Robert Lisowski

This article focuses on Husserl’s aesthetics as found in his lecture series: “Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898–1925).” Specifically, I shall describe and critique his categorical exclusion of perceptual illusions from the realm of aesthetic experience and suggest a contrary position. In pursuit of this, I shall first briefly discuss Husserl’s overall thinking concerning phantasy and image consciousness, before proceeding to his position on aesthetics proper. With this foundation laid, I shall then consider his rejection of perceptual illusions from his aesthetics and the reasons he provides. In response, I shall illustrate how Husserl’s reasons for rejecting illusions are less than convincing and argue for including perceptual illusions as potentially aesthetic objects based on Husserl’s overall aesthetic position and modal structure.

This essay examines Karl Rahner’s theology of sin, specifically his unique rendering of original sin. Before advancing to this specific consideration of original sin, I shall seek to situate his overall theology of sin within his thinking on human freedom. Following this, Rahner’s Mariology will be described and shown to be more or less compatible with traditional Marian teachings. The crux of this essay will argue that Rahner’s rendering of original sin creates a tension with the Mariology that he and the church espouse. Therefore, revision or addition to either Rahner’s Mariology or theology of original sin appears necessary for greater theological coherence.

This article will examine the religious phenomenology of Max Scheler as it is found in his essay on repentance. In outlining Scheler’s understanding of repentance, I shall note his attempt at defining the phenomenon, as well as the presuppositions to and outcomes of this religious act. With this foundation laid, I shall then offer two critiques. First, Scheler’s rendering of repentance limps in not accounting for the cyclical and repeatable nature of repentance, to which human experience and Scheler’s own broader philosophy attest. Second, Scheler’s essay does not consider the role of other persons both in leading one to repentance and in completing the process. As with the first critique, both human experience and Scheler’s own personalist philosophy testify to the necessary role of other persons. These lacunae detract from the otherwise rich phenomenological account.

This article considers the positions of Gabriel Marcel and Thomas Aquinas on self-knowledge and argues for a synthesis between them. The basis of this Marcelian-Thomistic synthesis is their common understanding of the self as inherently in relation to that which is other and in the necessity of activation for self-knowledge to occur. The divergence between these thinkers occurs in regard to the process of activation. While Aquinas presents an Aristotelian account of activation rooted in his understanding of cognition, Marcel offers a broader vision of activation that gives pride of place to intersubjectivity. A Marcelian-Thomistic synthesis preserves the Aristotelian systematization of Aquinas, while adding Marcel’s expanded understanding of activation and his prioritization of intersubjectivity. Such a synthesis allows for a treatment of self-knowledge that is metaphysically systematic and true to lived experience.