Roberto Di Ceglie

In an essay titled Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge, Eleonore Stump rejects the idea that Aquinas's epistemology is foundationalist. I agree with Stump, and share in her conviction that the Angelic doctor developed instead what can be seen as a kind of theological reliabilism. In this article, I intend to take her position a step further. First, I would like to show that Thomistic reliabilism falls into a vicious circle if seen as based on a merely rational theism. Second, I am going to argue that for Aquinas such reliabilism depends instead on Christian faith, construed as the act of believing the revealed truth by virtue of the love relationship that God allows human beings to have with him.

Epistemologists have been discussing the Gettier problem (GP) for 60 years. Numerous proposals have been suggested to solve it. In this article, I argue that the problem can be dismissed if we consider it in light of Thomas Aquinas’s view of truth. According to Aquinas, there are two types of truth: ‘ontological’ and ‘logical’. Unlike the latter, only God can possess the former. My argument is that the GP arises due to the implicit use of the former type of truth; the latter type, typically possessed by humans, would prevent the GP from arising.

Having hope is important for motivation and human agency, especially when it is certain. People with unwavering hope are more likely to succeed in their endeavours than those without. However, in modern debates, hope is usually seen as characterised by vain optimism. Thomas Aquinas, in contrast, argues that the virtue of hope is characterised by certainty — a view that could contribute significantly to these debates. Nevertheless, there seem to be problems with Aquinas' view. He argues that hope can only be said to be certain by participating in the certainty proper to faith. But this reference to the certainty of faith and the cognitive faculties seems to imply that faith is endowed with conclusive evidence, since it is this evidence that enables the cognitive faculties to attain certainty. And throughout his writings, Aquinas denies that faith enjoys conclusive evidence. In this article I will show that one can resolve this difficulty by understanding that for Thomas faith is indeed an intellectual act, but its certainty is different from the certainty of reason. This will enable us to gain an understanding of Aquinas' view of the certainty of hope, as well as other aspects of his reflections on hope and faith.

As we know, transhumanism can be seen as an attempt to overcome the limits of the human being, from the biological to the cognitive and moral. Even the limit of life - its finiteness in time - should be overcome with the achievement of immortality by means of technology. This would not only change human nature, but would also have a decisive impact on religion, at least the Christian religion. Given the importance to Christians of the promise of eternal life and communion with God, would their religion not be in danger of becoming superfluous if we could achieve physical immortality and moral perfection by technological means? In this article, I intend to show that the Christian religion will not become superfluous, because even if the promise of physical immortality could in some sense be achieved by technological means, there are at least two obstacles to the technological attainment of moral perfection, obstacles that do not affect the attainment that Christianity promises.

In his book The Problem of Evil for Atheists, Yujin Nagasawa argues that the problem of evil is not a challenge for theists alone. He also argues that theism, which usually implies supernaturalism, responds to the problem more successfully than atheism and non-theism, which usually imply naturalism. All of this is advanced from the perspective of a project of global philosophy of religion, that is, an attempt to bring Western philosophy of religion into interaction with other philosophical traditions. In my contribution to this book symposium, I intend to deepen some aspects of Nagasawa’s reflections. First, I identify relevant convergences in the West with Eastern traditions regarding the importance of a practical and existential, rather than merely theoretical, response to the problem of evil. Second, I use these convergences to support, in a way different from his own, the author’s thesis that supernaturalism has an advantage over naturalism in responding to the problem.

Di solito, chi soffre non risulta interessato alle concatenazioni di argomenti offerte dalla teodicea. In questo saggio, intendo mostrare che tali argomenti dovrebbero fondarsi nella devozione di chi ama Dio, confida in lui e dà assenso convinto alla sua rivelazione. In tal modo si promuoverebbe l’apologetica positiva, tesa a mostrare la coerenza interna della rivelazione divina, che raccomanda una risposta pratica consistente nell’alleviare la sofferenza e nel promuovere la fioritura della persona. E si promuoverebbe anche un'apologetica negativa, il cui fine è di promuovere una risposta teorica. Questa dovrebbe mostrare l'insostenibilità delle obiezioni alla visione cristiana del male e della sofferenza, compresa l'obiezione apparentemente imbattibile secondo cui un mondo privo di sofferenza innocente è senz’altro preferibile, perlomeno in termini di giustizia, a quello nel quale viviamo.

