Assuming that natural theology and science share a common methodology, some philosophers urge the positive reassessment of belief in God. Adopting an abductive strategy, these explanatory theologians contend that belief in God is as warranted as belief in the theoretical entities of science. Although initially quite promising, certain possibly fatal flaws mar this approach. In particular, one wonders whether, of itself, the explanatory adequacy of an hypothesis provides warrant for belief in its…
Read moreAssuming that natural theology and science share a common methodology, some philosophers urge the positive reassessment of belief in God. Adopting an abductive strategy, these explanatory theologians contend that belief in God is as warranted as belief in the theoretical entities of science. Although initially quite promising, certain possibly fatal flaws mar this approach. In particular, one wonders whether, of itself, the explanatory adequacy of an hypothesis provides warrant for belief in its truth. If not, then this strategy remains impotent to establish the reality of God. A sound abductive argument for scientific realism, on the other hand, might provide just those resources necessary for establishing theological realism. ;I begin, then, by examining the general problems which arise from abductive inference to the existence of unobservable entities. Next, I argue that Richard Swinburne's The Existence of God so misconstrues the nature of scientific inference that his argument, which depends on his understanding of scientific methodology, fails to warrant belief in God's reality. In the third chapter, then, the focus shifts to those explanatory theologians whose construal of scientific explanation more adequately reflects actual scientific practice. I contend, however, that, insofar as their arguments for realism remain vulnerable to an instrumentalist critique, they also fail to provide sufficient support for a theological realist position. Therefore, the fourth chapter endeavors to explicate exactly which evidential considerations are relevant to belief in scientific realism; for to be of use to the theologian, the argument for scientific realism must not only provide an adequate response to the antirealist's challenge, but also involve the kind of evidence which is available, at least in principle, in the religious domain. Thus, I advance an argument for scientific realism which does not rely on such constraints as predictive success or experimental manipulation. In the final chapter, then, I appropriate those general methodological principles which provide support for the scientific realist's position, and explore the possibilities of utilizing them in an argument for theological realism
