Roberta Ann Springer Loewy

This paper argues for the necessity of universal health care (as well as universal free education) using a different argument than most that have been made heretofore. It is not meant to conflict with but to strengthen the arguments previously made by others. Using the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution we argue that universal health care in this day and age has become a necessary condition if the ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are to be more than an empty promise and if the discussion of “promoting of general welfare” in the preamble is to have any meaning

This paper sets out to examine the integrity and professional standing of “Bioethics.” It argues that professions have certain responsibilities that start with setting criteria for and credentialing those that have met the criteria and goes on to ultimately have social responsibilities to the community. As it now stands we claim that Bioethics—while it certainly has achieved some progress in the way medicine has developed—has failed to become a profession and has to a large extent failed in its social responsibility. We feel that Bioethics has to define itself, set criteria for membership in the profession, police itself and—above all—meet its social responsibility to become a profession meriting that name

Bioethics and its offspring Health-care Ethics have a variety ofuses and obligations among which and perhaps most importantly istheir social obligation. This paper raises questions as toBioethics fulfilling the necessary criteria for a profession,suggests that it can serve as a link between individual andcommunal problems, discusses the task of health-care ethics as well as ways of teaching it, lists some of the obligationsof health-care ethics professionals and discusses the dangers to and failings of these health-care professionals today. Itconcludes that we are at a crossroads in which we must choosebetween our own personal security and comfort and fulfilling our social role

This text examines the dominant ways of looking at patient/clinician relationships in healthcare. By challenging these dominant views the author can explore presuppositions that are defective. She further explains how they come to be so readily and uncritically held and reinforced; and, why their implications can have such a profound affect on how we think and act. Using the methodology of philosopher, John Dewey, the author proposes an alternative bio/psycho/social approach to understanding the patient/clinician relationship and for resolving increasingly common bioethical issues that arise in healthcare settings.

In this paper I make a radical claim regarding selective non-disclosure of treatment options that have some hope of prolonging a patient's life. I suggest that selective non-disclosure under such circumstances is tantamount to what might be called “euthanasia by deception.” I offer a case to test the validity of my claim and to demonstrate how the failure to offer or, at least, to discuss renal dialysis in this case (and, by inference, any other form of treatment which has some hope of prolonging a patient's life) qualifies as paternalism in its most egregious form. I discuss the actions of the health care team and try to find some plausible reasons why they acted as they did. I conclude that there must be greater emphasis placed on teaching clinicians how better to incorporate frank, open and on-going discussion about the central elements of the therapeutic relationship with patients long before they lose decisional capacity.

In this paper some very fundamental attitudes we have and assumptions we make in the US about persons, what they owe and what they are owed, are scrutinized and found to be indefensibly ageist. It is argued that these assumptions and the attitudes they engender are supported by logically and ethically suspect methods and conclusions. These errors are summarized and some remedial steps by which we might better protect against such illicit and unwarranted methods and conclusions in the future are suggested

This paper sets out to examine the integrity and professional standing of “Bioethics.” It argues that professions have certain responsibilities that start with setting criteria for and credentialing those that have met the criteria and goes on to ultimately have social responsibilities to the community. As it now stands we claim that Bioethics—while it certainly has achieved some progress in the way medicine has developed—has failed to become a profession and has to a large extent failed in its social responsibility. We feel that Bioethics has to define itself, set criteria for membership in the profession, police itself and—above all—meet its social responsibility to become a profession meriting that name.

This entry addresses the phenomenon known as a “strike.” It provides a brief introduction to the history and development of strikes in general. Then, it describes the conceptual underpinnings and the sociological and ethical aspects of four different types of strikes: (1) general or “mass” strikes; (2) “capital” strikes; (3)“essential” strikes, which includes a section devoted to physician strikes; and (4) “hunger” strikes. This entry stresses the importance of understanding strikes and their related phenomena as specific incidences, each having its own unique biopsychosocial context, without which the process of ethical analysis cannot proceed. It discusses some of the ethical aspects of strikes in general, and identifies those contextual features that are pertinent to assessing the ethical dimension in each type of strike. It concludes that: [a] ethical analyses of strikes must be contextually thorough, [b] the ethical justification of particular strike actions will continue to undergo questioning and debate and [c] while the right to strike is conditional because it must compete with various other conflicting rights, it is also necessary, for without it the ability to negotiate the boundaries of power relationships along the continuum between freedom and justice would be lost.

Today's ever-widening expert/novice gap–in technology generally but in healthcare technology especially–has been implicated as both cause and consequence of a sharp rise in fundamental misunderstandings between medical professionals and lay populace. Recently created social roles and institutions have further prompted critics to suggest that a multiplication of “disinterested” experts not only fails to resolve such misunderstandings, it compounds them. As a result, it should come as no surprise that the problem of paternalistic expertise has emerged as an ethical issue of immense interest from both a theoretical and practical standpoint. For this reason, a critical inquiry in healthcare today centers on finding a practical model that most adequately and accurately characterizes patient–physician relationships.