I argue that there are three limits to the transhumanist project of moral enhancement. They are “technological ignorance,” “technological passivity” and “technological easiness.” I argue that they make it unlikely that the enhancement in question will be achieved. I also argue that there are no similar limits in the context of theistic Christian ethics, although it may seem otherwise at first sight. Following Aquinas, I show that there is no “theological ignorance,” “theological passivity” or “theological easiness” that may hinder moral progress via the Christian faith. In conclusion, Christian theistic ethics is more beneficial to us than transhumanist views of moral enhancement.

For Aquinas, the preambles of faith, including the existence of God, play a crucial role in his view of faith because they are presupposed by the articles. However, the existing literature does not make it clear how exactly the preambles can be held. In particular, the existence of God seems to cause problems. Should it be held by demonstration or by faith? I think there are problems with both. A possible solution was suggested three decades ago. In this article I argue that this solution follows from a view of faith, fully attributable to Aquinas, which includes three dimensions, the intellectual, the moral and the religious. Instead, to say that in order to believe in God one must first prove or believe by faith that God exists is based on a limited perspective that reduces faith to the purely intellectual dimension.

Theodicy is often rejected because a suffering person is hardly interested in abstract arguments—even if these arguments were convincing, they might not change the suffering she is experiencing. I propose a twofold theodicy. First, Christians are invited to promote positive apologetics—they should show the internal consistency of divine revelation, which recommends that they should alleviate suffering and promote flourishing. Second, Christians should develop negative apologetics and show the untenability of objections to the Christian view of evil and suffering, including the seemingly uncontroversial objection that a world without innocent suffering would be better in terms of justice than the one we live in. My argument is that in both positive and negative apologetics believers should be guided by devotion and commitment to God. The more they love and trust God, and consequently believe what God has revealed, the more they are expected to encourage both flourishing and rational confrontation.

The Italian semiotician and novelist Umberto Eco (1932–2016) offered an insightful interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ thought on beauty. Eco’s book, translated into English in 1988, is considered an authoritative source of reflection on the subject and has been widely cited by those who have focused on Aquinas’ aesthetics in recent decades. In this article, I first assess the depth and richness of Eco’s interpretation, including his critique of Aquinas’ view. I then reject this critique by arguing that Aquinas’ reflection on beauty is grounded in his theological interests, the connections between which and his aesthetic views are overlooked by Eco.

Scholars of Aquinas have usually focused on the intellectual aspect of the Christian faith, i.e., on the view that faith is a propositional belief. In this view, faith can be subjected to ra - tional scrutiny, and at least in principle rejected, if this is required by contrary evidence. In this article, I intend to show that for Aquinas, faith is not only a propositional belief. Consequently, it cannot be limited to the intellectual dimension. A moral and a religious one should be included, since faith is also a matter of good choice and relationship with God. Because of this relationship – which is the religious dimension of faith – faith is caused by charity, which makes the faithful firmly believe the fundamental tenets of divine revelation, however convincing contrary evidence may appear to be. Furthermore, when it comes to the relationship between faith and rational arguments, such a firm faith leads the believer to promote intellectual virtues, among which, open-mindedness stands out. The believer is led to follow reason wherever it leads, which means that he is put in the optimum condition to conduct research and debates.

