My research is mainly in philosophy of science, and especially the ‘special sciences’ such as economics and biology. I have also written extensively on related themes in metaphysics, especially the notions of causation and causal explanation. These various strands connect when, for instance, analysing the use of statistical techniques to measure causation, or when analysing several other philosophical issues, including scientific progress, harm, innateness, and free will.
My primary interest is in how knowledge is produced in field sciences, i.e. in sciences outside the confines of the laboratory and unable to conduct shielded experiments. W…
My research is mainly in philosophy of science, and especially the ‘special sciences’ such as economics and biology. I have also written extensively on related themes in metaphysics, especially the notions of causation and causal explanation. These various strands connect when, for instance, analysing the use of statistical techniques to measure causation, or when analysing several other philosophical issues, including scientific progress, harm, innateness, and free will.
My primary interest is in how knowledge is produced in field sciences, i.e. in sciences outside the confines of the laboratory and unable to conduct shielded experiments. What is the relation, for instance, between the theoretical development of abstract models, and progress in terms of better predictions and explanations of messy real-world events? Broadly speaking, I argue for more emphasis on local empirical work and less on development of generalised theory.
Most recently, I have been examining the role in field sciences of prediction. When can we rest content with after-the-fact explanation, and when should we insist instead on accurate prediction? What kind of knowledge do we really have if we can't predict well?
