Robert Muehlmann

This collection of fourteen interpretative essays on the philosophy of George Berkeley (1685-1753) focuses specifically on Berkeley’s theory of the nature and variety of existing things. The collection is notable for containing the first four winners of the Turbayne International Berkeley Essay Prize (only the first of which has been previously published). The seven essays in the first part, entitled “Idealism,” attempt to illuminate Berkeley’s notorious thesis that to be is to be perceived, that the _esse_ of sensible things (trees, mountains, rivers, etc.) is _percipi._ Most of the essays in this first part are either direct or indirect responses to an influential interpretation of Berkeley’s idealism advanced thirty years ago by Edwin B. Allaire. The second part, “Volition, Action, and Causation,” contains four essays focusing on Berkeley’s volitionism, on his thesis that only the activities of minds (volitions) are causally efficacious. “Vision and the Perceptual Objects,” the third part of the volume, deals with Berkeley’s theory of vision and his doctrine that all of the objects of perception depend on God’s will for their existence.

In spite of the seeming heterogeneity of topics in its title - Revolutions, Systems, and Theories - this volume purports to be something more than a random collection of Essays in Political Philosophy. The Colloquium of the Philosophy Department of the University of Western Ontario (29-31 Octo­ ber, 1971) at which initial versions of the first eight papers were delivered was entitled 'Political Theory'; and while the organizers anticipated and indeed welcomed topicality in the issues accorded priority arid in the empirical evidence invoked, they were also hoping for a reasonably comprehensive explorat ion of some of the central issues of political philosophy. For this reason it was quickly decided that in such a field a philosophical focus on clarification of ordering concepts required the suppIement - and test - of researches into more particular subject maUers by social scientists. Thus, to speak in general terms (where the specializatlons and their taxonomies multi­ ply fissiparously!), contributors include political scientists, economists and sociologists (Barnard, Baston, Tullock, Rapoport) as well as philosophers (Scriven, Morgenbesser, Braybrooke, TayIor), and juxtaposed as proponents and commentators ·to generate exchanges across disciplinary frontiers. While the five additional invited papers are alI by professional philosophers, they extend the original Colloquium either by continuing controversy on its funda­ mental issues (e. g., Rubinoff, Nielsen, Roy) or by their continued explorations in what are acknowledged to be boundary areas (e. g., Schick, Wartofsky). The greatest topical emphasis is that on revolution.

BOOK REVIEWS $0 5 David Berman. George Ber~ley: Idealism anti the Man. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xi + 230. Cloth, $42.00. Professor Berman's focus on Berkeley is more on "the Man" than on the metaphysics and this engaging study will therefore be of greater value to those with a historical, rather than a philosophical, interest in the good bishop. The book is aptly subtitled, particularly if we understand 'idealism' in its first, or Platonic sense , rather than just in the peculiarly Berkeleyan metaphysical sense. The first three of its eight chapters deal with Berkeley's metaphysics, but the bulk of the book is concerned with extraphilosophical events in Berkeley's life, in particular with the two most significant ones: the abortive Bermuda Project and the messianic, indeed almost mystical, devotion to tar-water as a medical panacea. One of the great virtues of Berman's book is that it ties together the three periods of Berkeley's career--"each marked by an..

This original new work takes a sharply focused look at Berkeley's ontology and provides a fuller understanding of the relationship between, on the one hand, Berkeley's nominalism and antiabstractionism and, on the other, his principal arguments for idealism and his attempts to square his idealism with common sense. Drawing heavily on detailed textual analysis, historical context, and careful examination of the work of other scholars, Muehlmann challenges, modifies, rejects, and exploits some well-established interpretations of Berkeley's philosophy.

My purpose herein is to demonstrate that Berkeley's only use of the argument from perceptual relativity (APR), in both of his major works, is ad hominem, that he uses it to undermine what he calls materialism. Specifically, I show that Berkeley does not use APR to conclude that sensible qualities are mind-dependent; rather he uses APR only to conclude that they are not in material substances; and that his real argument for the former is a quite different one: the heat-pain identification argument

This collection of fourteen interpretative essays on the philosophy of George Berkeley (1685-1753) focuses specifically on Berkeley’s theory of the nature and variety of existing things. The collection is notable for containing the first four winners of the Turbayne International Berkeley Essay Prize (only the first of which has been previously published). The seven essays in the first part, entitled “Idealism,” attempt to illuminate Berkeley’s notorious thesis that to be is to be perceived, that the _esse_ of sensible things (trees, mountains, rivers, etc.) is _percipi._ Most of the essays in this first part are either direct or indirect responses to an influential interpretation of Berkeley’s idealism advanced thirty years ago by Edwin B. Allaire. The second part, “Volition, Action, and Causation,” contains four essays focusing on Berkeley’s volitionism, on his thesis that only the activities of minds (volitions) are causally efficacious. “Vision and the Perceptual Objects,” the third part of the volume, deals with Berkeley’s theory of vision and his doctrine that all of the objects of perception depend on God’s will for their existence.

Berkeley's idealism consists of the following claims. Objects such as chairs, apples, mountains, and our bodies are combinations of sensible qualities. Sensible qualities and combinations of such are ideas or sensations. In the philosophical sense of ‘substance’ there is no such entity as a substance. There are minds which perceive and will: When a mind perceives it has sensations or ideas; and when a mind wills it produces or causes sensations or ideas. These claims are grounded in the ontological and epistemological framework of assumptions, distinctions and arguments informing Berkeley's doctrine thatesse est percipi aut percipere.The purpose of this paper is to explore and expose the main features of that framework.What is the ontological force and import on Berkeley's claim thatesse est percipi?One influential recent suggestion1 is this: Berkeley holds that (1) material substances do not exist, (2) the analysis of sensible things yields nothing but sensible qualities, (3) minds are mental substances and (4) no sensible quality or collection of sensible qualities can exist without inhering in some substance.

This paper consists of a thorough examination of the russell-Wittgenstein controversy over identity. The early wittgenstein's comments on this issue are cryptic and obscure; yet one thing is obvious. His views on identity are partly, If not wholly a negative response to russell's. In unearthing the source of the controversy, I distinguish several senses of 'identity'. I then examine several texts of russell's showing that he fails to make these necessary distinctions. I conclude by demonstrating that wittgenstein's comments are designed in part to rectify this mistake and in part to offer an illuminating analysis of his own

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Davis, Colleague John Whitney Davis (b. February 11, 1921) began his teaching career at Emerson College (Boston) in 1949, received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Boston University in 1957 and was hired by The University of Western Ontario in that same year. Rapidly ascending the academic ladder, John became Head of the Philosophy Department in 1960—a position he occupied for three years—and was promoted to the rank of Professor in 1963. Throughouthis teachingcareer (until his retirement from U.W.O. in 1986) Professor Davis was an especially active member ofthe Department, serving on numerous important committees at both the departmental and university levels, helping to organize colloquia, hosting visiting speakers, and contributing in a variety of other significant ways to the vitality and excellence of the Philosophy Department. Professor Davis taught philosophy both at the undergraduate and graduate levels and in the area of the history of ideas. Robert Butts (his successor as Head) once described him as having "extensive knowledge, enormous industry, and great insight." This no doubt contributed much to his reputation as an exemplary teacher. His teaching range was by no means confined to the history of ideas, however. It was common knowledge in the Philosophy Department that John could teach any course on the philosophical syllabus; andhe was often called upon to teach courses no one else had the expertise or desire to undertake. John's main interest, however, is the British Empiricists and he worked for many years preparing books on both Berkeley and Hume. Although these books have yet to appear, several important articles on both philosophers have issued from this work and have been published in Dialogue, Journal ofthe History of Ideas, Review of Metaphysics, as well as in an anthology, The Methodological Heritage ofNewton (edited jointly with Robert Butts). Yet most historians of philosophy will agree that the crowning achievement of John's career has been his creation and editorship of Hume Studies. In 1974 Davis succeeded in convincing the University to provide ongoing financial assistance for a uniquely and narrowly focused journal. Journals devoted to single historical figures are risky ventures, so this initial success, in itself, was no mean feat. The first volume appeared in April, 1975 and from that very modest beginning Hume Studies has grown, underJohn's guidance, to become a standard, ifnot the standard, ofserious Hume Scholarship. John retired as editor with the April 1990 issue of Hume Studies. His brilliant tenure as founding editor is celebrated in this volume. Robert Muehlmann Vl...