Robert Pál-Wallin

In this doctoral thesis I investigate two key issues at the heart of the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the emotions – their nature and their normativity. I argue against the deeply entrenched view according to which emotions are representational mental states and fitting in virtue of accurately representing their objects. Drawing on recent attitudinal accounts of the emotions, I develop my own view according to which emotions are sui generis affective modes of engagement through which we express our cares, concerns, and various commitments – i.e., elements that constitute our evaluative orientations and practical identities as agents. In light of this conception of the emotions, I go on to argue that the issue of emotional fittingness is essentially an agent-relative matter, the answer to which can only be settled by taking into consideration the full range of the particular agent’s evaluative orientation. The thesis consists of an introductory kappa and four self-contained papers, all of which touch on a variety of different issues pertaining to philosophy of emotion, value theory, normativity, moral psychology, moral responsibility, and phenomenology. The objective of the thesis can thus be seen as not only examining various isolated questions concerning the emotions, but also as making sense of the way in which such questions hang together in the broader scheme of things, things that are part and parcel of the lives we lead. In short, the thesis might be said to be about the ways in which affectivity imbues life with meaning and substance, how it structures our relationships to other people and to ourselves, and the indispensable role it plays in constructing a world in which things matter.

A standard analysis of moral responsibility states that an agent A is morally responsible for φ-ing if and only if it is fitting to have—depending on the nature of φ—a negative or positive reactive emotion vis-à-vis A on account of A's φ-ing. Proponents of Alethic views of moral responsibility maintain that the relevant notion of fittingness in the analysis should be understood in terms of accurate representation. The allure of understanding emotional fittingness as representational accuracy arguably stems from the widespread idea that emotions are representational mental states with a mind-to-world direction of fit. Accordingly, defenders of Alethic views argue that the fittingness of a potential reactive emotion is a matter of whether the representational content of that emotion accurately matches the targeted agent. The aim of this article is to argue against Alethic views of moral responsibility by means of exposing various problems that these accounts face in virtue of their inherent commitment to understand emotional fittingness in terms of representational accuracy.

In the wake of Peter Frederick Strawson’s landmark essay Freedom and Resentment (1962), much of the theorizing about moral responsibility has centered around the reactive attitudes – with a particular emphasis on guilt, resentment, and indignation. Although philosophical interest in previously unexamined reactive attitudes has grown rapidly in recent years, remarkably little has hitherto been said about fear as a candidate reactive attitude. The aim of this chapter is to explore the phenomenon of fearing other human agents qua agents. Drawing on P.F. Strawson’s seminal work on the reactive attitudes, I aim to develop an account of agent-directed fear as a distinct reactive attitude (which I refer to as reactive fear). In order to pave the way for such an account, I shall in the first part of this chapter consider a potential objection to the central claim that people can fear other agents. The objection has its roots in a propositionalist view of mental states according to which fear is a propositional attitude and thus essentially about potential events, or state of affairs (something that is, was, or will be the case). I will provide reasons for why we should reject such a restrictive view of fear, and more specifically, why we need to embrace the idea that fear can be directed towards other human agents. In the second part of the chapter, I contrast my proposed account of reactive fear to some existing views of fear, according to which fear is seen as reactive in a very general sense, as a reaction to any number of objects. On the account I propose, reactive fear is a distinct fearing attitude vis-à-vis human agents qua agents. As I aim to show, this kind of attitude is a particular mode of engagement which reflects an underlying concern of the fearing agent not to have her practical identity harmed by the feared agent. I will conclude by discussing the upshot and importance of recognizing fear as a bona fide reactive attitude.