Nell’ambito degli studi su fede e ragione nel pensiero di Tommaso d’Aquino, si è solitamente scelto di mostrare l’armonia dell’una e dell’altra attraverso ciò che le accomuna, ossia il fatto che la fede abbia un carattere intellettuale in quanto essa è assenso dell’intelletto alla rivelazione. Limitare la fede a questo, tuttavia, la espone al giudizio della ragione e quindi alla possibilità di essere rifiutata, se ciò è richiesto dal criterio dell’evidenza. In questa sede, dopo aver ricordato che per Tommaso la fede è sì assenso intellettuale alla rivelazione ma in quanto dovuto principalmente alla carità, mostro come questo porti il credente a credere fermamente, anche nel caso l’evidenza sembrasse smentire l’atto di fede. E mostro che in tal modo il credente sembra messo nella migliore condizione possibile per promuovere l’attività intellettuale.

Secondo i sostenitori della prospettiva transumanista, la tecnologia contemporanea può condurci a ridefinire la natura umana attraverso il superamento dei suoi limiti. Tra i limiti in questione, si ricordano di frequente quelli biologici e quelli cognitivi. Risulta infatti di generalizzato interesse la possibilità di prevenire ed evitare l’insorgenza di malattie più o meno curabili come pure quella di aumentare le prestazioni intellettuali, compresa la generazione di strumenti di cosiddetta intelligenza artificiale. Forse interessa meno la possibilità di superare limiti di natura morale, per esempio intervenendo sul codice genetico o impiantando appositi neurotrasmettitori per farci desiderare le cose migliori e quindi migliorare il nostro agire morale. Che sia vero o no che il progresso morale indotto dalla tecnologia (moral enhancement) risulti di minore interesse per il grande pubblico, la possibilità di migliorare l’agire morale è comunque un tema di enorme importanza. Questo per tre ragioni. La prima, praticamente ovvia, è che, considerata la storia di dolore arrecata all’umanità da una tensione al male che sembra ineliminabile, renderci migliori sotto un profilo morale sarebbe di straordinario valore. La seconda ragione consiste nel fatto che ogni altro tipo di miglioramento, da quello biologico a quello psicologico e cognitivo, risulterebbe ancora maggiore una volta che ci si fosse assicurati quello morale. È infatti difficilmente negabile che anche una condizione ottimale sotto il profilo fisico e psicologico e un invidiabile livello cognitivo non avrebbero risvolti positivi se conseguiti in assenza di un’adeguata formazione morale. La terza ragione è che, mentre il miglioramento cognitivo e soprattutto quello biologico sembrano costituire un obiettivo effettivamente realizzabile, per cui la discussione a proposito è unicamente tesa a considerarne il valore e le potenzialità come pure gli effetti collaterali, del progresso morale si possono offrire invece ragioni atte a sostenere la tesi che esso, per via tecnologica, sia altamente improbabile. In questo articolo sosterrò questa tesi. Nella prima parte, al modo di una premessa, mi soffermerò sul significato che la riflessione transumanista solitamente attribuisce al legame tra progresso morale e progresso tecnologico. Procederò poi, nella seconda e terza parte, a evidenziare l’esistenza di tre limiti sostanziali alla possibilità che il progresso tecnologico generi progresso morale. Li chiamerò “ignoranza tecnologica”, “passività tecnologica” e “facilità tecnologica”. Infine, mostrerò che essi possono aggravarsi data la visione del futuro della tecnologia come ignoto, visione che è tipica della riflessione transumanista.

Divine providence plays a significant role in John Schellenberg’s formulation of the divine hiddenness argument. Although Schellenberg does not openly mention the providence of God, his refutation of this attribute supports his denial of God’s existence, a denial which is the aim of Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument. In this article, I show that Schellenberg’s implicit refutation of providence presupposes two assumptions, the more comprehensive of which consists in saying that there is no good end of history and no commitment to the good is required on the part of the prospective believer. I argue that the assumptions at stake are inconsistent with Schellenberg’s view of God as the omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly loving creator of all things, a view which Schellenberg uses as a starting point for his hiddenness argument.

