-76. 2008.
    You might think a simple “No” would suffice as an answer. But there are features of Kant’s ethics that appear to be strikingly similar to virtue oriented views, so striking that some Kantians themselves have argued that Kant’s ethics in fact shares these features with virtue ethics. In what follows, I will argue against this view, though along the way I will acknowledge the features of Kant’s view that make it appear more like a kind of virtue ethics than it really is. My plan is to first set ou…Read more
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    So Michael Slote argues. There is and can be no obligation to foster one's own wellbeing for Kantians, only an obligation to foster the wellbeing of others. And any distinctively Kantian position both denies that our own wellbeing is the source of our moral duties and denies that a concern for wellbeing can be a morally worthy motive. So not only is the agent's own good not foundational to morality; it is of no moral importance. Hence, Slote concludes, the devaluation of the moral agent.
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    Kantian ethics can at times appear to defend the position that there is a unique sort of value that plays a foundational role in morality. For instance, Kant's most well known work in ethics, the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, begins by trying to establish that a good will is good without qualification' and then ends with a first statement of the fundamental principle that divides right from wrong, the Categorical Imperative.1 This presentation can make it seems as if Kant believes the …Read more
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    Internal reasons: Reply to Brady, Van roojen and Gert
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213). 2003.
    In an earlier paper I identified two desiderata of a theory of practical reasons which favour internalism, and then argued that forms of this doctrine which are currently on offer lose either one or the other in trying to avoid the conditional fallacy. Michael Brady, Mark van Roojen and Josh Gert have separately attempted to respond to my argument. I set out reasons why all fail
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    Virtue and right
    Ethics 113 (4): 810-834. 2003.
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    Review: The authority of reason (review)
    Mind 111 (443): 676-679. 2002.
  • History at the End of the World? History, Climate Change and the Possibility of Closure (edited book)
    with Mark Levene and Richard Maguire
    Humanities-EBooks. 2010.
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    Kant's moral philosophy
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that moral requirements are based on a standard of rationality he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Immorality thus involves a violation of the CI and is thereby irrational. Other philosophers, such as Locke and Hobbes, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either desirebased instrumental principles of rationality or based on sui generis rational intuitions. Kant agreed with many of hi…Read more
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    Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, including the argument that it is impossible to owe anything to yourself, and the view that an obligation to improve onself is overl…Read more