Robert Seltzer

This paper is an attempt to offer a Wittgensteinian critique of Platonic universals, abstract objects which Plato took to be (1) the essential elements of particulars, and (2) the meanings of general words. I will first offer an interpretation of Plato from the dmlogucs Republic, Phaedo, and Theaetetus, and then identify specific assumptions contained within this metaphysical doctrine which concern, first, the concepts of meaning and understanding; and, second, the claim of essentialism for particulars. I will then discuss criticisms of this view from a Wittgensteinian perspective. The concepts of "surface grammar" and "depth grammar" in the Investigations will be discussed, and I will then apply these concepts to the Theory of Forms to offer a second critique from this perspective.

This paper is an attempt to offer a Wittgensteinian critique of Platonic universals, abstract objects which Plato took to be the essential elements of particulars, and the meanings of general words. I will first offer an interpretation of Plato from the dmlogucs Republic, Phaedo, and Theaetetus, and then identify specific assumptions contained within this metaphysical doctrine which concern, first, the concepts of meaning and understanding; and, second, the claim of essentialism for particulars. I will then discuss criticisms of this view from a Wittgensteinian perspective. The concepts of "surface grammar" and "depth grammar" in the Investigations will be discussed, and I will then apply these concepts to the Theory of Forms to offer a second critique from this perspective

In the spirit of David Kaplan’s “Afterthoughts,” Kent Bach has defended a version of an intention-based semantic theory for demonstratives. I argue that his version is not sufficient. I then make some further observations on the general motivations for intention-based semantic theories and argue that such motivations do not make intention-based semantic theories plausible. The intentions of speakers should be viewed as part of the metasemantics of the context, rather than part of the semantics for demonstratives. Rather, demonstratives should be treated like proper names for the correct placement of the intentions of speakers

Of the two ways Kaplan views demonstratives in "Afterthoughts"---an indexical model or a generic-name model---I argue, contra Kaplan, that a generic-name model is more plausible. The semantics of demonstrative reference, like proper names, contains only the demonstratum, and anything prior to that belongs to the realm of metasemantics. ;The shift of Kaplan's position from Demonstratives to "Afterthoughts" resulted in demonstrative reference being intention-based---i.e., to get to the content of a demonstrative proposition, you see what the speaker "had in mind" when she demonstrated as she did. But how are we to obtain this relevant characterization of the speaker's mental content? This basic question plagues intention-theories of demonstrative reference. ;To offer some positive suggestions, I explore the notion of what a speaker "has in mind" when she demonstrates an object, and suggest that it can have two main characterizations---i.e., de dicto or de re . But, even with these characterizations, the problem of how to characterize a speaker's mental state still remains---and intention-based theories of demonstrative reference either pass this problem over, or answer it in such a way as to emasculate the mental contents of speakers. ;Also, there are familiar externalist constraints on mental content, suggesting that the taxonomy of mental states can change while holding fixed all of an agent's non-intentional physical history. Changes in linguistic usage can result in changes in mental contents, due to the relational aspects our mental states have to both physical and social kinds in our environment and linguistic community. Such considerations are connected to demonstratives, and suggest the more plausible claim to put directing intentions in the realm of metasemantics, as would be done for proper names