Robert Stecker

This chapter takes up the question of whether literature can have cognitive value. It responds to skepticism with regard to the cognitive value of literature voiced recently by Gregory Currie. Currie gives a number of skeptical arguments, chief among which is the argument that assumptions about character in literature are based on folk intuitions and so are inconsistent with current social psychology research. This chapter responds to this and Currie’s other arguments. It calls Currie’s view “deflationist” and defines it in opposition to the “inflationist” view associated with Berys Gaut. The chapter defends the position of “moderate cognitivism”: while the inflationist holds that literature can provide knowledge, this chapter maintains that literature has cognitive value and can offer important insights but not necessarily anything that could be deemed “knowledge.”

Provides a wide-ranging introduction to aesthetic theory and philosophy of art for readers, particularly university students who seek an overview of major controversies, theories, and writers. The 44 readings are chosen for their capacity to provide a representative set of competing perspectives within the contemporary debate and are edited to be accessible to undergraduates. With 40 readings by contemporary authors and 4 classic texts that provide a solid foundation, Aesthetics: A Reader is both accessible and current

In this paper we defend a direct reference theory of names. We maintain that the meaning of a name is its bearer. In the case of vacuous names, there is no bearer and they have no meaning. We develop a unified theory of names such that one theory applies to names whether they occur within or outside fiction. Hence, we apply our theory to sentences containing names within fiction, sentences about fiction or sentences making comparisons across fictions. We then defend our theory against objections and compare our view to the views of Currie, Walton, and others.

Praised in its original edition for its up-to-date, rigorous presentation of current debates and for the clarity of its presentation, Robert Stecker's new edition of Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art preserves the major themes and conclusions of the original, while expanding its content, providing new features, and enhancing accessibility. Described as a "remarkably unified introduction to many contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art," Stecker specializes in sympathetically laying bear the play of argument that emerges as competing views on a topic engage each other.

Can a moral defect be an artistic virtue? Can it make a positive contribution to artistic value? Further, if this can happen on occasion, does this imply that moral value has no systematic connection to artistic value since every conceivable relation between them is possible? The idea that moral defects can sometimes be artistic virtues has received a fair number of defenders recently and so has the anti-theoretical view that there is no systematic relation between artistic and moral value. But I think immoralism—as the first of these views is called—is mistaken and I will try to show that no good reason has been offered to believe it. If immoralism is wrong, the anti-theoretical view at best devolves into moderate moralism—the idea that moral defects sometimes, but not always, are responsible for artistic defects. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?