Quale atteggiamento deve assumere il cristiano in filosofia? Se la condizione di cristiano è tale da influire sulle modalità della riflessione filosofica, che cosa ne consegue per il rapporto tra la fede e la ricerca della verità? I due autori, entrambi cristiani, hanno approcci diversi al riguardo, sotto il profilo dell’ispirazione intellettuale, degli approfondimenti tematici e dello stile espositivo, ma è comune a entrambi il desiderio di riflettere sull’amore e l’obbedienza come fonti della filosofia del credente. Questo piccolo libro realizza un’eco italiana del dibattito intorno a «una filosofia conforme a Cristo», molto vivo soprattutto nei paesi anglosassoni, qui articolato con un costante riferimento al pensiero di san Tommaso d’Aquino, così centrale nella tradizione religiosa e culturale del nostro Paese.

In this article, I focus on what emerges from Thomas Aquinas’s religious epistemology once taken into consideration in the light of the contemporary debates on Christian philosophy. I argue that Aquinas profitably explores what is specific to Christian faith – its being under the command of the will moved by God’s grace. According to Aquinas, it seems that it is precisely that which is specific to faith and distinguishes it from human reason that puts believers in an ideal condition to develop intellectual activities.

Can epistemology be shaped by the Christian faith? Is there anything specific to this faith that can give rise to an equally specific epistemology without compromising the autonomy that the latter requires from faith? In the footsteps of Aquinas's religious epistemology, I first focus on the fact that Christian faith seems to characterize intellectual activity in a way that appears to be irreconcilable with epistemological perspectives that are not shaped by faith. Second, I argue that it is possible to do justice to the irreconcilability in question by making reference to what radically distinguishes the Christian faith from the epistemological reflection. Finally, I focus on two ways in which the specific nature of Christian faith can shape and promote rationality, and give rise to a Christian epistemology.

Sacrifice as a practice aimed at honoring deities by offering them something as a sign of propitiation or worship is usually studied from the viewpoint of numerous disciplines and religious cultures, from which equally numerous interpretations follow. However, the view of sacrifice as able to shape life in its entirety, which means that every act taken by believers may be seen in sacrificial terms, does not seem to be sufficiently considered. This is a view that I believe emerges from various reflections on sacrifice, especially the ones offered by thinkers of the past such as Augustine and Aquinas. In this essay, I first focus on these reflections and more specifically on Augustine’s and Aquinas’s view that religious believers should order everything to God. I then argue—in the footsteps of Aquinas—that this view applies to important acts taken by believers. These acts are prayer, faith, and intellectual activity.

È possibile che, perlomeno in alcuni casi, la parzialità in epistemologia vada promossa? Per ‘parzialità epistemica’ intendiamo la volontà di non venire meno alle proprie tesi anche laddove sembrasse che esse siano contraddette dall’evidenza. Tale parzialità ovviamente contraddice quanto è invece solitamente dato per scontato, ossia la disposizione – che chiamiamo ‘imparzialità epistemica’ – ad accettare qualsivoglia tesi, non importa se irriconciliabile con le proprie opinioni, purché essa sia adeguatamente supportata dall’evidenza. Qui si intende argomentare che, sulla scia di Tommaso d’Aquino, e perlomeno in alcuni casi riguardanti la vita di fede e la religione, la parzialità epistemica andrebbe promossa. Si intende mostrare che da ciò deriverebbe una posizione più ampia di quella che invece emerge dall’assunzione dell’imparzialità epistemica; inoltre, alcuni problemi, che quest’ultima comporta, verrebbero risolti.

In this essay, I focus on the theological origins of the argument for the existence of God that Anselm develops in chapters 2-4 of the Proslogion. By ‘theological origins’ I mean that the unum argumentum was put forward in support of the truth (or at least of the internal consistency) of the Christian faith, whether the argument was intended to convince unbelievers or not. My aim is to demonstrate that, contrary to what is often believed, it is precisely the theological origins here under consideration that created the circumstances out of which Anselm developed a rigorous and original philosophical inquiry.