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1A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional AttitudesIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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Authoritative self-knowledge and perceptual individualismIn Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought, Tucson. 1988.
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Belief and Belief’s PenumbraIn Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, Palgrave. 2013.
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24Vygotsky's philosophy: Constructivism and its criticisms examinedInternational Education Journal: Comparative Perspective 6 (3). 2005.© 2005 Shannon Research Press.
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190Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third waySynthese 153 (3): 377-391. 2006.The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aim…Read more
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102That ‐clauses: Some bad news for relationalism about the attitudesMind and Language 37 (3): 414-431. 2020.Propositional relationalists about the attitudes claim to find support for their view in what they assume to be the dyadic relational logical form of the predicates by which we canonically attribute propositional attitudes. In this paper I argue that the considerations that they adduce in support of this assumption, specifically for the assumption that the that-clauses that figure in these predicates are singular terms, are suspect on linguistic grounds. Propositional relationalism may nonethele…Read more
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1That-clauses in attitude predicates: Giving syntax its dueTheoretical Linguistics 46 (3-4): 289-245. 2020.Abstract: In this brief commentary, I focus on two issues, first on Moltmann’s proposed Davidsonian event semantics for transitive verb attitude predicates, and second on the import of what she calls ‘the underspecification of content’ for the proper semantic interpretation of that-clauses. With respect to the first of these issues, I question the empirical justification of her proposed semantics, suggesting that she needs a syntactic rationale for her semantics. With respect to the second is…Read more
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6Inquiries and Provocations: Selected Writings, 1929-1974Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 339-344. 1983.
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11Art and Philosophy: Conceptual Issues in AestheticsJournal of Aesthetic Education 16 (4): 109. 1982.
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161Measurement‐Theoretic Accounts of Propositional Attitudes (review)Philosophy Compass 6 (11): 828-841. 2011.In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of philosophers, notably Churchland, Field, Stalnaker, Dennett, and Davidson, began to argue that propositional attitude predicates (such as believes that it’s sunny outside) are a species of measure predicate, analogous in important ways to numerical predicates by which we attribute physical magnitudes (such as mass, length, and temperature). Other philosophers, including myself, have subsequently developed the idea in greater detail. In this paper I s…Read more
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Interpretation and Understanding: An Essay in Philosophical MetacriticismDissertation, Cornell University. 1974.
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4Book Reviews : Belief, Language, and Experience. RODNEY NEEDHAM. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, I972. Pp. xvii+269. $I0.00 (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (1): 91-97. 1974.
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17The Act of Interpretation: A Critique of Literary Reason (review)Philosophy and Literature 4 (1): 141-142. 1980.
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24Arthur F. Smullyan 1912-1998Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5). 1999.
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12Book reviews : Belief, language, and experience. Rodney Needham. Chicago : The university of chicago press, i972. Pp. XVII+269. $I0.00 (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (1): 91-97. 1974.
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109Can connectionists explain systematicity?Mind and Language 12 (2): 154-77. 1997.Classicists and connectionists alike claim to be able to explain systematicity. The proposed classicist explanation, I argue, is little more than a promissory note, one that classicists have no idea how to redeem. Smolensky's (1995) proposed connectionist explanation fares little better: it is not vulnerable to recent classicist objections, but it nonetheless fails, particularly if one requires, as some classicists do, that explanations of systematicity take the form of a‘functional analysis’. N…Read more
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21Troubles with representationalismSocial Research: An International Quarterly 51 (4): 1065-97. 1984.
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36The Elusive Case for Relationalism about the Attitudes: Reply to RattanPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2): 453-462. 2017.The question I address here is whether there is anything about what Rattan describes as the normative and perspectival aspects of propositional attitudes that demands a relational account of the attitudes, specifically anything that cannot equally well be explained on measurement-theoretic accounts of the sort that I (and others) have defended which do not incorporate or presume a cognitive relation to a proposition. I argue that there is not.
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Logical form and the relational conception of beliefIn Gerhard Preyer Georg Peter (ed.), Logical Form and Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 421--43. 2002.
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62Describing and interpreting a work of artJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 36 (1): 5-14. 1977.
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28Epistemic Heresies: Reply to John Collins’ ReduxCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1): 45-55. 2008.Elaborating on views I have expressed elsewhere, I argue that the common-sense notion of linguistic competence as a kind of knowledge is both required by common-sense explanatory and justificatory practice and furthermore fully compatible with the non-intentional characterization of linguistic competence provided by current linguistic theory, which is itself non-intentional.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |