In spite of the inherent oddity of the notion that the human soul might be constrained by its own lawlike will, it is not likely that the arguments I have advanced against that notion will be entirely convincing to committed incompatibilists. I should expect that the point of view will soon be reaffirmed that, in some sense, human beings, because of the lawlike behavior of their wills, cannot be free. It is to this puzzling intractability of the ‘free-will’ debate that I turn in this paper. By m…
Read moreIn spite of the inherent oddity of the notion that the human soul might be constrained by its own lawlike will, it is not likely that the arguments I have advanced against that notion will be entirely convincing to committed incompatibilists. I should expect that the point of view will soon be reaffirmed that, in some sense, human beings, because of the lawlike behavior of their wills, cannot be free. It is to this puzzling intractability of the ‘free-will’ debate that I turn in this paper. By my own arguments (See note \5/ on R. Pendleton) it is logically possible that human beings might be construed as ‘constrained’ by their own wills. All we have to do is define the constrained human self so as to exclude the willing faculty. But does it make any sense to construe the human self in such a way? Can the human will itself be conceived as an ‘alienable’ property capable of constraining, in a meaningful way, the human self?
