Robert Pasnau

Our standard view about sound is incoherent. On the one hand, we suppose that sound is a quality, not of the object that makes the sound, but of the surrounding medium. This is the supposition of our ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. On the other hand, we suppose that sound is the object of hearing. This too is the assumption of ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. Yet these two assumptions cannot both be right – not unless we wish to concede that hearing is illusory and that we do not listen to the objects that make sounds. To avoid these consequences we must recognize and repair the inconsistencies contained in our standard view of what sound is. I offer an account that describes sound as a quality belonging, not to the medium, but to the object that makes the sound.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy annually collects the best current work in the field of medieval philosophy. The various volumes print original essays, reviews, critical discussions, and editions of texts. The aim is to contribute to an understanding of the full range of themes and problems in all aspects of the field, from late antiquity into the Renaissance, and extending over the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian traditions. Volume 8 ranges widely over this terrain, including Caleb Cohoe on Augustine on happiness; Susan Brower-Toland on Augustine on perception; Mary Sirridge on Seneca’s influence on Anselm; Taneli Kukkonen on al-Ghazālī’s meditations in comparison with later traditions; David Cory on how Aquinas’s soul moves the body; Michael Szlachta on Thomas of Sutton’s theory of will; Nathaniel Bulthuis on Walter Burley and opaque signification; and Jenny Pelletier on Ockham’s theory of ownership.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy annually collects the best current work in the field of medieval philosophy. The various volumes print original essays, reviews, critical discussions, and editions of texts. The aim is to contribute to an understanding of the full range of themes and problems in all aspects of the field, from late antiquity into the Renaissance, and extending over the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian traditions. Volume 6 includes work on a wide range of topics, including Davlat Dadikhuda on Avicenna, Christopher Martin on Abelard’s ontology, Jeremy Skrzypek and Gloria Frost on Aquinas’s ontology, Jean‐Luc Solère on instrumental causality, Peter John Hartman on Durand of St.‐Pourçain, and Kamil Majcherek on Chatton’s rejection of final causality. The volume also includes an extended review of Thomas Williams of a new book on Aquinas’s ethics by Colleen McCluskey.

This new and updated edition of Christopher Shields and Robert Pasnau's The Philosophy of Aquinas introduces the Aquinas' overarching explanatory framework in order to provide the necessary background to his philosophical investigations across a wide range of areas: rational theology, metaphysics, philosophy of human nature, philosophy of mind, and ethical and political theory. Although not intended to provide a comprehensive evaluation of all aspects of Aquinas' far-reaching writings, the volume presents a systematic introduction to the principal areas of his philosophy and attends no less to Aquinas' methods and argumentative strategies than to his ultimate conclusions. The authors have updated the second edition in light of recent scholarship on Aquinas, while streamlining and refining their presentation of the key elements of Aquinas' philosophy.

The distinction between two kinds of qualities, primary and secondary, is one of the core doctrines of Scholastic natural philosophy. Far from being an invention of the modern era, it is something to which any student of Aristotelian philosophy—which is to say anyone who studied philosophy in a European university up until the eighteenth century—would have been introduced at a tender age. The distinction is, moreover, every bit as important for Scholastic philosophers as it would become in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, since the primary qualities, on the Aristotelian tradition, are the fundamental causal agents of the natural world.

The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy comprises over fifty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of this period. Starting in the late eighth century, with the renewal of learning some centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, a sequence of chapters takes the reader through developments in many and varied fields, including logic and language, natural philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, and theology. Close attention is paid to the context of medieval philosophy, with discussions of the rise of the universities and developments in the cultural and linguistic spheres. A striking feature is the continuous coverage of Islamic, Jewish, and Christian material. There are useful biographies of the philosophers, and a comprehensive bibliography. The volumes illuminate a rich and remarkable period in the history of philosophy and will be the authoritative source on medieval philosophy for the next generation of scholars and students alike.

For most of the recorded history of philosophy, it has been assumed that an adequate account of language and thought would require postulating abstracta of one sort or another. In this chapter, wielding the bright light of Lewisian metaphysics, the author draws into the open some less well‐known moments from the history of philosophy. Puzzlement over persistence goes back to the beginnings of philosophy, and gave rise to protracted debates between those who were skeptical about whether anything persists through change. It would be natural to suppose that, up until the time of Hume, philosophers generally and uncritically accepted the notion of causality in something like our modern sense. Though historical generalizations are always hazardous, it seems safe to say that no one before David Lewis attempted to account for modality in terms of real, concrete possible worlds.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy annually collects the best current work in the field of medieval philosophy. The various volumes print original essays, reviews, critical discussions, and editions of texts. The aim is to contribute to an understanding of the full range of themes and problems in all aspects of the field, from late antiquity into the Renaissance, and extending over the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian traditions. Volume 10 ranges widely over this terrain, including Christina Van Dyke on humility among women authors, Daniel Davies and Alexander Lamprakis on al-Fārābī in Hebrew translation, Reginald Chua on Aquinas and the Trinity, Can Löwe on the soul’s relation to its powers, John Morrison on the indiscernibility of identicals, and Boaz Schuman on Buridan’s logic. In addition, the volume features critical reviews of recent books by David Piché and Tobias Hoffmann, authored by Nicholas Faucher and Sonja Schierbaum.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy annually collects the best current work in the field of medieval philosophy. The various volumes print original essays, reviews, critical discussions, and editions of texts. The aim is to contribute to an understanding of the full range of themes and problems in all aspects of the field, from late antiquity into the Renaissance, and extending over the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian traditions. Volume 9 ranges widely over this terrain, including Mark Kalderon on Augustine's theory of perception, Alexander Lamprakis on belief in miracles among Baghdad Christian philosophers, Andreas Lammer on Avicenna on time, Ana María Mora-Márquez on logical methodology, Franziska van Buren on Bonaventure's theory of universals, Eric Hagedorn on Ockham's divine-command theory, and Dominik Perler on exemplar causes in Suárez.

It is seven hundred years since Peter of John Olivi's death, and all of modernity has forgotten his legacy. All? Well, not entirely. One small village of indomitable Gauls still holds out against the forces of oblivion. While the empire of English-language scholarship has largely let Olivi's creative and influential work go unedited, untranslated, and unstudied, this hearty band of French scholars has persisted in exploring the fundamentals of his thought.This latest contribution focuses on some of the most innovative and foundational features of Olivi's natural philosophy, revolving around the causal relationships that substances hold to one another. This is not, however, exactly a book on Olivi's theory of...

Recent philosophy has paid considerable attention to the way our biases are liable to encroach upon our cognitive lives, diminishing our capacity to know and unjustly denigrating the knowledge of others. The extent of the bias, and the range of domains to which it applies, has struck some as so great as to license talk of a new form of skepticism. I argue that these depressing consequences are real and, in some ways, even more intractable than has previously been recognized. For the difficulties we face in this domain are fueled not only by implicit biases but by various other sorts of entrenched cognitive attitudes we bear toward others, whether or not we judge them to be our peers. Inasmuch as the epistemic standing of this broader set of attitudes is itself quite dubious, the problem of epistemic injustice turns out to be just one special case—albeit of a particularly nasty kind—from a broader domain of cases where the collaborative character of knowledge clashes with tendencies that make collaboration difficult. This makes the threat of skepticism all the greater, and at the same time makes it harder to see what path of escape there might be.