One of Mary Shepherd’s primary philosophical aims is responding to the inductive skepticism of David Hume. However, her inductive theory has so far received only limited scholarly attention. Even less attention has thus far been paid to how her solution applies to the ordinary cases of induction that are central to both Hume’s presentation of his riddle and to Shepherd’s purported solution to it. We argue that Shepherd draws upon a distinction between real and nominal essences to justify the ind…
Read moreOne of Mary Shepherd’s primary philosophical aims is responding to the inductive skepticism of David Hume. However, her inductive theory has so far received only limited scholarly attention. Even less attention has thus far been paid to how her solution applies to the ordinary cases of induction that are central to both Hume’s presentation of his riddle and to Shepherd’s purported solution to it. We argue that Shepherd draws upon a distinction between real and nominal essences to justify the inductions of the folk in everyday contexts, at least by her own lights. Along the way, we sketch how attending to Shepherd’s work enriches traditional narratives surrounding the reception of Hume and the traditional problem of induction.
