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1A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional AttitudesIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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Authoritative self-knowledge and perceptual individualismIn Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought, Tucson. 1988.
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Belief and Belief’s PenumbraIn Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, Palgrave. 2013.
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193Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third waySynthese 153 (3): 377-391. 2006.The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aim…Read more
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109That ‐clauses: Some bad news for relationalism about the attitudesMind and Language 37 (3): 414-431. 2020.Propositional relationalists about the attitudes claim to find support for their view in what they assume to be the dyadic relational logical form of the predicates by which we canonically attribute propositional attitudes. In this paper I argue that the considerations that they adduce in support of this assumption, specifically for the assumption that the that-clauses that figure in these predicates are singular terms, are suspect on linguistic grounds. Propositional relationalism may nonethele…Read more
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1That-clauses in attitude predicates: Giving syntax its dueTheoretical Linguistics 46 (3-4): 289-245. 2020.Abstract: In this brief commentary, I focus on two issues, first on Moltmann’s proposed Davidsonian event semantics for transitive verb attitude predicates, and second on the import of what she calls ‘the underspecification of content’ for the proper semantic interpretation of that-clauses. With respect to the first of these issues, I question the empirical justification of her proposed semantics, suggesting that she needs a syntactic rationale for her semantics. With respect to the second is…Read more
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7Inquiries and Provocations: Selected Writings, 1929-1974Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 339-344. 1983.
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14Art and Philosophy: Conceptual Issues in AestheticsJournal of Aesthetic Education 16 (4): 109. 1982.
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162Measurement‐Theoretic Accounts of Propositional Attitudes (review)Philosophy Compass 6 (11): 828-841. 2011.In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of philosophers, notably Churchland, Field, Stalnaker, Dennett, and Davidson, began to argue that propositional attitude predicates (such as believes that it’s sunny outside) are a species of measure predicate, analogous in important ways to numerical predicates by which we attribute physical magnitudes (such as mass, length, and temperature). Other philosophers, including myself, have subsequently developed the idea in greater detail. In this paper I s…Read more
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Interpretation and Understanding: An Essay in Philosophical MetacriticismDissertation, Cornell University. 1974.
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7Book Reviews : Belief, Language, and Experience. RODNEY NEEDHAM. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, I972. Pp. xvii+269. $I0.00 (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (1): 91-97. 1974.
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20The Act of Interpretation: A Critique of Literary Reason (review)Philosophy and Literature 4 (1): 141-142. 1980.
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24Arthur F. Smullyan 1912-1998Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5). 1999.
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15Book reviews : Belief, language, and experience. Rodney Needham. Chicago : The university of chicago press, i972. Pp. XVII+269. $I0.00 (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (1): 91-97. 1974.
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36Book Review:Inquiries and Provocations: Selected Writings, 1929-1974 Herbert Feigl (review)Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 339-. 1983.
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82Three-concept Monte: Explanation, implementation, and systematicitySynthese 101 (3): 347-63. 1994.Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) and McLaughlin (1993) challenge connectionists to explain systematicity without simply implementing a classical architecture. In this paper I argue that what makes the challenge difficult for connectionists to meet has less to do with what is to be explained than with what is to count as an explanation. Fodor et al. are prepared to admit as explanatory, accounts of a sort that only classical models can provide. If connectionists are to mee…Read more
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25Does cognitive science need “real” intentionality?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 616-617. 1990.
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16Connectionism and systematicityIn L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
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21The alleged evidence for representationalismIn Stuart Silvers (ed.), Rerepresentation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1989.
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Is there vindication through representationalism?In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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72Could Competent Speakers Really Be Ignorant of Their Language?Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 457-467. 2006.This paper defends the commonsense conception of linguistic competence according to which linguistic competence involves propositional knowledge of language. More specifically, the paper defends three propositions challenged by Devitt in his Ignorance af Language. First, Chomskian linguists were right to embrace this commonsense conception of linguistic cornpetence. Second, the grammars that these linguists propose make a substantive claim about the computational processes that are presumed to c…Read more
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26On the hypothesis that grammars are mentally representedBehavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3): 405-406. 1983.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |